An Internal Compliance Program (ICP) is a system through which enterprise internally manage their own export control processes to ensure compliance with domestic export control laws. Around the world, ICPs are actively utilized as a means of export control for strategic items. However, they are not mostly applied to the Trigger List Items. However, advanced countries such as the United States and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) have been actively researching the potential application of ICPs to the Trigger List Items recently. This paper suggests additional considerations that should be taken into account when applying an ICP to the Trigger List Items. The key elements of classical ICP include Top-level management commitment to compliance; Risk analysis; Organizational structure/chain of responsibilities; Human and technical resources allocated to the management of exports; Workflow management and operational procedures; Record -keeping and documentation; Selection of staff; training and awareness-raising; Process-/Systemrelated controls (ICP audit)/Corrective Measures; Physical and technical security. An ICP for Trigger List Items must encompass all these core elements. Additionally, as the nuclear industry often involves collaborative projects participating with various companies, the effectiveness of the ICP could be enhanced through the operation of consultation groups among participating companies. Furthermore, enterprises must take into account the unique characteristics of Trigger List Items that differ from other strategic items, when making requirements of the ICP establishment. First, export requirements related to safety measures and physical protection should be reviewed to export the Trigger List Items. The procedure and obligations in aspects of internationally controlled items should also be reviewed. Moreover, active support from enterprises for GTGA procedures should also be included, since the Government to Government Assurance (GTGA) procedure is additionally required for the export of Trigger List Items, in contrast to other strategic items. Additionally, for materials categorized within Trigger List Items, such as deuterium and heavy water, should be controlled based on their end-use and cumulative quantity, which Government cannot effectively manage without enterprise supports. Therefore, enterprises must establish an internal material management system based on the end-use and cumulative quantity of these materials under ICP.

Emerging technologies are innovative technologies currently under development or in the early stages of introduction. These technologies have the potential to impact a wide range of industries and sectors significantly and may, therefore, be subject to export controls. The list of emerging technologies subject to export controls varies from country to country and constantly changes as new technologies are developed. For example, the U.S., EU, and South Korea have responded to these changes by adding software and technologies related to artificial intelligence and machine learning to their export control lists. Nevertheless, export control of emerging technologies still presents challenges and limitations. The rapid pace of technological advancement makes it difficult for export control regulations to keep up. For export control purposes, international cooperation on information sharing and control methods is necessary for most countries to control similar items. Several new technologies in the nuclear field may be subject to export controls. These technologies include advanced reactors, nuclear fuel cycle technologies, and nuclear waste management technologies. Small modular reactors (SMRs) and fourth-generation reactors are being developed as advanced technologies, and new technologies are being developed to improve the nuclear fuel cycle. There is also active development of technologies for space applications utilizing nuclear reactors, such as the Nuclear Thermal Propulsion System and the Nuclear Electric Propulsion System. As these technologies may include new systems and items not in existing export control, they may pose a proliferation risk or may include software design know-how for advanced materials, it is necessary to consider whether and how they should be subject to export control to prevent nuclear proliferation. Overall, export controls are an essential issue in the emerging technology and nuclear energy sectors. Countries are moving toward strengthening regulations and international cooperation to overcome these challenges and ensure safe technology transfer, and South Korea should actively participate and lead this trend.

