Domestic nuclear power plants have developed radiological emergency plans based on the USNRC’s NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-Rev.1 report and the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety’s (KINS) research report on radiation emergency criteria for power reactors (KINS/RR-12). NUREG-0654 is a US emergency planning guide for nuclear power plants and provides detailed technical requirements for the content of radiological emergency plans. The document classifies radiological emergencies into three levels: Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency, which correspond to the white, blue, and red emergency levels used in domestic nuclear power plants. KINS/RR-12 is a technical guidance document published by the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety in 2012, which divides radiological emergency criteria into criteria for pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and criteria for boiling water reactors (BWRs), and describes in detail the regulatory position and implementation of radiological emergency criteria for domestic PWRs and BWRs. The physical protection-related radiation emergency criteria included in the radiological emergency plan are specified in the radiological emergency criteria guidelines. There are two items each related to white and blue emergencies and one item related to red emergencies. Standard order of emergency plan lists the physical protection-related radiological emergency criteria for domestic PWRs and BWRs, which are identical according to the radiological emergency criteria guidelines. To enhance the physical protection regulation, the legal and regulatory basis for target set identification and vital area identification need to be established by considering radiological and physical protection emergency plan.

Sabotage on nuclear power plants are of great national and social significance and long-term damage, the IAEA’s “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5) provides a standard direction for physical protection of their nuclear facilities in almost all member countries, including Korea and the United States. In the United States, Federal Law 10 CFR Part 73, Sections 73.40 to 73.57 specify requirements for physical protection of nuclear power plants, performance criteria, physical protection systems and components thereof, core information, and physical protection for key activities related to nuclear power plant operations. Accordingly, the USNRC carefully examines whether the plant meets the physical protection objectives and criteria set out in SRP 13.6.2, whether the core area/protection area is properly set up to protect against internal and external physical attacks, sabotage threats, and what design measures and facilities are being set up for these areas. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), established in 2002 following the 2001 World Trade Center attacks, authorized federal, local governments, and authorities National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) to protect facilities from terrorist attacks and man-made physical attacks in 2007. NIPP clarifies the great principles and governance of the physical protection of national infrastructure in the United States presented by DHS. There are many physical protection design guidelines and technical standards for preventing attacks from terrorists or internal and external sabotage attackers, improving the viability of mitigating the damage in case of emergency, and achieving efficient recovery from such damage. Particularly important, small-scale damage/damage at a particular location of a major facility is extended to the entire facility, resulting in asymmetrical large-scale damage, so-called “Progressive Collapse” under initial attack loads, minimizing local damage, and protecting the building’s integrity through isolation from other structural components. Consequently, this paper deal with physical protection system design on Unite states standards and practices for applying to physical protection system design in Republic of Korea.

In December 26, 2017, the Ministry of Science and ICT’s Cyber Infringement Response Division, the KCC’s Internet Ethics Team, and the National Police Agency’s Cyber Investigation Division announced the “Comprehensive IP Camera Measures” to prevent damage to users by strengthening IP camera security. The background was a countermeasure against the spread of public anxiety such as leakage of privacy and threatening national security as cases of illegal filming and distribution of videos by accessing IP cameras without permission at that time occurred. At that time, the measures consisted of three major strategies: institutionalization of products with security (manufacturing and import stage), rapid action and response to hacking threats in advance, and intelligent advancement of IP cameras (industrial development) and fostering various video and safety industries. This paper deals with the development of installation standards and evaluation indicators for CCTV systems installed in the relevant national security facility. When designing a CCTV system, the resolution and sensitivity of the camera, the angle of view of the lens, and the aperture should be selected in consideration of the length and width of the monitoring area. When it is necessary to determine an alarm based on the recorded image information, the resolution of the recording device should also be considered. If there is a restriction on the surveillance area of the camera due to topographic features, visitors, etc., additional cameras should be considered. Additional surveillance cameras should be considered to effectively monitor sections where fences are bent or sections with severe slopes. When designing a CCTV system, supplementary means that can be used for intrusion monitoring should be devised even if the entire or part of the system causes a failure. KISA’s performance test and certification procedures shall apply mutatis mutandis to intelligent CCTV image analysis test procedures and certification. Intelligent CCTV image analysis evaluates the performance of the equipment by comparing files of ground truth (GT) and system alarm (SA) for verification to calculate the evaluation score.