이 연구는 2007년부터 2022년까지 16년 동안 한국의 코스피시장과 코스닥시장의 비금융업종 기업을 대상으 로 환노출이 정보비대칭과 주가급락위험 간의 관계에 미치는 영향에 대해 분석한다. 분석결과 기업의 정보비대칭 이 높을수록 주가급락위험이 증가한다. 그러나 환노출이 큰 기업의 경우 주가급락위험은 감소한다. 이러한 결과는 환노출이 큰 것으로 확인되는 경우 경영자는 환노출 및 환노출 관리와 관련된 정보를 적극적으로 공시함으로써 환노출 관련 정보비대칭이 감소해 주가급락위험이 오히려 감소하기 때문인 것으로 판단된다. 환노출이 정보비대칭 을 감소시켜 주가급락위험을 감소시킨다는 결과는 환노출과 정보비대칭 관계, 파생상품 사용 여부를 고려한 분석 결과와도 일관성 있는 결과이다. 그러나 글로벌금융위기 기간에는 환노출이 정보비대칭과 주가급락위험에 미치는 영향을 확인할 수 없다. 이는 글로벌금융위기 동안에 환율의 급격한 상승과 환노출의 증가가 주가급락위험을 증가 시키는 직접적인 영향이 환노출이 정보비대칭을 감소시켜 주가급락위험을 감소시키는 간접적인 영향을 상쇄시키 기 때문인 것으로 판단된다. 이 연구의 분석결과는 환노출이 존재하는 기업의 경우 환노출과 관련된 정보를 적극 적으로 공시하는 것이 정보비대칭을 감소시킴으로써 주가급락위험을 감소시킬 수 있는 적절한 전략이 될 수 있음 을 지지한다. 이 연구는 기업의 환노출과 정보비대칭 그리고 주가급락위험의 관계를 체계적으로 설명함으로써 환 위험에 대한 연구를 확장시켰다는 측면에서 학술적 의의를 갖는다.

Purpose: This research aims to investigate the impact of corporate integrity on stock price crash risk. Research design, data, and methodology: Taking 1419 firms listed in Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China as a sample, this paper empirically analyzed the relationship between corporate integrity and stock price crash risk. The main integrity data was hand-collected from Shenzhen Stock Exchange Website. Other financial data was collected from CSMAR Database. Results: Findings show that corporate integrity can significantly decrease stock price crash risk. After changing the selection of samples, model estimation methods and the proxy variable of stock price crash risk, the conclusion is still valid. Further research shows that the relationship between corporate integrity and stock price crash risk is only found in firms with weak internal control and firms in poor legal system areas. Conclusions: Results of the study suggest that corporate integrity has a significant influence on behaviors of managers. Business ethics reduces the likelihood of managers to overstate financial performance and hide bad news, which leads to the low likelihood of future stock price crashes. Meanwhile, corporate integrity can supplement internal control and legal system in decreasing stock price crash risks.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of quality of management discussion and analysis (MD&A) disclosure on stock price crash risk. The MD&A can be seen to reflect the management's intention on public announcement and reveals directly what the management says to communicate with outside investors. A firm's high-quality MD&A implies the management's commitment to communicating with the market, not allowing the managers to have incentives to hoard unfavorable news, which if revealed to the public, may lead to downward stock price corrections, damaging corporate values. The high-quality MD&A is, thus, likely to reduce the stock price crash risk. We use a logistic regression to test whether MD&A influences crash risk using listed companies in the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) stock market between 2010 and 2013. Findings of the empirical test show that the higher the quality of MD&A, the less likely crash risk appears, implying that the MD&A disclosed adequately can be one of the factors mitigating firm's stock price crash risk. This study has implications as it presents the MD&A disclosure as a factor influencing stock price crash risk and suggests voluntary disclosure as well as mandatory disclosure acts as a variable that explains the risk of stock price crash.

Purpose – This study examines the effect of control-ownership wedge on stock crash risk. In Korea, controlling shareholders have exclusive control rights compared to their cash flow rights. With increasing disparity, controlling shareholders abuse their power and extract private benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders. Managers who are controlling shareholders of the companies tend not to disclose critical information that would prevent them from pursuing private interests. They accumulate negative information in the firm. When the accumulated bad news crosses a tipping point, it will be suddenly released to the market at once, resulting in an abrupt decline in stock prices. We predict that stock price crash likelihood due to information opaqueness increases as the wedge increases. Research design, data, and methodology – 831 KOSPI-listed firm-year observations are from KisValue database from 2005 to 2011. Control–ownership wedge is measured as the ratio (UCO −UCF)/UCO where UCF(UCO) is the ultimate cash-fl ow(control) rights of the largest controlling shareholder. Dependent variable CRASH is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has at least 1 crash week during a year, and zero otherwise. Logistic regression is used to examine the relationship between control–ownership wedge and stock price crash risk. Results – Using a sample of KOSPI-listed firms in KisValue database for the period 2005–2011, we find that stock price crash risk increases as the disparity increases. Specifically, we find that the coefficient of WEDGE is significantly positive, supporting our prediction. The result implies that as controlling shareholders’ ownership increases, controlling shareholders tend to withhold bad news. Conclusions – Our results show that agency problems arising from the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights increase the opaqueness of accounting information. Eventually, the accumulated bad news is released all at once, leading to stock price crashes. It could be seen that companies with high control-ownership wedge are likely to experience future stock price crashes. Our study is related to a broader literature that examined the effect of the control-ownership wedge on stock markets. Our findings suggest that the disparity is a meaningful predictor for future stock price crash risk. The results are expected to provide useful implications for firms, regulators, and investors.