In the contemporary digital age, the rapid pace of technological advancement has elevated concerns regarding unauthorized technology transfers. These illicit transfers not only pose economic threats but also have the potential to compromise national security, strain international relationships, and impede technological innovation. Recognizing these challenges, the United States, as a technological leader, has implemented stringent laws and regulations to counteract such activities. Unauthorized technology transfer or disclosure is treated seriously within the United States. It can be subject to various laws, including export control regulations, economic sanctions, and Nonproliferation laws. Export control measures such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), targeting defense items, and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), focused on dual-use items, are enforced. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulations oversee U.S. trade sanctions. At the same time, the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Non-proliferation Act (INKSNA) penalizes those aiding proliferation activities in these countries. Such unauthorized transfers could undermine global security by violating international agreements like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States employs a multi-faceted approach to counter these threats, including international partnerships, strengthened export controls, diplomatic efforts, and rigorous enforcement. Beyond the legal aspects, unauthorized technology transfer carries significant economic, national security, and global trade implications. Intellectual property (IP) theft can result in economic losses, national security risks, and strained trade relations. Legal protections against IP theft encompass Patents, Trade Secrets, Copyright, and Trademark Acts. In conclusion, unauthorized technology transfers and IP theft present multi-faceted challenges with far-reaching implications for global security, economic prosperity, and international relations. The comprehensive approach taken by the United States, which combines legal measures, diplomatic engagement, and collaborative efforts, serves as a valuable example that South Korea can learn from and enhance to keep technological advancements and ensure a secure digital future.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been exporting weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to the volatile Middle East and Africa. It is expecting that military illicit activities would isolate DPRK economically, as it has been placed on multiple sanctions lists, including UN sanctions, multilateral export control regime sanctions, and country-specific sanctions. However, DPRK funds its WMD programs through various sanctions evasion activities. DPRK’s primary sanctions evasion activities include obtaining foreign currency, acquiring dualuse or restricted technology, smuggling, and money laundering, which are global in scope. This study analyzes the sanctions evasion activities used by DPRK to acquire economic, material, and technological resources for its WMD program and devises ways to disrupt these evasions effectively. First, the international community should strengthen export controls by encouraging states with weak export control regimes to join international organizations and conventions to limit DPRK arms and technology exports. Second, states should improve their intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities by sharing information on DPRK’s evasion activities and working together. This will help identify and counter DPRK’s evasion techniques and networks. Third, the international community should strengthen cooperation on DPRK’s evasion efforts. This can be done by strengthening cooperation with states and entities that enforce international sanctions and by working with relevant agencies such as customs, immigration, and police to track and interdict the movement of funds and assets used for evasion. Fourth, publicize DPRK’s illicit activities and apply diplomatic pressure. Diplomatic pressure can lead to more states and entities to enforce sanctions. In conclusion, these strategies are expected to deter DPRK’s illicit activities; but to sanction DPRK effectively, it is essential to continue to adjust and refine the strategies in response to DPRK’s evolving sanctions evasion efforts. The results of this research are expected to prevent WMD proliferation through DPRK by blocking or reducing the risk of sanctions evasion.

This study examined the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s illegal trade in UNsanctioned items as revealed in the UN panel of experts report in order to estimate the types of illegal trade in nuclear items, one of the UN-sanctioned prohibited items, and to find efficient ways to block it. Also, The research revealed that DPRK secretly imports UN-sanctioned prohibited items without going through customs through maritime transshipment, conceals or disguises them through identity laundering by falsifying documents at customs clearance, and makes various attempts to escape the international community’s surveillance, such as using a combination of methods such as Re-Flagged and Double-Flagged for identity laundering, and concealing them without operating the Automatic Identification System (AIS) at sea. The DPRK’s Illicit trade cases have been divided into two types of transactions: those that violate customs clearance procedures by providing false information to customs through disguise or concealment, and those that do not go through normal customs procedures, such as smuggling. To block customs violations, technical measures such as increasing the number of inspections of container ships or improving the accuracy of inspections are required, while to block smuggling, since it does not go through physical inspections, there are ways to monitor it through satellite images or strengthen border enforcement such as airport bays and land routes. As a result, DPRK’s nuclear items are designated as sanctioned items under UN resolutions, and it is assumed that DPRK and its networks will attempt to trade illegally through a combination of customs clearance violations and non-customs clearance violations, depending on the circumstances. Furthermore, since DPRK is subject to extensive sanctions from the international community, including the UN, in connection with its nuclear weapons program, illegal trade continues, and efforts should be made to block illegal trade through physical inspection at customs clearance.

The concept of catch-all controls is not new, having been developed in the US and EU over 30 years ago and legislated about 20 years ago. It is a system that controls what is not in an item based on the end-user and end-use rather than the strategic items defined by the existing multilateral export control regimes. Most importantly, the controls are based on end-user or end-use. Catch-all controls are the best tool to solve the problems of traditional list based controls. Technological advances, emerging technologies, and globalization have made standard export controls insufficient. Catch-all controls are optimized to control non-compliant, under-specified, partial, and intangible technology transfers. Catch-all controls have been adopted and implemented in the four multilateral export control regimes (MECR) and are also reflected in legislation in the United States and the European Union. The NSG has a catch-all provision in INFCIRC/254/Part2 Paragraph 5, the AG has a catch-all condition in the Guidelines, and the MTCR has a catch-all provision in the Guidelines Paragraph 7. Korea has also implemented catch-all controls reflected in the Foreign Trade Act of 2004. However, there are still many challenges of catch-all controls. First, the problem with catch-all controls is that there are different cases in different countries for list controls, and there are too many cases in other countries to control what is not on the list. Second, there is very little international legal enforcement for failing or missing catch-all controls. Finally, information about these catch-all cases is not uniformly available. For catch-all control, Korea currently consolidates the list of traders of concern including UN sanction list and denial list of MECR, provides a correlation table of significant items and countries requiring catch-all control for stakeholders, and organizes and operates a coordination committee for traders of concerns. In the future, Korea should strengthen the monitoring of other countries’ catch-all control cases and participate in international cooperation meetings to disseminate Korea’s best practices.

