On January 28, 2019, the US Department of Justice announced criminal charges against Huawei. A pair of indictments accusing Huawei of violating the US sanctions as well as stealing trade secrets was unsealed in two separate cases. In fact, as a technology-intensive enterprise, Huawei has always been under close scrutiny from the US government for ‘national security’ concerns, and both the criminal allegations have existed for years. The Chinese side questioned the American motives, accusing that the US is actually using law enforcement as one tool among many to achieve its policy objectives in the Huawei case. The article presents the Chinese side of the case as well as the grounds for its position.

The investment-related initiatives have been included in the FOCAC since its beginning. The investment promotion initiative is consistent, mutually sustainable, and goal-clear; the investment protection initiative relies on the protection from domestic and international law; the investment facilitation initiative becomes more important; the investment dispute resolution initiative proposes a creative new choice. Due to investment-related initiatives, the FDI between China and Africa is growing, the bilateral investment treaties are in progress, the investment facilitation situation is improved, and a new dispute resolution institution appears. The investment-related initiatives of FOCAC achieves great success to date.

This article discusses American Institute for International Steel v. the United States, which is pending in the little-known United States Court of International Trade in New York. It involves an attempt to declare that the US legislation delegating authority to the president to impose trade restrictions is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. A loss would legally curtail the president’s discretionary power to use national security as a reason to impose punitive measures against trading partners. The article identifies legal trends, where this case fits into the trade policy debates, and why it is so important. The article concludes that domestic US litigation in 2019 may well have a tremendous impact on US law and the global trading system. Many in the domestic and international trading communities (as well as those in the foreign policy and national security communities) are waiting for the results of this little-known steel litigation.

The PCA’s decision refusing historic rights concerning the 9-DL cannot be enforced because the decision advantaging the Philippines has already been rejected by China. It, however, may be as a reference for some states to negotiate, since an optimistic atmosphere emerges among the disputing parties. The readiness for negotiation among them clearly requires that parties should not have rigid attitudes but should show flexibility based on the reciprocity principle. On one side, the PRC should set aside its typical intention to dominate most parts of the South China Sea as its traditional fishing ground based on historic rights concerning the 9-DL. On the other side, the Philippines should guarantee the regional stability and peace without questioning the real sovereignty of the PRC over several natural features, possibly related to the 9-DL claimed as its historic rights. The 9-DL is incompatible with the UNCLOS.

Kazakhstan is one of the few countries worldwide endowed with a wealth of diverse natural resources. However, the country has yet to fully exploit these resources, for a variety of reasons, including high levels of corruption, ambiguous laws that cause confusion to the judiciary and consumers. The aim of this paper is to explore the exploitation of natural resource in the country from an international legal perspective. The article demonstrates how corruption hinders the exploitation of natural resources in Kazakhstan. It also describes how the current law seeks to address the issue of natural resource exploitation, noting its ambiguities. The paper concludes by highlighting the provisions made in the UN Declaration concerning Rights to Exploit Natural Resources, and makes recommendations concerning how Kazakhstan’s government can promote the rights of citizens to enjoy access to the land and natural resources.

The era of globalization has created a proverbial ‘rush’ to utilize trade and investment in developing nations. Growing fear over the abuse of developed nations’ bargaining power in these areas led the WTO to adopt remedial measures ensuring the protection of developing nations during disputes. The WTO’s dispute settlement system is unequivocally the most comprehensive form of the resolution of disputes among its Member States. Despite the numerous privileges and safeguards offered to developing Members States, reluctance and a lack of understanding in using the WTO dispute resolution process remain within these nations. This paper explains the options available to these nations, in an attempt to attract to use the dispute resolution process, and offers key insight on future amendments that can facilitate developing Member’s participation in the future. It will further articulate the statutory safeguards and favors provided to developing countries in DSS.

Millions of people worldwide use the Internet. One of the many uses derived from the Internet is the development of digital trade. Digital trade thus lends itself to distinctive issues. The WTO members recognized the benefits digital trade offers and have developed a work program to facilitate the digital trade. However, their efforts have stalled, slowing down the anticipated progress. The author will try to address how the WTO supports and deals with digital trade. This essay briefly discusses the historical advancement of the Internet; defines the concept of digital trade and its development in the international market; analyzes how existing WTO agreements have dealt with digital trade; and then addresses recent trade agreements particularly the USMCA. The USMCA was chosen because it involves the largest economy in the world and the US could use its provisions as template for future trade agreements

The Spratly Islands dispute is an ongoing territorial dispute between China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei, concerning territorial sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. This conflicting territorial claim between these coastal parties is raising tensions in Asia, so the settlement of this dispute is of key importance for a peaceful atmosphere in the area. The dispute is also significant in respect of being an international geo-strategic, economic, political and legal matter. After a 1988 armed conflict between Vietnamese and Chinese forces, the claimants have looked for approaches to solve the conflict peacefully through different informal endeavors, but due to the complexity of the dispute there are a number of barriers to reaching a permanent settlement. This study puts forward some potential approaches for resolving the dispute, considering its complex nature, by evaluating the six parties’ competing claims and analyzing the legal soundness of their claims.

