In this study, factors analysis is performed for reducing friction in elevation motion of a large television stand over 50 inch. The first study is for specification decision and volume compensation experiment as an apparatus for compensating of the volume of the cylinder is compressed as the volume of piston rod. The second study is for optimized piston structure development by comparison pipe orifice and labyrinth orifice. Consequently, the result of total consideration in stability problem and performance of volume compensation for specification decision and volume compensation experiment is determined the final speculation of hollow rod ∅8 x ∅4 and riveting system. and the labyrinth orifice is not founded that of the Ø0.4~0.6 orifice both tests on 300 mm intervals.

The study for reducing friction in elevation motion of a large television stand using over 50 inches is performed in this paper. The first study attempted to reduce the frictional force the gas seal lip technology. The second study is for optimized piston structure development by comparison pipe orifice and labyrinth orifice. As the result of the first study, in the gas seal lip technology, the outer-inner diameter of Ø20 × Ø8 in the test result of hollow rod is revealed more proper if the weight of 50 inch television assumed as 30. As the result of the second study, the optimized piston structure development through experiment is fixed orifice specification as labyrinth orifice because pipe orifice is founded slip up/down phenomenon of the Ø0.4~1.0 orifice and the labyrinth orifice is not founded that of the Ø0.4~0.6 orifice both tests on 300 mm intervals.

This paper explores the impact of corporate control, measured by ownership structure, on top-executives’ compensation in Japan. According to agency theory, the pay-performance link is expected to be affected by the firm’s ownership structure. Using a sample of 4,411 firm-year observations (401 firms for the 11-years period from 2001 to 2011) for Japanese non-financial firms publicly traded on the first section and second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), this study demonstrates that institutional ownership (both financial and corporate) is negatively related to the level of executives’ compensation. Such finding is in line with efficient monitoring hypothesis which claims that the presence of institutional shareholders provides direct monitoring over managers, limits managerial self-dealing and curves the increase in top-executives pay. On the other hand, the results also show that managerial ownership is positively related to their compensation which supports managerial power theory hypothesis, i.e. management-controlled firms are more likely to extract more compensation from the business than other firms. Overall, this study confirms that corporate control has significant impact on cash compensation paid to Japanese top-executives after controlling the conventional pay-performance relationship.