SMR, which has recently been in the spotlight, has several advantages. However, it poses additional challenges in the areas of new design, digitalization, security, safety and safeguards. Among them, security refers to measures to protect nuclear materials and facilities from unauthorized access, theft, or destruction. Safeguards refer to measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The relationship between security and safeguards is complex and constantly evolving. In general, security measures are designed to protect nuclear materials and facilities from physical attack, while safeguards are designed to track and monitor the movement of nuclear materials and prevent them from being used to create nuclear weapons. In some areas security and safeguards work in complementary ways, and in other areas they conflict. But ultimately, finding a balance is what is effective and efficient. In conclusion, although the security and safeguards of SMRs have different key objectives, they are closely related and must be implemented comprehensively and consistently to ensure the safety of nuclear facilities, the public, and the environment. In this paper, we investigate how the safety and safeguards of SMR are currently being researched and analyze what difficulties there are when assuming that they are operated as a single interface.

IAEA has the right and obligation to verify the states’ commitments for safeguards under the comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocols. There are IAEA inspections such as PIV, DIV, RII, SNRI under these agreements. As part of the implementation of this mission, the IAEA inspectors perform the verification for the state’s accounting reports related the nuclear materials such as ICR, PIL, MBR. To do well this verification, the inspectors often use non-destructive analysis, which aims to measure attributes of the items during the inspections. This kind of an activity aims to detect the missing nuclear items or wrong things in the facility using nuclear materials. In general, NDA techniques use the neutron counting and gamma ray spectrometry. Besides, IAEA also performs several verification measures as follows. - C/S (Containment and Surveillance techniques) is to maintain the continuity of the knowledge by giving assurance that its containment remains unimpaired. - Unattended and remote monitoring is to transmit the data from onsite of the facility through the on-line system. - E/S (Environmental Sampling) is to detect the minute traces of nuclear materials by smearing some points in the on-site of the facility. Nowadays, the above mentioned techniques are important ways to increase the effectiveness of the safeguards approaches reducing IAEA actual costs. To strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of safeguards approaches, IAEA always develops and adopts the techniques and equipment for safeguards. Especially, IAEA seems to be concerned with the improvement and development of the non-destructive techniques and equipment in the fields of nuclear fuel cycle. IAEA develops the new techniques and equipment through the help of MSSP (Member States Support Programs). The IAEA defines the needs of safeguards and coordinates the support programs. After the IAEA tests and evaluates the techniques/equipment developed, IAEA decides whether to use the developed techniques and equipment during the inspection by the procedure of the IAEA quality assurance. This paper aims at studying the current changes of the IAEA equipment such as DCVD, NGSS and HCES.