After the decision of the Wolsong unit 1 permanent shutdown (2019), spent fuel stored in the spent fuel bay (hereafter, SFB) should be transported to a dry storage facility (MACSTOR or Canister) in order to decommission Wolsong unit 1. Accordingly, KHNP has established a shipment schedule for damaged fuel of Wolsong Unit 1 and is trying to complete the shipment according to the schedule. Wolsong is equipped with transportation casks and dry storage facilities, but baskets need to be manufactured separately. In addition, license approval is required for baskets, transport cask, and dry storage facilities for legal grounds to contain, transport, and store damaged fuels. In this paper, the initial model, upgrade model, and automation model of encapsulation equipment planned to be introduced in Canada to handle PHWR’s damaged fuel were compared, and the optimal model was selected in consideration of KHNP’s planned spent fuel shipment schedule. The PHWR’s damaged fuel encapsulation system is a system developed the PHWR’s damaged spent fuel to be handled in the same way as the existing PHWR when storing it in the dry storage facility and loading a basket for capsulation into transport cask. At the Gentilly-2 nuclear power plant in Canada, a manually operated encapsulation system was used due to the low quantity of damaged fuel, which can be encapsulated two bundles a day, and this model is an initial model. In the case of Wolsong Unit 1, it has about 300 damaged fuels, so it takes about nine months to work when using the initial model. The upgrade model developed to improve work efficiency and reliability has increased work efficiency through some automation, but it would take about eight months to process the damaged spent fuels of Wolsong Unit 1, and this model has not yet been manufactured and applied. Lastly, the automation model changed the work location outside the SFB and automated drainage/drying operations. It is easy to maintain and replace consumables because the work is carried out by lifting the damaged fuel to a shuttle outside the SFB surrounded by a shielding chimney. Considering the reduction of drainage/drying time, it is possible to save about four times as much time as the initial model. That is, if the automation model is used, it is judged that the supply of Wolsong Unit 1 can be processed in about two months. However, in terms of license, initial model and upgrade model are expected to be easier and the period is expected to be shortened. However, if licensing is carried out as soon as equipment design is completed, it is believed that the period can be shortened by parallel equipment manufacturing and licensing. It is judged that the best way to comply with the target schedule is to select an automation model with excellent work performance, develop equipment, and proceed with licensing at the same time. Accordingly, KHNP is in the process of designing equipment with the aim of using the automation model to take out damaged fuel for Wolsong Unit 1.

More than 20,000 bundles of spent nuclear fuel are stored in the spent nuclear fuel storage pool of domestic nuclear power plants, and the dry storage facility project in the nuclear power plant site is being promoted as the saturation of the wet storage pool is imminent. Since bending or twisting of spent nuclear fuel is an important item in order to load spent nuclear fuel into a dry storage cask, PSE (Pool Side Examination) was performed to verify this. This paper describes whether it can be safely loaded into a dry storage cask based on the measurement results of bending or twisting of spent nuclear fuel. The nuclear fuel assembly is designed to prevent excessive assembly bending and twisting because it can cause interference during dry storage and handling due to factors such as differences in depletion of nuclear fuel rods, irradiation growth, and coolant flow during reactor operation. The bending of the nuclear fuel assembly is measured by establishing a Plumb Line to photograph the nuclear fuel assembly based on it, and calculating a pixel that images the distance between the support grid and the Plumb Line. The twisting of the nuclear fuel assembly is measured by forming a virtual vertical plane with two Plumb Lines, and based on this, the twisting angle of the lower fixed compared to the upper fixed. As a result of the measurement, the bending of spent nuclear fuel was about 0.0-10.2 mm, much lower than the reactor loading criteria of 15.0 mm, and in the case of twisting, about 0.0~2.2° much lower than the reactor loading criteria of 5.0°. Therefore, it was confirmed that spent nuclear fuel at domestic nuclear power plants was not affected by bending and twisting when loading into dry storage cask.

