In 1999, Professor Philip Nichols argued that FCPA-style home country laws are efficient in combating transnational bribery, unlike host country regulation and corporate selfregulation. Observing feeble results obtained in 15 years of OECD Anti-bribery Convention, we find arguments for amending this assertion; home countries, aside from enforcing their own laws banning foreign bribery, should reconsider the classical ways of fighting transnational corruption, by helping host governments in their anti-corruption efforts and by encouraging their own corporations to join international dialogic webs. After presenting an original analysis of the reasons behind the limited impact of FCPA-style action, we would then further argue for the two alternative solutions backed by home states, looking respectively at the spectacular results of the anti-corruption campaign in Romania with US support, and at China’s recent position that her corporations should adhere to international private standards on foreign bribery.

I. Introduction
II. How Willing are Home States to Enforce Laws against Overseas Bribery?
III. Prosecuting the Supply Side of International Bribery
    A. From the Regulators’ Perspective
    B. From the Duty Bearers’ Perspective
IV. Case of Romania: The Home State Supporting the Host Country’s Anti-corruption Efforts
V. Case of China: The Home State Encouraging the Private Enforcement of Anticorruption Rules
VI. Conclusion
References

• Ciprian N. Radavoi(International Investment Law at the University of International Business and Economics (UIBE) Law School)
• Yongmin Bian(Public International Law at the University of International Business and Economics (UIBE) Law school)