Even though it is emphasized to apply safeguards-by-design (SBD) concept in the early phase of the design of a new nuclear facilities, there is no clear guideline or tools for the practical SBD implementation. Generally known approach is trying to review whether there is any conflicts or shortcomings on a conceptual safeguards components in a design information. This study tries to build a systematic tools which can be easily applied to safeguards analysis. In evaluating the safeguards system or performance in a facility, it is essential to analyze the diversion path for nuclear materials. Diversion paths, however, can be either extremely simplified or complicated depending on the level of knowledge and purpose of specific person who do analyze in the field. In the context, this study discusses the applicability of an event tree and fault tree method to generating diversion paths systematically. The essential components constituting the diversion path were reviewed and the logical flow for systematically creating the diversion path was developed. The path generation algorithm based on the facility design components and logical flow as well as the initial information of the nuclear materials and material flows was test using event tree and fault tree analysis tools. The usage and limitation of the applicability of this two logic methods are discussed and idea to incorporate the logic algorithm into the practical program tools is suggested.The results will be used to develop a program module which can systematically generate diversion paths using the event tree and fault tree method.