The extension of MFN clauses to dispute settlement under BITs is one of the most controversial areas in investment treaty law. Currently, the area is divided into two streams of case law. The award in Tze Yap Shum v Peru and other recent Chinese investment arbitral awards did not side the Maffezini stream. The question on which stream works the best for China is complicated and essentially a balancing exercise. This article examines the question from a Chinese perspective and adopts the analytical framework of the New Haven School. It identifies the issue of comparability of more preferential treatment as the key criterion in determining the question. It reviews the previous case law and assesses the economic, social and cultural factors shaping the Chinese investment policy. From there, the article seeks to discover if the current law helps fulfil China’s policy goals and proposes recommendations accordingly.

Over the past decade, the backlash against investment arbitration has become worldwide and correspondingly the investment treaty reform has been undertaken at multiple levels. In this context, a multilateral investment agreement (“MIA”) has been called for as a global effort to address the global backlash. Arguably, the current condition for a MIA might be more favorable than before, as the interests of developed countries and developing countries have changed. After examining the need of a MIA for the global backlash, this paper attempts to explore China’s recent practice in this aspect, including that (1) China’s changing interest in outward foreign direct investment and investment treaty practice reflect the changing landscape of international investment law; (2) the 2016 G20 under China’s presidency achieved the Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking; and (3) China has joined to work on a multilateral framework on investment facilitation at the WTO.

The 2018 amendment of the KORUS has made an important stride in the investment chapter of the agreement. In particular, the amendment introduced new provisions to regulate multiple, subsequent or parallel ISDS proceedings involving the same governmental measures. The new provisions, however, arguably contain inherent limitations. They will be able to address only some of the multiple, subsequent or parallel proceedings. They then leave open a possibility where essentially the same investor raises a series of ISDS proceedings against essentially the same measures by an advance planning on the scope of ‘measures’ and/or form of ‘control.’ This means that the new provisions will not be able to fully prevent multiple, subsequent or parallel proceedings in the same context or circumstances from taking place, as was originally intended by the drafters. More detailed wordings and elaborations would have helped to achieve the objective. Future Joint Committee discussions or additional amendments should consider such clarification or elaboration.