In this conceptual paper, we use the multiple agency theory to explain the governance issues in cross-sector partnerships. In doing so, we identify five typologies of cross-sector partnerships, each distinct from one another in terms of the governance structure. We also discuss three problems that occur in these relationships, mainly differences in institutional logic, temporal differences, and free-riding and opportunistic behavior, as well as how these problems affect each type of cross-sector partnership. These findings make several significant contributions to the literature and theories. First, this is one of the few studies to use agency theory to examine the governance structures and problems in cross-sector partnerships. Second, our study further contributes to solidifying our understanding of the agency problems arising in cross-sector collaborations. Lastly, our study confirms their presence in other types of cross-sector partnerships as well and we maintain that these problems do not affect each type of cross-sector partnership in the same way, leading us to offer more nuanced implications for researchers and practitioners.

Recently companies have increased the new projects to improve and innovate the business process in order to adopt the advanced technologies such as IoT (Internet of Things), Big Data Analysis, Cloud Computing, mobile and artificial intelligence technologies for sustainable competitive advantages under rapid technological and socioeconomic external environmental changes. However, there are obstacles to achieve the project goals, corporate's strategy and objectives due to various kind of risks based on characteristics of projects and conflicts of stakeholders participated on projects. Hence, the solutions are required to resolve the various kind of risks and conflicts of stakeholders. The objectives of this study are to investigate the impact of the project governance, agency conflicts on the project success based on agency theory by using the statistical hypothesis testing the relationship among those variables. As a result of hypothesis testing, we could find that the project governance impacts positively on project success and negatively on the agency conflicts. Further, the agency conflicts impacts negatively on the project success. Finally, we could find that the agency conflicts such as goal conflict, different risk attitude and information asymmetry between project manager and team members impact negatively on the project success. Meanwhile, the project governance impact positively on the project success, negatively impact on the agency conflicts such as goal conflict, different risk attitude and information asymmetry between project manager and project team members. In order to increase the project success rate, the project governance institutions such as PGB (Project Governance Board), EPMO (Enterprise Project Management Office), PSC (Project Steering Committee) are needed to prevent or reduce the agency conflicts between project manager and team members. 1)

The paper addresses the phenomenon of the opportunism that arises from a parent (principal) toward an IJV (agent) and its antecedents. This study integrates Agency Theory and Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) to discover its determinants from the perspectives of principal opportunism. Using Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) techniques and fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) based on a sample of 185 Chinese-foreign IJVs in China, which are useful to reals the overall story of the principal opportunism. This study finds an IJV depends on parents’ support in both knowledge- and property-based resources has more chances to subject to principal opportunism. The result also indicates that psychic distance has a negative impact on principal opportunism. fsQCA, however, provides further solutions that the specific combinations of these predictors or their negation predicts principle opportunism.