Past service recovery research is dyadic in nature, focusing most prominently on bilateral relationships between the firm and the individual customer. However, customers rarely make use of services alone, thus creating a failure context where another customer (i.e., bystander) is socially present, and switching from a dyadic to a triadic perspective. A phenomenon, idiosyncratic to triadic relationships, is coalition forming, which refers to the temporary alliance among individuals to pursue a specific goal. In service recovery, customers may form coalitions to increase compensation likelihoods and service employees may form coalitions to strengthen their position against roaring complainants. Prior research suggests that relationship strength between people drives coalition forming, which can be explained by emotional contagion processes. Therefore, we seek to answer: (1) Are coalitions formed in service failure situations, and (2) do they follow predictable patterns? To answer our research questions we conducted a 2x2x2 experiment (N=1242), using video and photographic material to manipulate relationship strengths (high vs. low) between the complainant, the bystander, and the service employee. The trilateral dimension was incorporated as another between-factor by illustrating the eight different relationship-strengths versions in the perspectives of the three parties. Manipulations and variable measurement were checked successfully. T-tests confirm that the likelihoods of the complainant-bystander and the service employee-bystander coalition are significantly larger than zero (p’s < .01). Specifically, the likelihood-values ranged from 4.5% to 33.1%. For the complainant-bystander relationship, results reveal a significant and positive indirect effect of relationship strength on the complainant’s coalition forming intentions with the bystander, mediated by his emotional contagion with the bystander. The same holds true vice versa for the bystander’s coalition forming intentions with the complainant. Accordingly, data reveal a positive indirect effect of relationship strength on the likelihood of the complainant-bystander coalition, mediated by both party’s emotional synchrony (i.e., measured as the product of both party’s emotional contagion with each other). Likewise results were obtained for the service employee-bystander relationship, where relationship strength eventually increased the likelihood of the service employee-bystander coalition, mediated by both party’s emotional synchrony. Our results show that there is value in considering service failure and recovery situations from a triadic perspective, which so far has received considerable research attention outside service recovery, for instance in social-psychological domains such as family therapies.

This research offers a concise retrospect on the South-South Coalition Strategy within multilateral trade negotiations of the GATT/WTO framework. The SSC strategy evolved in the postwar era, when the South integrated itself to demand for a New International Economic Order featured by fairness of outcome in international economic rules and activities. It then encountered an opponent trend of neo-liberalism, through which the South practically decided to sectoral exchange of economic interests with the North. From the new millennium onward, the South is learning to adopt a more issue-specific SSC strategy in trade negotiations. Although a question is arising for the future of SSC because of some emerging nations rising out from the traditional South group, a timely reflection from an evolutionary perspective would facilitate the understanding of the SSC strategy for weak countries to establish a fairer international economic order.

현대의 항만은 선박 대형화가 진행됨에 따라 허브 & 스포크 방식의 전략이 강화 되었다. 이러한 항만 이용자의 니즈 변화에 따라 항만 역시 대형화 및 현대화 되는 추세이다. 이 같은 상황 하에서 기존 항만 운영의 변화가 예상된다. 중, 소규모의 운영사 연합 운영을 통해 경제적, 운영적 효과를 도모하는 움직임은 하나의 예로 들 수 있다. 본 연구에서는 부산항 신항을 대상으로 중, 소규모의 운영사 연합이 경제 적 측면에서 어떠한 효과를 내는지에 대해 분석하였다. 더불어 운영사 연합 내에서 비용배분의 문제를 게임이론을 통해 제시하였다. 결과적으 로 현재와 같이 5개의 운영사로 나뉘어 운영되는 것보다 연합하여 운영할 경우 운영사 측면에서 비용 감소의 효과가 있는 것으로 나타났다. 연합에 참여한 운영사 간에 비용을 배분하는데 있어 비례배분법, 샤플리밸류, 중핵 방법을 사용하는 것을 고려하였으며, 본 연구에서는 샤플 리밸류 방법이 가장 적합한 방법으로 나타났다.

Purpose: This study examines the impact of individual reciprocal preferences on coalition formation. The reciprocal model considers a player’s own payoff, the player’s perception of others’ payoffs, and others’ perceptions of the player’s payoff. Research design, data and methodology: A reciprocal model is built to illustrate how reciprocity influences individual decisions in a coalition game and its formation. The prediction is examined with experimental evidences from a dictator game and a membership game. Results: The theoretical result suggests that the coalition formation could be unstable due to negative reciprocal kindness. The experimental findings support that negative reciprocal kindness could lead players participating in a coalition, no matter their dominant strategies are. When subjects were essential to make contributions to a coalition, they were more likely to cooperate if they were treated badly. In contrast, when subjects were unnecessary, the reciprocal kindness could enhance cooperative tendencies. Conclusions: This study reveals that the reciprocal behavior could influence individual decisions and reshape the coalition formation. In terms of policy implications, this study has shown that coalition formation could be reshaped by reciprocal prefe rences. Due to the strategic and complicated decision process in an interactive environment, a comprehensive investigation of factors would be required in a climate coalition in practice.