In Germany, the notion of corporate criminal liability has attracted the attention of lawyers, scholars, and recently of politics. At present, legal persons are not criminally responsible but may only receive administrative fines under Section 30 of the Regulatory Offences Law. In light of recent scandals involving large business enterprises, efforts are under way to expand the liability of legal persons for misconduct, possibly leading to the introduction of criminal sanctions. In China, corporate criminal responsibility for certain offenses (unit crimes) were adopted in 1997 and has been practiced ever since. Here, both the unit and its responsible members are punished if a unit crime has occurred. In addition, administrative agencies may impose administrative sanctions and measures on the unit. Since the practical and legal problems appear similarly in the German and Chinese systems, a brief review of the Chinese experience may be helpful for the German reform process.

The US-Korea FTA, in its initial days of negotiation saw severe protests by public and political turmoil in Seoul. After crossing several procedural hoops and political hurdles in parliaments of both countries it became effective in 2012, though it was signed in 2007. At that time, it was considered by the US a ‘model agreement’ which could open opportunities for the US exporters in the Korean market. However, only couple of years later, the Trump administration called this FTA a ‘horrible’ deal that has ‘destroyed’ America. Thus, the Trump administration wanted to scrap the FTA. After considering the political implications of such action, the US government decided to re-negotiate the FTA so that the US concerns are addressed. In a short period of negotiation, both sides agreed to the revised terms of the FTA which has become effective from January 1, 2019. This paper analyses outcomes of the revised US-Korea FTA, 2018 from the US perspective and evaluate if all concerns of the US are met.

On December 27, 2017, the 31st session of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress passed the Vessel Tonnage Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China. China’s Vessel Tonnage Tax Law has basically maintained the stability of the vessel tonnage tax collection system and accorded with the basic national conditions of China’s shipping industry. The system established by China’s Vessel Tonnage Tax Law is basically a traditional vessel tonnage tax system, which is different from those implemented by many other countries. This paper explores the reason why China chooses to implement the vessel tonnage tax system and evaluates the policy within a certain scope and from a certain angle. It also examines the shortcomings of China’s vessel tonnage tax system as well as the burden brought by it to the shipping enterprises and puts forward countermeasures and suggestions for reforming and perfecting the vessel tonnage tax system in China.

The 2018 amendment of the KORUS has made an important stride in the investment chapter of the agreement. In particular, the amendment introduced new provisions to regulate multiple, subsequent or parallel ISDS proceedings involving the same governmental measures. The new provisions, however, arguably contain inherent limitations. They will be able to address only some of the multiple, subsequent or parallel proceedings. They then leave open a possibility where essentially the same investor raises a series of ISDS proceedings against essentially the same measures by an advance planning on the scope of ‘measures’ and/or form of ‘control.’ This means that the new provisions will not be able to fully prevent multiple, subsequent or parallel proceedings in the same context or circumstances from taking place, as was originally intended by the drafters. More detailed wordings and elaborations would have helped to achieve the objective. Future Joint Committee discussions or additional amendments should consider such clarification or elaboration.

In the early days of the UN, human rights was one of the most pressing issues. After the UN Commission on Human Rights was established, the international community began to draft the UDHR. By exploring UN archives, this paper finds that during that process, Pengchun Chang (P. C. Chang), the Chinese representative, drew heavily on his view that human dignity was the raison d’être of human rights, and as a consequence recognition of the importance of human dignity was a key element in the UDHR eventually adopted. I conclude that Chang was skilled in his advocacy of the recognition of human dignity as he persuaded people to reach a consensus on human rights standards, providing a common standard for all peoples and all nations. This paper will mainly ask: What was the role of human dignity in P. C. Chang’s idea on human rights? What role can we say human dignity played? How did the UDHR treat the issue of human dignity?

Considering the large number of civil, commercial and investment disputes that arise between Chinese investors and their counterparts along the Belt and Road, it is necessary to establish a dispute settlement mechanism. The open, cooperative and non-institutionalized features of the Belt and Road Initiative require the reform and improvement of China’s domestic dispute settlement mechanism for foreign civil, commercial and investment disputes; and bilateral and multilateral dispute settlement mechanisms between or among China and the Belt and Road countries should be strengthened. When appropriate, China may propose the establishment of a multilateral dispute settlement mechanism that is especially designed for the Initiative. The status quo of dispute settlement mechanisms between China and the Belt and Road countries necessitates the establishment of a preset mechanism that uses arbitration as the primary approach, litigation as the secondary approach, and mediation as an alternative.

