The information products dramatically reduce the production costs of vertically differentiated products. Information products are also more likely to be affected by network externalities. Thus the proliferation of digital products is increasing the interests in network externality and vertical product differentiation. In step with this trend, the impact of network externalities on price competition in vertically differentiated markets has been continuously studied. Existing studies related to this topic have assumed that network externalities increase consumers' willingness to pay per unit quality. The results show that higher quality products are affected more by network externality. However, network externality is essentially a concept affected by the size of the consumer, not a concept associated with quality. In this work, unlike previous studies, we present a new market model that reflects the essential definition of network externality. Based on the proposed market model, we derive both simultaneous and sequential Nash equilibria and analyze them numerically. The main results obtained from the analysis can be summarized as follows. First, network externalities primarily increase the demand for low-quality products and have a secondary impact on the demand for high-quality products. Second, the larger the quality difference between products, the more profitable they are. It also has been shown that sequential pricing methods are more advantageous in terms of revenue than simultaneous pricing method.

Aftermarket refers to a market in which a company sells complementary goods, replacements of parts, and upgrade or maintenance services to consumers after selling them main durable goods. Intuitively, consumers who purchase main durable goods become major potential customers in subsequent aftermarket. Thus the existence of the aftermarket has a significant impact on pricing of the main durable goods as well as the aftermarket products. In this study, we analyze the effect of aftermarket on the pricing strategy for a company selling both main durable goods and aftermarket products. To do this we first divided the market into markets where the aftermarket products are indispensable and optional. Based on the proposed market types, the profit maximizing solutions are derived using two-period model, and the impacts of consumers’ undervaluation of aftermarket product prices on pricing strategy are analyzed. The results can be summarized as follows : (1) Regardless of the market type, the total profits were found to be inversely proportional to the consumer’s awareness accuracy of product prices in the aftermarket. This is in line with marketing efforts that sales companies have made intuitively to make consumers underestimate the cost of the aftermarket. (2) If aftermarket product is indispensable, only revenue from the aftermarket is sought. On the other hand, if aftermarket product is optional, revenue from the main durable good as well as the aftermarket product will be sought simultaneously. (3) Moreover, when aftermarket product is optional, the lower the awareness accuracy of consumers, the higher the price and profit of the main durable goods, while the lower the price and profit of the aftermarket products. This is contrary to the intuition that the lower the consumer's valuation of the costs of aftermarket, the more advantageous it would be to rely on aftermarket products rather than on main durable goods.

It is a general phenomenon for manufacturers to provide vertically differentiated product line for more profit through improved market coverage. For such manufacturers, the compatibility between vertically differentiated products is an important decision issue. Some manufacturers provide full compatibility between high and low version products, whereas some provide only downward compatibility for the purpose of recommending high version product. In this study, the two representative compatibility strategies, full or downward, between vertically differentiated products produced by a single manufacturer are analyzed, especially under network externality and in the viewpoint of profit maximization. To do this we used a market model which captures the basic essence of vertical differentiation and network externality. Based on the proposed market model, the profit maximizing solutions are derived and numerically analyzed. The results can be summarized as follows : (1) Regardless of compatibility strategy, under network externality, vertical differentiation is always advantageous in terms of profit. (2) The full compatibility strategy is shown to be the most advantageous in terms of profit. In addition, it is necessary to make quality difference between differentiated products as wide as possible to maximize profit. (3) To gradually drive low version product out of the market and shift the weight pendulum of market to high version product, it is shown that the downward compatibility strategy is essential. Unlike intuition, however, it is also shown that in order to drive low version product out of market, it is necessary to raise the quality of the low version product rather than to lower it.