South It is necessary to develop the future technologies to improve the sustainability and acceptability of nuclear power plants generation. Currently, our company is preparing to build the dry storage facility on-site in accordance with the basic plan for managing high-level radioactive waste announced by the government in 2021. However, studies on technologies for the volume reduction of spent nuclear fuel to increase the efficiency of on-site spent fuel dry storage facilities are very not enough. Accordingly, in this study, the storage efficiency and appropriateness for the SF volume reduction processing technologies such as SF oxide processing technology and consolidation technology are evaluated. Finally, the goal is to develop the optimized technologies to improve the storage efficiency of spent nuclear fuel. As a result in this study is followings. [Safety] After removing volatile fission products (Xe, Kr, I, etc.), Xe, Kr, etc. are removed during storage of the sintered structures. UO2 has a high melting point of approximately 1,000°C after cesium (Cs) has been removed, and heat can be removed by natural convection. [Economy]1999 DUPIC unit facility unit price reference, 2020 standard 328 $/kg estimated. A Comprehensive Approach Considering the Whole System is needed. Benefit from replacement and continuous operation of metal storage containers. Changes in economic efficiency obtained in conjunction with fluctuations in electricity prices and disposal. [Waste filter] A separated solidification facility high-level waste filter is required, and overseas outsourcing must be considered. [Waste cladding]. Cannot be accommodated in low-level disposal site. This reason is why the Ni nuclides occur to be in bulk. [Metal structural material] It is possible to reduce the initial volume by 7.6% or more when compressed or melted, but the technology needs to be advanced. [Oxide blocks] Larger size and density are expected to improve storage and disposal efficiency. [Facilities operation waste] Expected to be able to be disposed of at mid-to-low level decommissioning sites in Gyeongju city. [Solidified volatile nuclides and activated metals] Expected to improve storage efficiency when used volume is reduced and stored, such as outsourced reprocessing. [Oxide block] Radioactivity and decay heat are estimated to be reduced by half during oxide treatment. 75% reduction in volume and 40% reduction in storage area compared to used nuclear fuel before treatment. [Merits/Shortages] Improvement of storage and disposal efficiency empirical research such as large-capacity [real-scale] oxide block production is required. Oxide processing facilities are likely to be classified as post-use nuclear fuel processing facilities. It is determined that additional documents such as a Radiation Environmental Report (RER) must be submitted. Existence of possible external leaks of glass, highly mobile radionuclides from the point of view of nuclear criticality and heat removal. Acceptancy requirements of citizens in the process of creating additional sites for oxide treatment facilities. Considering social public opinion, it is necessary to secure the acceptability such as residents’ opinions convergence. Characteristics of high nuclear non-propagation compared to other processing technologies involving chemical processing. Also, Expectation of volume reduction effect for spent nuclear fuel itself. Volume reduction methods for solid waste and gaseous waste are required.

The treatment of waste generated during operation as a part of preparation for decommissioning is coming to the fore as a pending issue. Non-fuel waste stored in the spent fuel pool (SFP) of PWRs in Korea includes Dummy fuel, damaged fuel rod storage container, reactor vessel specimen cask, spent in-core instrumentation, spent control element assemblies, spent neutron source assemblies, burnable poison rods, etc. In order to treat such waste, it is necessary to classify radioactive waste level and analyze kinds of nuclide in accordance with legal requirements. In order to solve the problem, the items that KHNP-CRI is trying to conduct like followings. First, KHNP-CRI will identify the current status of non-fuel waste stored in the SFP of all domestic nuclear power plants. In order to consider the treatment of non-fuel waste, it is essential to know what kind of items and how many items are stored in the SFP. Second, to identify the dimension and characteristics of non-fuel waste stored in the SFP would be conducted. The configuration of non-fuel waste is important information to handle them. Third, the way to handle non-fuel waste would be deduced including analysis of their dimension, whether the equipment should be developed to handle each kind of non-fuel waste or not, how to transport them. In order to classify radioactive waste level and analyze the nuclide for the non-fuel waste, handling tools and the cask to transport them into the facility which nuclide analysis is able to be performed would be required. Fourth, the nuclide analysis technology would be identified. Also, domestic holding technology would be identified and which technology should be developed to classify the radioactive waste level for the non-fuel waste would be deduced. This preliminary study will provide KHNP-CRI with the insight for the nuclide analysis technology and future work which is following action for the non-fuel waste. Based on the result of above preliminary study, the feasibility of the research for the treatment of non-fuel waste would be evaluated and research plan would be established. In conclusion, the treatment of non-fuel waste stored in the spent fuel pool of domestic PWR should be considered to prepare the decommissioning. KHNP-CRI will identify the quantity, the dimension and kinds of non-fuel waste in the SFP of domestic PWR. Also, the various nuclide analysis technology would be identified and the technology which should be developed would be defined through this preliminary study.

South Korea has been storing UNF in spent fuel pool dry storage facility within Nuclear Power Plants. The dry storage facility of used nuclear fuel (UNF) is essential to sustain safety and sustain stable operation of a nuclear power plant. Most abroad countries have attempted to develop a variety of dry storage facility for used nuclear fuel in order to retain the safe restoration. Many studies have been conducting to safety evaluation for the dry storage facility. However, there is not a ventilation evaluation in the wake of fire event that could influence of the thermal effect on the dry storage facility, even though it will likely to occur fire events such as wildfire, air craft crash. In practice, it happened to catastrophic disaster due to the wild fire adjacent to ul-jin mountain. Also, it happened to fire accident near to the Japonia NPP in Ukraine territory caused of military air plane missile. It has not mostly been studied on the ventilation evaluation considered to thermal safety in the dry storage facility excepted for some researches. It could need the mechanical ventilation systems such as HVAC system in the dry storage system, so that thermal effect can be reduced. In this study, we conducted to the ventilation control modelling by using fire modelling tool (Fire Dynamic Simulator v.6.7). The ventilation scenarios made up for 3 case that can compare flowrate variation with ventilation control. As a result of modelling, there is no differentiation between ventilation control using performance curve with not using performance curve even though the pressure fluctuation would be increased, compared with the case of considering performance curve. Second, it evaluated that the mode for fraction control would occur to pressure rise in the state of controlling the ventilation system flowrate. However, sensitivity of flowrate control was more decreased below less than 5 seconds. Third, in the case of on/off control system revealed more higher resolution than other cases caused by flowrate variation. These results could be considered as the design guidelines for the development dry storage facility to improve the thermal performance that can reduce thermal risk. Furthermore, the study results would expect HVAC system installed in dry storage to help automatic ventilation control relevant to dry storage safety increased.

