The deployment of drones for targeted killings in recent years has sparked intense debates regarding the ethical and legal implications of their deployment in contemporary conflicts. Through an examination of the complexities surrounding the application of fundamental international humanitarian law (IHL) principles - such as differentiating targets and ensuring a proportionate response – and their deployment, the article aims to illuminate the potential legal ramifications of using drones in targeted killing. It also highlights challenges arising from the ambiguous distinction between combatants and non-combatants, compounded by the remote nature of drone missions. The inclusion of a few relevant case studies enhances the analysis, providing practical insights into the nuanced legal landscape and emphasising the pressing need for a comprehensive legal framework tailored to regulate drone usage. This paper stresses the immediate requirement for an effective regulatory structure to ensure adherence to IHL, thereby upholding humanistic principles and reducing the human toll of conflicts.

This research examines the rescue of refugees at sea in the context of international law and human rights. The article focuses on the search and rescue obligations outlined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The article also discusses other international initiatives relevant to the rescue of refugees at sea, including the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the Global Compact on Refugees. The challenges surrounding the rescue of refugees at sea are also analysed, including issues such as delays and refusals in assistance. The authors further explore disagreements over responsibility and jurisdiction in rescue operations involving refugees. Finally, the article underscores the need for a comprehensive understanding of international legislation and basic humanitarian principles when addressing the rescue of refugees at sea. It offers insights into potential solutions for addressing the challenges and controversies encountered in these rescue operations.

Since the beginning of the seventh century, Islamic law has played an essential role in protecting the personal, economic, judicial, and political rights of civilians during armed conflict. Fourteen centuries before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was drafted in 1948, it had already initiated a human revolution consisting of a set of human principles. In addition, Islamic law has made a significant contribution to international humanitarian law (IHL). This paper focuses on two specific legal constructs in warfare: the definition of the combatant and the principle of distinction. This article comparatively examines how these two laws deal with different aspects of war that fall under jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. A comparative analysis of the various elements and aspects of just war theory in Islamic and contemporary international law provides a much deeper understanding of its limitations. We can safely conclude that there is a unique relationship between the Islamic law of war and IHL.

The prohibition on torture has attained status as a peremptory norm of general international law. This gives rise to the obligation erga omnes to take action against those who torture. Despite this, most world states routinely conduct torture. Is there really a worldwide prohibition of torture? Argument is framed to demonstrate that the concept of a jus cogens peremptory norm, flowing erga omnes to all nations, is in practice unattainable, preventing any absolute and universal international law prohibition against torture. States cannot declare someone an enemy of all mankind, or bind all other states to that view. Jus cogens is a text writers’ municipal communis opinio, but held administratively to be based in customary international law. Any prohibition against torture appears to remain in municipal customary law form, breaches of which are proved as arguments based on fact, eliminating operation of any absolute peremptory governing norm.

The right to freedom of religion is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed in many international and regional human rights instruments. Several international documents safeguard freedom of religion including the right to convert from one faith to another. In Malaysia, the safeguard of this fundamental right is provided under Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution with some limitations. The right to convert out of one’ s faith is not mentioned explicitly. However, for the non- Muslims, this right to opt out of one’ s faith and choose another has been regarded as an implicit part of religious liberty guaranteed by Article 11. In relation to the Muslims, the issue of apostasy is regarded as a taboo as well as a politically explosive proposition. This paper aims to examine the concept of freedom of religion under international law focusing mainly on the issue of apostasy in the context of the Malaysian Federal Constitution. The paper concludes that the position of Muslims especially in the context of embracing a new religion remains unsettled.