KINAC is trying to build a comprehensive aerial view of the nuclear material balance to predict North Korea’s weapons-grade nuclear material production capacity. We are creating a visualization model for North Korea’s nuclear facilities as part of these efforts. However, information on North Korea’s nuclear facilities is scarce, and it is not easy to consider additional facilities other than those already known. In addition, in the case of a model that targets only exceptional situations, it is not easy to secure objectivity for model validation, so it is necessary to upgrade to a general-purpose analysis tool that can be applied more generally. The following two examples are proposed as an analysis tool that can be a high degree of analysis. The first case is an Acquisition Path Analysis (APA) utilized to introduce IAEA’s State-Level Approach (SLA). The acquisition path analysis aims to find and evaluate the technically possible pathways to obtain nuclear materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive development. It can be an acquisition route if it is possible to produce at least 1 Significant Quantity (SQ) of weapongrade nuclear material within five years. The assessment of technologically feasible pathways is based on available information about the country’s past and present nuclear cycle capabilities. The second is the IAEA Physical Model. The IAEA Physical Model was carried out to introduce a comprehensive approach to all information on a country’s nuclear activities. It describes and characterizes the technologies and processes expressed at all levels of the acquisition path, depending on the development objectives. The IAEA Physical Model attempts a multi-tiered acquisition path analysis to identify all known technologies and processes in the nuclear fuel cycle, from raw material production to weapon usable material acquisition. Based on this analysis, the IAEA evaluates the signs of nuclear proliferation in a specific country. Based on the two cases discussed above, we intend to derive the following implications and priorities for extending the existing nuclear cycle model to a more general-purpose for a specific country. First of all, the requirements necessary to evaluate nuclear non-proliferation or verification of denuclearization must be at a level that the international community can recognize. In the stage of actual denuclearization verification, since verification will be conducted through the IAEA, a corresponding level of tools and technology will be required. From this point of view, the following is presented as a prerequisite for adding versatility to the existing physical model: It is necessary to derive all processes related to the nuclear cycle and standardize relevant indicators and data. In order to determine the signs of nuclear activity, detailed information on technologies, materials, by-products, and wastes, which are essential for each process, is required. For denuclearization verification, cumulative information from the past to the time point is required, and a comparative analysis of the operation history information of all facilities and the amount of nuclear material is required. To this end, it is necessary to make it possible to trace the history at every point where it can be determined that nuclear material has been diverted so that missing nuclear material can be found. Based on this, it is expected that it can be possible to evaluate a hypothetical threat state, but it is also expected that it will be easy to verify the model through the evaluation of easily accessible domestic facilities.