Since Russia-Ukraine war, India and the United States has enhanced their cooperation as evidenced by the recent engagements. Multiple meetings by officials and leaders including two Quad and 2+2 dialogue summits, have provided a clear stance on each country’s perspective on the recent conflict. The US-India dispute regarding Russia-Ukraine war demonstrates that it is a stress test for the US-India ties, as well as a test of the US leadership in the global politics. The balancing act required to settle the differences between the two countries will have implications for the Indo-Pacific region as well as global security, even though the disagreements are not yet mutually incompatible. Strengthening ties with the US is now a tightrope walk for India. While there are differences between the two countries in Ukraine, the real challenge is turning these differences into opportunities. The paper deals with the different issues arising from the Russia and Ukraine conflict in the context of US-India interface.

러-우전쟁은 장기전으로 전환하여 지리한 소모전을 수행하고 있다. 전 쟁을 예방하기 위해서는 전쟁의 원인을 연구하여 전쟁의 발생을 억제하 고 전쟁 발발의 가능성을 최소화하여야 한다. 따라서 본 연구의 목적은 러-우전쟁을 전쟁원인이론의 3가지 수준별 분석을 중심으로 연구하여 전쟁 의 원인과 한반도에 미치는 영향을 분석하는 데 있다. 분석 결과 러-우전쟁 은 인간적, 국가적, 국제체제적 수준에서 발발할 수 밖에 없었다는 결론 을 도출할 수 있었다. 또한 전쟁의 3가지 수준별 분석의 상호관계를 분 석하여 국제체제적 수준이 인간적, 국가적 수준의 발발원인에 영향을 미 치고 있음을 확인할 수 있었다. 러-우전쟁의 영향은 동북아의 및 한반도 에 미치는 영향도 지대하다. 첫째, 우크라이나의 장기전 전환은 미국의 대선 국면에 영향을 미칠 가능성이 높다. 또한 최근의 한미일 안보협력 에 대응해 북중러의 안보협력을 강화할 수 있다. 둘째, 북러의 실질적인 군사협력으로 북한은 러시아로부터 취약한 첨단 군사기술을 전수받을 수 있다. 셋째, 북한의 위상 강화로 미국의 대선국면과 맞물려 핵실험 등 도 발을 해올 수 있다. 이에 대한 대비가 요구되는 상황이다.

본 연구는 러시아-우크라이나 전쟁에 있어 유럽의 제재 조치를 분석하 고 이에 따른 시사점을 도출하는 데 목적을 둔다. Manner(2002)가 주장 한 EU의 규범적 권력(Normative Power)과 Portela(2005)가 적용시킨 EU 제재의 규범적 성향(Normative Characters)을 근거로 제재 조치의 동기를 살펴보았고, 개념틀을 통해 EU의 규범적 권력과 EU의 근린지역 에 미치는 영향력을 살펴보았다. EU의 제재는 결국 EU의 규범적 권력을 행사하는 것이 아닌 지역의 평화를 구축하기 위해 기울이는 규범적 성향 에 근거해 제재 조치를 시행한 것이다. 따라서 현재 EU의 규범적 권력 의 존재에 대해 예측 및 기대는 어렵지만 전쟁의 진행 여부에 따라 차후 검토가 가능할 것으로 생각된다.

Since the 1992 ‘Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’ was agreed, various negotiations and policies have been conducted. There were policies such as CVID, Strategic Patience, Top-Down Approach, Calibrated Practical Approach, Audacious Initiative and the Geneva Agreement, and 9.19 Joint statement by the six-party talks were signed to denuclearize Korean Peninsula. However, starting with the first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea conducted six nuclear tests to develop atomic bombs, boosted fission bombs, ICBMs, and SLBMs to enhance its weapon capabilities. In addition, nuclear security crisis on the Korean Peninsula has been rising day by day as signs of restarting the North Korea’s Yongbyon 5MWe Graphite-moderated reactor were observed and the possibility of a seventh nuclear test have been increased. Since North Korea’s nuclear issue has a lot of influence on international security, especially on the Northeast Asian countries, a realistic denuclearization policy that reflects North Korea’s current domestic situation along with the international situation is needed. It’s been six months since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The war between Russia, which has nuclear weapons, and Ukraine, which gave up its possession of nuclear weapons due to the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program known as the Nunn-Lugar program, is expected to have a significant impact on North Korea, which is considering denuclearization due to UN sanctions on North Korea. Therefore, in this study, based on the war patterns of Russia-Ukraine war, perspective on how it could affect North Korea’s denuclearization is analyzed. Also, significance and limitations of the previous nuclear negotiations, the North Korea’s political regime, the ‘five-year strategy for North Korea’s economic development’ and the ‘five-year plan for North Korea’s economic development’ were analyzed to suggest practical DPRK’s denuclearization policy.

After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia continued to deploy military forces and equipment near the Ukrainian border in March and October of 2021, heightening the international crisis. On February 24, 2022, Russia began its full-scale invasion of Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, with missiles and ground forces. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was accompanied by an urgent speech by Russian President Vladimir Putin on the day he would conduct a special military operation in Ukraine. Putin warned that Russia would seek to demilitarize Ukraine and retaliate immediately if foreign interference occurred. In particular, he stated that the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and exploitation of Ukrainian territory was unacceptable. Due to the current Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States has updated export controls and sanctions as of March 15. Extensive US export controls and sanctions recently imposed on some areas of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine have included industries such as defense, aerospace, energy, and finance. Executive Order EO14065 is issued to ban transactions with specific individuals and entities, including financial institutions. Additionally, Executive Order EO14066 has banned US imports of Russian oil, natural gas, and coal and new investments in the Russian energy sector. The EAR was revised to strengthen export controls on Russia and Belarus. The sanctions imposed include 48 major defense companies, 328 personnel, and the CEO of Sberbank, which produced weapons used in the attack on Ukraine. Companies are listed on the Sectoral Sanctions Identification (SSI) List, and individuals are listed on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List. Sanctions such as asset freezing and a ban on all financial transactions with Americans apply. In line with the international trend, Korea also declared its participation in sanctions against Russia. As of March 25, 2022, export controls have been strengthened by newly established items subject to catchall licenses related to Russia and Belarus. Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE) added Fifty-seven items to Annex 2-2 in the Notification of Export and Import of Strategic Items. Most of these sanctions are for dual-use items under the jurisdiction of MOTIE. However, as countries, organizations, and individuals who may be subject to catch-all licenses are included in the sanctions list, Nuclear Safety and Security Commission should also review catch-all licenses for Trigger List Items. These sanctions are expected to last for some time. Even though China and Russia are the Nuclear Weapon States, the US has strengthened export controls. This is likely due to the opacity of China and Russia’s export controls system and the lack of active implementation of UN Security Council sanctions. However, there is an aspect of protecting their technology. It seems that Korea should also pay attention to these changes in international trends and keep pace with the level of control in other countries.