이 연구에서는 김정은 시대 북한의 핵 관련 법에 나타난 핵전략과 핵 태세를 분석하였다. 북한은 미국의 대북 적대시 정책에 대한 대응으로 핵을 개발하였다고 주장하였으나, 김정은 시대 북한은 핵 관련 법을 제 정하고 핵을 무기화하였으며 핵능력을 고도화하였으며 당 제8차 대회 이 후에는 전술핵능력까지 구비하였다. 연구를 통해 북한이 핵을 군사적으 로 사용할 능력을 구비하고 고도화하면서 핵전략과 핵태세가 공세적으로 변화하였음을 확인할 수 있었다. 북한의 핵능력이 고도화되면서 핵전략 은 선언적 수준의 최소억지전략에서 대남 제한억지전략과 대미 최소억지 전략으로 발전하였고, 핵태세 또한 현재는 가장 공세적인 비대칭확장태 세 유형을 보여주고 있다. 북한의 핵·미사일 능력 고도화는 계속될 것이 다. 북한의 핵능력증가에 따른 대응 방안 마련이 제한되는 우리로서는 궁극적으로 북한의 핵 위협이 증가하지 않도록 하는 것이 중요하다.

The DPRK had been upgrading its nuclear weapons capabilities from the past to the sixth nuclear test in 2017, and Kim Jong-un has been in power since the death of Kim Jong-il in 2011, striving to upgrade and diversify four nuclear tests and firing means. In 2022, in particular, DPRK launched more than 40 ballistic and cruise missiles and provoked them in various ways, such as developing solid rocket engines, flying fighter jets, and invading drones. In addition, reprocessing facility activities have been observed again since 2021 at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Complex. Operational activities such as continuous activities of the 5MWe Yongbyon reactor and the additional construction of new buildings are observed. DPRK’s recent activities could result in nuclear weapons in all except conventional weapons provocations. DPRK has researched and developed nuclear weapons since the 1950s. It has been preparing to operate nuclear weapons, operating nuclear power, and modernizing nuclear power simultaneously. Given the number of nuclear weapons using DPRK’s nuclear materials and various means of missiles, an offensive transition is expected to enable restrictive deterrence strategies that can be used first use and on assured retaliation. In addition, based on the nuclear strategy, which is interpreted as Vipin Narang’s nuclear doctrine and nuclear posture, DPRK is also capable of assured retaliation and asymmetric escalation posture. In particular, considering the continuous activities of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Complex, which has recently diversified the investment vehicle, and the delegation of nuclear weapon use, it is expected to move differently from the previous one based on the changed nuclear strategy. However, there are clear limitations to interpreting it as a completely assured retaliation and asymmetric expansion nuclear strategy. First, there is a lack of development of atmospheric reentry vehicles that can avoid ICBM interception for assured retaliation capabilities against the United States. Second, there are limitations in the open capacity of nuclear weapons due to the absence of SSBN capabilities. However, delegation to operations at strategy force suggests the possibility of asymmetric expansion strategies. The previous analysis of DPRK’s nuclear strategy and limitations is valid in that the U.S. nuclear umbrella guarantees the Republic of Korea in a strong alliance between the Republic of Korea and the U.S. If the Republic of Korea lacks a nuclear umbrella due to the weakening of the alliance or limits U.S. intervention by having more than dozens of ICBMs, it is considered that DPRK can use a definite confirmation retaliation and asymmetric escalation nuclear strategy. As a response to this, it is the first way to verify and strengthen the validity of the three-axis system (Kill Chain, KAMD, KMPR), second to strengthen the Korea-U.S. alliance, and finally to appeal to the international community and increase consensus. In particular, it is possible to form a consensus of sanctions and condemnation DPRK by expressing concerns about nuclear dominoes caused by nuclear proliferation and arms competition to the international community.