The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has developed geological repository systems for the disposal of high-level wastes and spent nuclear fuels (SNFs) in South Korea. The purpose of the most recently developed system, the improved KAERI Reference Disposal System Plus (KRS+), is to dispose of all SNFs in Korea with improved disposal area efficiency. In this paper, a system-level safety assessment model for the KRS+ is presented with long-term assessment results. A system-level model is used to evaluate the overall performance of the disposal system rather than simulating a single component. Because a repository site in Korea has yet to be selected, a conceptual model is used to describe the proposed disposal system. Some uncertain parameters are incorporated into the model for the future site selection process. These parameters include options for a fractured pathway in a geosphere, parameters for radionuclide migration, and repository design dimensions. Two types of SNF, PULS7 from a pressurized water reactor and Canada Deuterium Uranium from a heavy water reactor, were selected as a reference inventory considering the future cumulative stock of SNFs in Korea. The highest peak radiological dose to a representative public was estimated to be 8.19×10-4 mSv‧yr-1, primarily from 129I. The proposed KRS+ design is expected to have a high safety margin that is on the order of two times lower than the dose limit criterion of 0.1 mSv‧yr-1.

In this paper, an overview of the scoping calculation results is provided with respect to criticality and radiation shielding of two KBS-3V type PWR SNF disposal systems and one NWMO-type CANDU SNF disposal system of the improved KAERI reference disposal system for SNFs (KRS+). The results confirmed that the calculated effective multiplication factors (keff) of each disposal system comply with the design criteria (< 0.95). Based on a sensitivity study, the bounding conditions for criticality assumed a flooded container, actinide-only fuel composition, and a decay time of tens of thousands of years. The necessity of mixed loading for some PWR SNFs with high enrichment and low discharge burnup was identified from the evaluated preliminary possible loading area. Furthermore, the absorbed dose rate in the bentonite region was confirmed to be considerably lower than the design criterion (< 1 Gy‧hr-1). Entire PWR SNFs with various enrichment and discharge burnup can be deposited in the KRS+ system without any shielding issues. The container thickness applied to the current KRS+ design was clarified as sufficient considering the minimum thickness of the container to satisfy the shielding criterion. In conclusion, the current KRS+ design is suitable in terms of nuclear criticality and radiation shielding.