Efforts for nuclear non-proliferation have continued since the development of nuclear weapons and the conclusion of the NPT Treaty. Nuclear proliferation requires materials, facilities, and human resources to make nuclear weapons, and it takes a medium to long-term time. There are many restrictions in the current system to obtain nuclear materials and facilities, so it is often done through illegal means, black markets, or confidential transactions. Methods have been developed to evaluate the nuclear non-proliferation regime to strengthen the non-proliferation and solve the problems. The IAEA and the United States DOE initiated the proliferation resistance evaluation in 1980. The DOE conducted the assessment in three main evaluation categories: materials, technical characteristics of facilities, and institutional barriers. In another nuclear non-proliferation evaluation study, some researchers evaluated three main types: current capacity, political situation, and international situation. Detailed indicators include economic capacity, industrial capacity, nuclear capacity, leader’s intentions, political structure, competitive relations, alliances, and international norms. Most of these evaluations are based on the situation at the time of assessment at the national level. Historical examples of nuclear proliferation are rare, and verification is also challenging. The Bayesian probability is widely used when the data is small, experiments are impossible, and the causal relationship is unclear. A Bayesian network is a combination of Bayesian probability and graphics. It is used throughout the industry because it can easily derive results according to causal relationships and weights of various variables, evaluate the risk for decision-making, and obtain changed results through data updates. In particular, to evaluate the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Freeman developed the Freeman network in 2008 and the Freeman-Mella network in 2014. Freeman explained in detail only the process of deriving variables, correlations, and probabilities of factors related to factors such as motivation, intention, and resources. It isn’t easy to view as an objective result value because it does not describe the academic background for path selection, motivation list, intention, and resource variable selection. However, the research was meaningful because he first used the Bayesian network for nuclear proliferation. Although some studies have been done at the macro level, there is no case of applying it in export controls, which is the beginning of the actual spread. Also, there is no quantitative value for factors for risk assessment. There is little data, and verification of causality is difficult, so if the Bayesian network is applied to export control and applied to actual implementation, it will help make decisions such as export license or export denial.

After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia continued to deploy military forces and equipment near the Ukrainian border in March and October of 2021, heightening the international crisis. On February 24, 2022, Russia began its full-scale invasion of Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, with missiles and ground forces. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was accompanied by an urgent speech by Russian President Vladimir Putin on the day he would conduct a special military operation in Ukraine. Putin warned that Russia would seek to demilitarize Ukraine and retaliate immediately if foreign interference occurred. In particular, he stated that the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and exploitation of Ukrainian territory was unacceptable. Due to the current Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States has updated export controls and sanctions as of March 15. Extensive US export controls and sanctions recently imposed on some areas of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine have included industries such as defense, aerospace, energy, and finance. Executive Order EO14065 is issued to ban transactions with specific individuals and entities, including financial institutions. Additionally, Executive Order EO14066 has banned US imports of Russian oil, natural gas, and coal and new investments in the Russian energy sector. The EAR was revised to strengthen export controls on Russia and Belarus. The sanctions imposed include 48 major defense companies, 328 personnel, and the CEO of Sberbank, which produced weapons used in the attack on Ukraine. Companies are listed on the Sectoral Sanctions Identification (SSI) List, and individuals are listed on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List. Sanctions such as asset freezing and a ban on all financial transactions with Americans apply. In line with the international trend, Korea also declared its participation in sanctions against Russia. As of March 25, 2022, export controls have been strengthened by newly established items subject to catchall licenses related to Russia and Belarus. Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE) added Fifty-seven items to Annex 2-2 in the Notification of Export and Import of Strategic Items. Most of these sanctions are for dual-use items under the jurisdiction of MOTIE. However, as countries, organizations, and individuals who may be subject to catch-all licenses are included in the sanctions list, Nuclear Safety and Security Commission should also review catch-all licenses for Trigger List Items. These sanctions are expected to last for some time. Even though China and Russia are the Nuclear Weapon States, the US has strengthened export controls. This is likely due to the opacity of China and Russia’s export controls system and the lack of active implementation of UN Security Council sanctions. However, there is an aspect of protecting their technology. It seems that Korea should also pay attention to these changes in international trends and keep pace with the level of control in other countries.