Network externalities are essentially dynamic in that the value consumers feel about a product is affected by the size of the existing customer base that uses that product. However, existing studies on network externalities analyzed the effects of network externalities in a static way, not dynamic. In this study, unlike previous studies, the impact of network externalities on price competition in a vertically differentiated market is dynamically analyzed. To this end, a two-period duopoly game model was used to reflect the dynamic aspects of network externalities. Based on the game model, the Nash equilibria for price, sales volume, and revenue were derived and numerically analyzed. The results can be summarized as follows. First, if high-end product has strong market power, the high-end product vendor takes almost all benefits of the network externality. Second, when high-end product has strong market power, the low-end product will take over most of the initial sales volume increase. Third, when market power of high-end product is not strong, it can be seen that the effects of network externalities on the high and low-end products are generally proportional to the difference in quality. Lastly, if there exists a strong network externality, it is shown that the presence of low-end product can be more profitable for high-end product vendor. In other words, high-end product vendor has incentive to disclose some technologies for the market entrance of low-end product, even if it has exclusive rights to the technologies. In that case, however, it is shown that the difference in quality should be maintained significantly.

The proliferation of information technologies made it possible to produce information products of different versions at much lower cost comparing to traditional physical products. Thus it is common for information product manufacturers to consider vertically differentiated product line for more profit through improved market coverage. Another salient characteristic of most information product is network externality. Existing researches dealing with vertical differentiation and network externality usually assumed oligopolistic market where vertically differentiated products are provided by competing companies, respectively. Moreover, they analyzed the essentially dynamic characteristic of network externality statically. In this study, different from the previous researches, the vertical differentiation strategy of a monopolistic company under network externality is dynamically analyzed. We used a two-period model to accommodate the dynamic feature of network externality. Based on the two-period model, the profit maximizing solutions are analyzed. The results showed that a monopolistic company has no incentive to differentiate products vertically when the network externality is absent. On the contrary, when the network externality exists, the monopolistic company can derive more profit by vertically differentiating the product line. It is also shown that, for more profit, the monopolistic company should keep the quality difference between the high quality product and the low quality product as greater as possible.

Network externality can be defined as the effect that one user of a good or service has on the value of that product to other people. When a network externality is present, the value of a product or service is dependent on the number of others using it. There exist asymmetries in network externalities between the online and traditional offline marketing channels. Technological capabilities such as interactivity and real-time communications enable the creation of virtual communities. These user communities generate significant direct as well as indirect network externalities by creating added value through user ratings, reviews and feedback, which contributes to eliminate consumers’ concern for buying products without the experience of ‘touch and feel’. The offline channel offers much less scope for such community building, and consequently, almost no possibility for the creation of network externality. In this study, we analyze the effect of network externality on the competition between online and conventional offline marketing channels using game theory. To do this, we first set up a two-period game model to represent the competition between online and offline marketing channels under network externalities. Numerical analysis of the Nash equilibrium solutions of the game showed that the pricing strategies of online and offline channels heavily depend not only on the strength of network externality but on the relative efficiency of online channel. When the relative efficiency of online channel is high, the online channel can greatly benefit by the network externality. On the other hand, if the relative efficiency of online channel is low, the online channel may not benefit at all by the network externality.

The proliferation of the Internet and related technologies has led to a new form of distribution channels, namely online retailers. The conventional offline and the new online retailers have different transaction costs perceived by the consumers in the following perspectives: the accessibility to the product information, the traffic cost and the opportunity cost for the time to visit the store, the delivery time and the possibility of ‘touch and feel’ to test the quality of the product. In particular, the online retailers have lower distribution cost structure in that they do not have physical stores, which results in lower selling price. Thus they continuously offer price competition against offline retailers using the lower selling cost as competitive weapon. Moreover the emergence of the social commerce is likely to intensify the competition between the online and offline retailers. To survive in this fierce competition, the offline retailers are trying to defend their business interests by sticking to offline transaction in anticipation of increased customer loyalty, customer’s preference for ‘touch and feel’ style shopping, and others. Despite of these efforts, customers who touch and feel a product in an offline store but purchase the product through an online retailer are increasing. To protect such customers, recently, some of the offline retailers began to provide the mobile discount service (MDS) which enables the offline customers to purchase a product at a discounted price through the mobile applications. In business competitions, the price discount strategy is usually considered to secure more market share at the cost of lower profit. In this study, however, we analyze the effect of MDS as a weapon for securing more profit. To do this, we set up a game model between the online and offline retailers which incorporates the effect of the MDS. By numerically analyzing the Nash equilibrium of the game, some managerial implications for using the MDS for more profit are discussed.

