The primary purpose of this paper is to know which formulation of FET standard among the diverse drafting approaches best serves the interests of both States and investors. In this respect, the paper first will have a review of general categorization of FET in a number of IIAs. Subsequently, it will focus on the two most controversial formulations of FET: (1) as a standalone clause and (2) with reference to the minimum standard of treatment under customary international law. In light of this, it will discuss the impact of the various FET drafts on the decisions of arbitral tribunals dealing with this standard. Lastly, the paper will also explore the most recent approaches to the formulation of FET to see if they are capable of brining clarity in the overall discussion of FET’s formulation as well as interpretation. In short, these recent constructions of FET clauses may best serve these interests as they bring clarity.
China’s foreign investment has been growing rapidly since 1990s. In this course, the first investor-state arbitration case raised by a mainland Chinese investor, Ping An v. Belgium, drew attention to an important issue – jurisdiction ratione temporis in successive international investment agreements. It is controversial in theory and practice as to whether the basic principle of non-retroactivity should apply to the dispute settlement clause in a successive agreement. This is especially true when tribunals are interpreting different kinds of jurisdictional clauses. This paper will take the Ping An Case as an opportunity to thoroughly analyze the issue of temporal jurisdiction in successive international investment agreements. Based on such analysis, this paper will also do reflection on relevant articles in China’s existing investment agreements, providing suggestions to China regarding the issue of jurisdiction ratione temporis, in an effort to make arbitration more certain and avoid possible dismissal, as occurred in the Ping An Case.
The practice of International Investment Agreements (IIAs) has developed immensly during the past 15 years. In particular, China has gained significant experience in concluding IIAs, adapting to concerns raised following an overflow of investor state disputes. This article analyzes an interesting case-study: an investment promotion agreement signed and negotiated between China and Israel (CIBIT) during the 1990s, however ratified more than a decade later, in 2009, without modifying or updating its contents. This commentary identifies major gaps in the CIBIT, including those concerning its preamble, key definitions of ‘Investment’ and ‘Investor’, standard of protection: FET, MFN, NT, and ISDS provisions, vis-à-vis the wider transformation of international investment law. Special emphasis is given to China’s change in approach to investment and IIAs. The growing economic ties between China and Israel, including recent discussions about a free trade agreement, requires a thorough understanding of the risks and benefits of the CIBIT. Therefore, the commentary concludes with an outline of a strategic roadmap for the future revision of the CIBIT.