The Comprehensive Analyzer of Real Estimation for spent fuel POOL (CAREPOOL) has been developed for evaluating the thermal safety of a spent nuclear fuel pool (SFP) during the normal and accident conditions. The management of spent nuclear fuel function provides a management tool for spent nuclear fuel in the SFP. The fuel assemblies both in SFP and reactor side can be shown graphically in the screen. The loading sequence into transfer cask can be checked respectively in the CAREPOOL. A basic heat balance equation was used to estimate the SFP temperature using the heat load calculated in the previous step. The characteristics of typical SFPs and associated cooling systems at reactor sites in the Korea were applied. Accident simulation like station black out leading to loss of SFP cooling or inventory is possible. Emergency cooling water injection pipe installed subsequent to the events at Fukushima 2011 is also modeled in this system. The CAREPOOL provides four main functions- management of spent nuclear fuel, decay heat calculation by ORIGEN-S code, estimation of the time to boil/fuel uncovering by thermal-hydraulics calculations, fuel selection for periodic spent fuel transferring campaign. All of these are integrated into the GUI based CAREPOOL system. The CAREPOOL would be very beneficial to nuclear power plant operator and trainee who have responsibility for the SFP operation.

On-site storage facility using concrete silo dry storage systems for spent nuclear fuel at Wolsong NPP site came into operation in 1992 and was expanded four times, and a total of 300 silo dry storage systems are currently in operation. The design lifetime of silo dry storage systems has been licensed for 50 years. As the dry storage systems are subject to time constraints for a limited lifetime, countries operating the dry storage systems are working to ensure the long-term integrity of dry storage systems and IAEA also recommends that the dry storage systems be assessed for long-term storage. To demonstrate the long-term integrity due to material degradation during the licensed design lifetime, the structural integrity of silo dry storage systems was evaluated by considering the material degradation characteristics of concrete. The concrete compressive strength results measured so far by the rebound hammer method, which is an internationally standardized nondestructive test method for converting hardness into compressive strength using the correlation between rebound number and strength at the time of a Schmidt hammer strike, were analyzed in accordance with Wolsong NPP’s procedure to quantify the degradation characteristics, and the prediction of concrete strengths for 20 years and 50 years after construction of the silo dry storage systems was determined, respectively. Based on these residual compressive strengths, structural analyses of the silo dry storage systems were carried out under normal, off-normal and accident conditions of the related regulations, and the structural integrity of silo dry storage systems was reevaluated. It was confirmed the silo dry storage systems are able to maintain structural integrity up to the design lifetime of 50 years even if the concrete is deteriorated.

One of the most important factors in the delivery and acceptance requirements for dry storage of spent fuel is the burnup of spent fuel. Here, burnup has a unit of MWD/MTU and is used as a measure of how much nuclear fuel is depleted in a nuclear reactor. In addition, since it is one of the most basic characteristic information for the soundness evaluation of spent nuclear fuel, it is a required item not only by regulatory agencies but also by KORAD, the acquiring agency. The burnup of spent nuclear fuel is the burnup calculated through flux mapping using signals measured from in-reactor instruments during nuclear power plant operation (hereinafter: actual burnup) and the burnup calculated using the core design code (hereinafter: design burnup). In this paper, the design burnup of spent nuclear fuel discharged from OPR100 NPPs (Nuclear Power Plants) in Korea was recalculated to confirm the reliability of the actual burnup currently managed at the nuclear power plant. Basically, since spent nuclear fuel must maintain subcriticality under wet storage or dry storage, a burnup error of about 5% is considered as a conservative approach when evaluating the criticality safety of wet storage tanks and dry storage systems. Therefore, in this paper, we tried to verify whether the difference between actual burnup and design burnup for all spent nuclear fuel released from domestic OPR100 type light water reactor nuclear power plants is within 5%. As a result of the evaluation, the largest deviation between actual burnup and design burnup was about 1,457 MWD/MTU, and when converted into a percentage, it was about 3.3%. Therefore, it was confirmed that the actual burnup managed by OPR1000 NPPs in Korea has sufficient reliability. In the future, we plan to check the reliability of the performance burnup managed in WH NPPs, and some of them will be verified through measurement.