The impending British exit (Brexit) from the European Union has placed the UK’s investment policy at a crossroads. A post-Brexit UK will now have to reorganise its investment relationships with its economic partners through bespoke UK IIAs. This exercise will have to accommodate the shifting zeitgeist concerning the balance of investors’ rights and the right to regulate IIAs that is expected. This paper examines the continued relevance of the recently minted Investment Protection Chapter in the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, acknowledged by Britain’s power brokers, as a persuasive model for the UK to emulate for this purpose. This is notwithstanding the uncertainties that now surround the implementation and efficacy of the Agreement in light of Brexit and a pending decision from the Court of Justice of the European Union. Such emulation would ultimately make for a better Investor-State Dispute Settlement System in the UK IIAs by providing a much needed update to its old investment treaty architecture.

Three foreign investment laws of China were enacted when she was mainly a capitalimporting state. The main purpose of these laws was to boost the Chinese economy with the capital, technology and management of foreign investors. Many preferential treatments, rather than national treatment, were given to foreign investment especially before the country joined the WTO. Following the reform of market economy, fair and equal treatment to foreign investors are replacing the preferential treatments. A new draft of Foreign Investment Law was released in the spring of 2015 to reform the governance of foreign investment by granting national treatment to foreign investors in both admission and operation. The restrictions to foreign investment will be subject to the categories of special administrative measures, which are composed of forbidden and restrictive categories. This is going to be China’s biggest reform on the legal system of foreign investment since 1980s.

Canada and China’s new Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (“CC-FIPA”) came into force on October 1, 2014. This work discusses some of the main benefits to be gained from building stronger investment relations between Canada- China, as well as a Canadian perspective on the main investment risks that are most likely to impede either country from achieving the full potential in their investment relations. Against this backdrop, this work then examines those provisions in the CCFIPA that are most central to promoting Canada-China investment benefits, as well as those provisions that are most relevant to protecting against the investment risks in Canada-China relations.

일반적인 국제법의 관점에서, 어느 국가도 외국투자를 유치하도록 강요 받을 수 없다. 영토내에서 주권을 행사하는 국가는 그들의 경제를 외국인투자자들에게 폐쇄할지 또는 개방할지에 관하여 자유롭게 결정할 권리를 가진다. 이에는 외국인투자자를 받아들여 사업을 수행함에 있어서 일정한 방법과 절차를 결정할 권리도 포함된다. 투자조약을 체결한 국가는 외국인투자를 받아들여 투자사업을 허용하여야 할 의무를 부담하며 이는 국내외 경제상황이 변할지라도 계속적으로 구속적 효력을 가진다는 것을 주지하여야 한다과거 오랜 기간 기업들이 국제적 경제영역에서 활동하고 있지만, 국제법은 기업들의 국제투자를 감독하고 보호하는 문제에 있어서 통일적인 해답을 제시하지는 못하고 있다. 국제투자를 보호하기 위한 여러 노력들이 이루어지고 있지만, 아직 국제투자를 보호하기 위한 국제법적 기반은 부족하다. 외국인투자자와 투자유치국간 투자를 시작하기 전 투자와 관련된 이행요건을 금지하거나, 보호대상이 되는 투자의 개념을 확고히 하고, 분쟁발생시 적용하는 준거법을 결정함에 있어서 국제법일반, 양자간 투자협정, 투자유치국의 국내법 등을 적용한다. 그러나 국제투자분쟁에 있어서 중요한 준거법규정을 비롯하여 외국인 투자자 및 투자를 보호하기 위한 안정적인 국제법 규정 또는 분쟁해결 체제는 아직 확실히 마련되지 않았다. 따라서 외국인 투자자 및 투자를 보호하기 위한 법적 구조는 다음의 규정을 포함하여야 한다. 첫째, 투자자와 국가간 분쟁이 발생하는 경우 ICSID와 같은 국제분쟁해결기구에 분쟁을 판단하도록 하여야 한다. 둘째, 준거법 결정과 관련하여, 투자유치국의 조치로 인하여 피해를 받은 외국인투자자에게 완전한 가치를 보상하도록 하는 국제적 기준을 제공하여야 한다. 셋째, 외국인투자자의 이익에 대한 완전한 가치를 평가 또는 결정에 있어서 무형자산, 지적재산권 등을 포함한 모든 자산의 가치를 포함하여야 한다. 이러한 노력으로 외국인투자는 계속 촉진될 것이다.

This study aims to examine the relationship of the four factors that increase the protection of minority shareholder investment. The factors are non-controlling shareholders, corporate governance, free cash flow, and shareholder wealth. The data for this study is obtained from the 2017 annual reports of 136 Thai public companies listed in the Market of Alternative Investment of Thailand (MAI). The analysis uses a multiple regression model to determine which factors encourage and which inhibit the protection of minority shareholder investment. The study tests four hypotheses. The results rejected H1 because non-controlling shareholders have negatively correlated with minority shareholder investment protection (beta -0.155 and p-value 0.050). The results accepted H2, H3 and H4 as follows. H2: corporate governance has positively correlated with minority shareholder investment protection (beta 0.17 and p-value 0.031). H3: free cash flow has positively correlated with minority shareholder investment protection (beta 0.214 and p-value 0.007). H4: shareholder wealth has positively correlated with minority shareholder investment protection (beta 0.318 and p-value 0.000). The major findings suggest strong minority shareholder investment protection was enhanced by increasing corporate governance, free cash flow and shareholder wealth. The protection of minority shareholder investment needs to reduce non-controlling shareholding pattern.