Despite the current developments in creation of state security, the question of affording energy security is of paramount importance worldwide. Hence, all countries try to adopt myriads of laws and regulations aimed at energy security. Energy security relates to the degree of economic welfare attached to the rise or fall in either the price or availability of energy. The Islamic Republic of Iran, on the one hand is located in a strategic center of producing and exporting energy (oil and gas) known as “ellipse of energy.” On the other hand, it is situated in the transit way of energy to large consuming markets such as South and East of Asia and Europe. Thus, Iran is currently considered as an effective player in providing energy security in the world. In this article, the authors seek to analyze the strategic policies and priorities stipulated in the oil and gas-related regulations of Iran in terms of energy security.

Since the traditional definition of ‘foreign elements’ cannot meet the new requirements of the arbitration of China’s FTZs, Chinese judicial practice must create a useful supplement to already established standards. In free trade zone arbitration cases, Chinese courts determine foreign elements based on the standards of subject, object, and legal facts. In this regard, the explanation for ‘other circumstances’ in the First Judicial Interpretation of the Supreme Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law of the PRC on Foreign-Related Relations is based on the three abovementioned elements. The Chinese arbitration system and legislation must be further perfected; however, overly broad standards may impede China’s domestic arbitration system. Moreover, China must add certain restrictions to the standards: judges should distinguish the artificial foreign elements created by contracting parties, controversial civil relations should have a material connection with foreign countries, and discretion should be reasonable with sufficient nucleus.

Climate friendly technologies contribute to tackling global climate crisis and the dynamic transfer of these technologies is important to achieve universal climate actions. The UNFCCC, and its recent Paris Agreement, have introduced international assistance to promote climate related-technology transfer. They call for collaborative actions from both technology supplier and demander sides in order to enable environments for a meaningful and effective technology transfer. According to the UNFCCC, the international technology assistance is unlikely to work in a desired way with the absence of indigenous enabling environments. Therefore, it is crucial to identify, assess and overcome potential barriers potentially confronted by host countries in their acquisition of climate technologies, which helps prepare these countries for climate resilience economy and sustainable development. This paper attempts to provide a deep and comprehensive analysis on enabling policy/law environments in host countries and uses Asian countries as examples in most occasions.

Human rights education is an important measure for promoting respect for the fundamental rights and freedom of individuals. In the Chinese context, scholars have paid an increasing attention to human rights education. With special references to the UN Documents and relevant literature, the issues on human rights education in the Chinese context are worthy of being explored because HRE is both a requirement of the United Nations and China’s national human rights action plan, a necessity in establishment of a harmonious society, and one that respects human rights in China. Human rights education has its own aims, functions and significance in China. The aim of this paper is to analyze the main factors affecting human rights education in China. In doing so, it examines multiple subjects, universal objects, rich contents and flexible methods. Based on aforementioned discussion, it points out existing problems affecting human rights education in China and puts forth strategies to deal with them.

As goods and services powered by AI continue to proliferate, scholarly opinion seems to consider that current WTO law is insufficient to regulate trade in AI-powered products. The following reasons can help explain this perceived insufficiency of the WTO law: (a) AI-powered products are difficult to categorise within the perceived goods/services dichotomy under WTO law, thus causing uncertainties as to the applicable legal regime; and (b) the WTO law has yet to respond to the need for national governments to strike a balance between trade and controversial trade practices regarding AI-powered products. This paper argues that while current WTO law is far from perfect, it does partly regulate trade in AI-powered products. The following observations substantiate the partial regulation of trade in AI-powered products by the WTO law: (a) AI-powered products cannot escape existing WTO disciplines on trade in goods and trade in services, by virtue of either the involvement of AI or the perceived goods/services dichotomy; and (b) efforts to balance trade/non-trade interests associated with trade in AI-powered products are allowed under the GATT/GATS’ ‘public morals’ and security exceptions.

Many Chinese scholars advocate transplanting the American Gideon to improve the quality of criminal defense and legal aid in China. Nowadays, less than thirty percent of criminal defendants in China have counsels to represent them, and this has worsened since the year of 2012, because laws and policies have expanded the legal aid to more candidates, while the appropriations cannot keep pace with the explosive caseload. Institutional impediments also frustrate lawyers’ efforts in providing effective representation, and there is no remedy for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. This paper calls for a fuller understanding of the Gideon’s broken promise in the US, and argues that the forces most essential to the support of the Chinese Gideon can only come from China’s practice and experience.