This study introduces the licensing process carried out by the regulatory body for construction and operation of the 2nd phase low level radioactive waste disposal facility in Gyeongju. Also, this study presents the experience and lessons learned from this regulatory review for preparing the license review for the next 3rd phase landfill disposal facility. Korea Radioactive Waste Agency (KORAD) submitted a license application to Nuclear Safety and Security commission (NSSC) on December 24, 2015 to obtain permit for construction and operation of the national engineered shallow land disposal facility at Wolsong, Gyeongju. NSSC and Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) started the regulatory review process with an initial docket review of the KORAD application including Safety Analysis Report, Radiological Environmental Report and Safety Administration Rules. After reflecting the results of the docket review, the safety review of revised 10 application documents began on November 29, 2016. Total 856 queries and requests for additional information were elicited by thorough technical review until November 16, 2021. As the Gyeongju and Pohang earthquakes occurred in September 2016 and November 2017, respectively, the seismic design of the disposal facility for vault and underground gallery was enhanced from 0.2 g to 0.3 g and the site safety evaluation including groundwater characteristics was re-investigated due to earthquake-induced fault. Also, post-closure safety assessments related to normal/abnormal/human intrusion scenarios were re-performed for reflecting the results of site and design characteristics. Finally, NSSC decided to grant a license of the 2nd phase low level radioactive waste disposal facility under the Nuclear Safety Laws in July 2022. This study introduces important issues and major improvements in terms of safety during the review process and presents the lessons learned from the experience of regulatory review process.

Numerical model was developed that simulates radionuclide (3 H and 14C) transport modeling at the 2nd phase facility at the Wolsong LILW Disposal Center. Four scenarios were simulated with different assumptions about the integrity of the components of the barrier system. For the design case, the multi-barrier system was shown to be effective in diverting infiltration water around the vaults containing radioactive waste. Nevertheless, the volatile radionuclide 14C migrates outside the containment system and through the unsaturated zone, driven by gas diffusion. 3 H is largely contained within the vaults where it decays, with small amounts being flushed out in the liquid state. Various scenarios were examined in which the integrity of the cover barrier system or that of the concrete were compromised. In the absence of any engineered barriers, 3 H is washed out to the water table within the first 20 years. The release of 14C by gas diffusion is suppressed if percolation fluxes through the facility are high after a cover failure. However, the high fluxes lead to advective transport of 14C dissolved in the liquid state. The concrete container is an effective barrier, with approximately the same effectiveness as the cover.

본 연구는 경주 중·저준위처분장 2단계 표층처분시설의 폐쇄 후 안전성에 대한 불확실성을 예측·평가하기 위하여 수행되 었다. 다중덮개와 처분고의 건전/열화를 고려한 총4가지의 시나리오를 도출하여 강우침투 시 예상되는 처분시설 내부의 유 체 이동을 모사하였다. 강우 조건은 총 30년(1985~2014) 간의 월평균 데이터를 적용하였으며, 시뮬레이션 기간은 제도적 관 리기간인 300년으로 설정하였다. 처분덮개와 처분고 콘크리트 모두 건전성을 유지하는 조건의 기본 시나리오 평가 결과, 처 분시설 내부의 처분고를 완전히 포화시키지 못하는 것을 확인할 수 있었다. 다중 덮개층을 구성하는 8개 층의 각 매질의 모 세관 압력과 투과도 차이로 인하여 다중 덮개층이 효과적으로 차수·배수 역할을 하는 것으로 나타났다.