본 연구에서 우리는 혁신시스템 국제화의 측정을 위한 프레임워크를 수립하고 한국원자력산업과 우주산업에 적용을 통해서 혁신시스템 국제화와 리더십의 연관관계에 대 한 사례연구를 수행하였다. 이 프레임워크를 통해 혁신시스템의 국제화 정도와 기술수준과 의 연관관계를 살펴본 결과, 한국 원자력산업은 기술수준의 선도그룹으로서 추격그룹인 우주 산업 대비 혁신시스템 국제화의 주요기능에서 국제적 적법성의 생성을 제외하고 높은 수준 을 보여주었다. 이를 통해 혁신시스템 국제화의 정도는 리더십과 높은 연관관계를 보임을 확 인할 수 있었다. 이처럼 한 국가 내에서 산업간 혁신시스템의 국제화 정도는 차이를 보이며 리더십을 획득하기 위해서는 혁신시스템 국제화의 흐름의 대응이 필요함을 제시하고 이에 대한 정책적인 시사점을 도출하였다. 이 프레임워크의 적용을 통해서 한국 산업의 국제적인 리더십에 대한 사례를 심층 분석 할 수 있게 하며, 또한 전략적 딜레마에 빠진 산업에서의 기술경영을 위한 시사점들을 제공 한다.

The proliferation of the Internet and communication technologies and applications, besides the conventional retailers, has led to a new form of distribution channel, namely home sopping through the telephone, TV, catalog or the Internet. The conventional and new distribution channels have different transaction costs perceived by the consumers in the following perspectives: the accessibility to the product information, the traffic cost and the opportunity cost for the time to visit the store, the possibility of ‘touch and feel’ to test the quality of the product, the delivery time and the concern for the security for the personal information. Difference in the transaction costs between the distribution channels results in the different selling prices even for the same product. Moreover, distribution channels with different selling prices necessarily result in different business surpluses. In this paper, we study the multilateral bargaining strategy of a manufacturer who sells a product through multiple distribution channels with different transaction costs. We first derive the Nash equilibrium solutions for both simultaneous and sequential bargaining games. The numerical analyses for the Nash equilibrium solutions show that the optimal bargaining strategy of the manufacturer heavily depends not only on the degree of competition between the distribution channels but on the difference of the business surpluses of the distribution channels. First, it is shown that there can be four types of locally optimal bargaining strategies if we assume the market powers of the manufacturer over the distribution channels can be different. It is also shown that, among the four local optimal bargaining strategies, simultaneous bargaining with the distribution channels is the most preferred bargaining strategy for the manufacturer.

In this paper, we study the bargaining strategy of a distributor who sells vertically differentiated, i.e. high and low brand products. We derive and analyze the equilibrium solutions for both simultaneous and sequential bargaining games among the distributor, the high brand product manufacturer and the low brand product manufacturer. The result shows that the optimal bargaining strategy for the distributor heavily depends on the relative quality and price level of the low brand product comparing to those of the high brand product. It is also shown that, for more bargaining profit, the distributor has strong motivation to prefer a low brand product which has lower quality level per unit price.

In this paper, we study the bargaining strategy of a manufacturer who sells a product through the online and offline distribution channels. To do this, we derive and analyze the equilibrium solutions for both simultaneous and sequential bargaining games. The result shows that the optimal bargaining strategy heavily depends on the size of the online distribution channel’s loyal customers and the difference between the retail prices of the online and the offline distribution channels. It is also shown that, in some cases, the online distribution channel has incentive to downsize its loyal customers and its retail price for a better bargaining outcome.

Recently, the increasing power of distributors has given them the opportunity of introducing private brand (PB) products. Based on the game theory, this study analyzes the decision making of a distributor regarding the optimal pricing and quality strategi

The proliferation of the internet and electronic commerce has given the manufacturers the opportunity of direct marketing. This study analyzes the decision of manufacturers regarding whether to sell the products through independent sales company or to sel