Safeguards systems and measures are determined through diversion scenario analysis based on the facility design information submitted to the IAEA when a new nuclear facility is introduced. While the concept of safeguards-by-design (SBD), which considers the safeguards from the design phase for a facility operator to minimize unplanned changes or disruption to facility operations as well as for the IAEA to increase the efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards implementation, has been emphasized for more than a decade, there is no practical tool or guidance on how to apply it. In this study, we develop a diversion path analysis tool and introduce how to apply SBD using it. A diversion path analysis tool was developed based on the elements that constitute diversion and the algorithm generated based on the initial information of facility and nuclear material flow. The results of utilizing the analysis tool depending on a different level of facility information and the safeguards set-ups were compared through examples. Taking a typical light water reactor as an example, the test analyzed the automatic generation of dedicated routes, configuration of safeguards measures, and diversion path analysis. Through this, the application and limitations of the analysis tool are discussed, and ideas for utilization according to the SBD concept and necessary regulatory guidance are proposed. The results of this study are expected to be directly utilized to domestic nuclear control during the regulation process for a construction of new nuclear power systems, and furthermore, to enhance national credibility in the engagement with the IAEA for implementation of safeguards.

• Seong-Kyu Ahn(Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI)) Corresponding author
• Bong Young Kim(Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI))
• Dae-Yong Song(Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI))
• Ho-Dong Kim(Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI))