During PIV (Physical Inventory Verification), the IAEA has been inspecting the CANDU-Type spent fuels using an optical fiber-based scintillation detector. KINAC has developed a new verification instrument to deal with problems of the existing one such as low sensitivity, heavy and large dimension, and inconvenience-in-use. Our previous studies focused on how to develop the new instrument and had not included its performance tests. Field tests were carried out recently at Wolsung unit 4 to evaluate performance of the existing and new instruments. The objective of this paper is to discuss background noise produced in the optical fiber signal cable itself. The verification equipment for the CANDU-type Heavy Water Reactor spent fuels uses a scintillation detector to bond a scintillation material to the end of an optical signal cable. At this time, the radiation signal obtained by a data acquisition system is the signal generated from the scintillator (p-terphenyl organic scintillator) and the optical signal cable ; The signal produced in the optical cable itself is background noise to degrade the spent fuel verification equipment. To characterize the background radiation noise, the spent fuel bundles at Wolsung Unit 4 were measured using the optical fiber cable without the radiation scintillator. This signal is generated by reaction of the optical cable and the radiation emitted from the spent fuel. From experimental results, it was observed that the background noise signal of the optical cable increased as the optical cable went down in the downward direction, because the cable length irradiated by the radiation increased with the optical cable area in the spent fuel storage pool. Difference in the background noise signal was dependent on the location of the vertical direction and the signal of the new optical cable was up to about 5 times higher than that of the existing cable. While, the new cable has the cross-section area about 3.2 times larger than the old cable. Our past studies showed that total signal amplitude – sum of signals generated from the scintillator and optical fiber - of the new verification instrument was at least about 15 times greater than that of the existing one. Considering the total signal and background noise signal, from this measured results, it was confirmed that the scintillator characteristics – in particular, light output and decay time – has a dominant impact on the signal sensitivity of the newly developed instrument. More details will be discussed at the conference.

Dry storage cask facilities are considered for temporary storage of spent nuclear fuels before their final disposal. According to relevant domestic laws and regulations, the integrity and gross defects of the PWR spent fuel must be inspected before they are transferred to the dry cask from a wet storage pool of a nuclear power plant. To meet nuclear safeguards requirements for a spent fuel transportation, the KINAC has been working to develop a simple and convenient Non-destructive Testing (NDT) equipment to verify the integrity and gross defects of the spent fuel assembly. This study was conducted in two processes. The first stage is to review the current NDT techniques conducted in the nuclear fuel manufacturing process. During the manufacturing process, the Ultrasonic testing (UT) and Eddy Current Testing (ECT) technique are used for detecting the cracks or foreign materials in a cladding of a fresh fuel. During an over-haul period after an end of one fuel cycle, the sipping test of the spent fuel is performed for detecting the failed fuel assemblies. If it is determined through the sipping test whether any fuel assembly contains a failed fuel rod, the failed fuel rod of lots of fuel rods in the assembly is found out using the UT instrument. The ECT is used for detecting the internal defects and oxide layer thickness of a fuel cladding. Because the UT and ECT are the wellknown technique and has already been employing for the spent fuel inspection, we adopted the UT and ECT technique for development of a new instrument for nuclear safeguards verification. The second stage is to design the UT and ECT equipment in consideration of nuclear safeguards activities in the spent fuel pool. For nuclear safeguards inspection, irradiated fuel or non-fuel items are distinguished. Thus, verification equipment newly designed using the UT and ECT should detect not only a failed rod, but also a false tube, or a false rod, or a different material from a cladding. New probe and signal processing methods are developed to achieve these goals. The design of UT and ECT probes are preferentially carried out according to technical requirements – the probe thickness including a damper material should be less than 1.0 mm - and the study on analyzing signal distortion caused from material difference will be conducted for development of the safeguards inspection equipment. Detailed results of our study will be discussed in this conference.