Recently companies have increased the new projects to improve and innovate the business process in order to adopt the advanced technologies such as IoT (Internet of Things), Big Data Analysis, Cloud Computing, mobile and artificial intelligence technologies for sustainable competitive advantages under rapid technological and socioeconomic external environmental changes. However, there are obstacles to achieve the project goals, corporate's strategy and objectives due to various kind of risks based on characteristics of projects and conflicts of stakeholders participated on projects. Hence, the solutions are required to resolve the various kind of risks and conflicts of stakeholders. The objectives of this study are to investigate the impact of the project governance, agency conflicts on the project success based on agency theory by using the statistical hypothesis testing the relationship among those variables. As a result of hypothesis testing, we could find that the project governance impacts positively on project success and negatively on the agency conflicts. Further, the agency conflicts impacts negatively on the project success. Finally, we could find that the agency conflicts such as goal conflict, different risk attitude and information asymmetry between project manager and team members impact negatively on the project success. Meanwhile, the project governance impact positively on the project success, negatively impact on the agency conflicts such as goal conflict, different risk attitude and information asymmetry between project manager and project team members. In order to increase the project success rate, the project governance institutions such as PGB (Project Governance Board), EPMO (Enterprise Project Management Office), PSC (Project Steering Committee) are needed to prevent or reduce the agency conflicts between project manager and team members. 1)

Prior literature expects a lower marginal cash value for weaker governance firms. We test this empirical hypothesis by using the sample of publicly traded Korean firms from 2005 to 2013. To measure the quality of governance structures, we employ the corporate governance scores provided by Korean Corporate Governance Services. The empirical model of Faulkender and Wang (2006) is adopted to estimate the marginal value of cash. Our empirical analysis shows a higher marginal value of cash for the good governance firms in the examination of the total governance score. This finding is consistent to the agency view of cash policy predicting a larger marginal value of cash for the firms with higher governance scores. However, this positive relationship is not robust for a subset of detailed governance scores; a lower marginal cash value is observed for the firms with better qualities of board structure, auditing, dividend policies. Moreover, our empirical analysis verifies a quite low level of marginal cash value for Korean firms, which supports the existence of severe agency conflicts in Korean corporations. Our results verify the significant role of agency conflicts between a manager and shareholders in the determination of marginal cash values in the Korean firms.