In order to facilitate its Belt and Road Initiative, China has issued dozens of policy documents and detailed guidelines, improved its legal and supervisory systems, and taken full advantage of all existing cooperation mechanisms at the bilateral, regional, sub-regional and multilateral levels. The current cooperation mechanism is characterized by non-systemicity, which makes it dependent upon other existing regional cooperation mechanisms. In fact, it has no uniform institutional structure, nor any dispute settlement mechanism. Although this non-systematic approach is based in China’s successful experience in opening up to outside influence and in the flexibility that enabled its rise to global prominence, this very flexibility also poses challenges to the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative by leaving it open to conflict with existing regional cooperation mechanisms. Therefore, to ensure the success of the Belt and Road Initiative, China should undertake a systematic plan for implementation by establishing a comprehensive legal framework; streamlining paths to economic cooperation; and institutionalizing the cooperation mechanism with a formal dispute settlement mechanism at its core.

In the South China Sea Arbitration, the Chinese term-“li shi xing quan li” was mistranslated into “historic rights short of title,” regardless of the official English translation provided by Chinese government and preserved by international organizations. ‘quan li’ connotes a categorical meaning covering sovereignty and non-sovereignty rights, while “li shi xing” relates to claims and conduct historically before 1982. China’s “li shi xing quan li” in the SCS developed with the history of the general category of historic rights-an umbrella concept connoting both exclusive historic title and non-exclusive historic sovereign rights. It included China’s exclusive sovereignty over nansha qundao in the SCS and its non-exclusive sovereign rights in part of SCS. The Arbitral Tribunal’s negligence of the conceptual difference led to uncertainty in China’s maximum maritime entitlements in the SCS and reasonable doubt about its decision on the Philippines’ Submissions 1 and 2.

Official Announcements of China and the Philippines have clarified their claims over the Huangyan Island, which has compartmentalized its history into three periods. Period I: Before 1946. China had acquired its title by discovery of terra nullius, and consolidated into a full title with the historical consolidation process. The Philippines made no claims in this period; instead its laws confirmed the Island lies out of its territory. Period II: 1946–1997. The Philippine evidences are private in nature, or contradictory to its laws and governmental position, thus making its claims vulnerable. China had exercised an open and peaceful effective occupation over the Island with superior evidences. Period III: After 1997. According to the ICJ judgment, April 30, 1997 was tentatively determined the critical date. Since China acquired its territorial sovereignty over the Island before the critical date, the Philippines’ acts cannot alter China’s ownership of the Island.