지구온난화 문제에 대응하기 위해 온실가스 배출 저감을 위한 다양한 규제와 정책이 시행되고 있다. 이러한 배경 속에서 탄소중립을 목표로 하는 국가들이 늘어나고 있으며, 이에 따라 소형원자로모듈(Small Modular Reactor 이하 SMR)이 새로운 발전소 모델 로 주목받고 있다. SMR은 전통적인 대형 원자력 발전소 크기의 5~10% 수준이지만, 수백 메가와트(MW)급의 발전 용량을 갖춘 고효율 시스템이다. 이 발전소는 화석 연료 기반 발전소에 비해 탄소 발생을 줄일 수 있으며, 신재생에너지의 불안정한 에너지 공급을 보완할 수 있는 장점이 있다. 하지만, 원자력 발전소는 사고 시 방사선물질 누출의 위험성이 있어 주변 주민의 반대를 받아 왔다. 이러한 문제 를 해결하기 위해 부유식 소형 원자력 발전선이 주목받고 있다. 부유식 소형 원자력 발전소는 해양에 설치되어 부지확보, 인근 거주민 보상, 협의 과정이 간소화되고, 자연재해에 대한 안전성이 높다. 본 연구에서는 SMR 발전선의 파랑 중 예인 안정성을 평가 하였다. 해 상상태 3, 4, 5에서의 운동해석 결과, 해상상태 5 이하에서는 예인하여 목적지까지 이동하는데 필요한 내항성능 기준을 만족시킬 수 있 음을 확인하였다.

The initial development plans for the six reactor designs, soon after the release of Generation IV International Forum (GIF) TRM in 2002, were characterized by high ambition [1]. Specifically, the sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) and very-high temperature reactor (VHTR) gained significant attention and were expected to reach the validation stage by the 2020s, with commercial viability projected for the 2030s. However, these projections have been unrealized because of various factors. The development of reactor designs by the GIF was supposed to be influenced by events such as the 2008 global financial crisis, 2011 Fukushima accident [2, 3], discovery of extensive shale oil reserves in the United States, and overly ambitious technological targets. Consequently, the momentum for VHTR development reduced significantly. In this context, the aims of this study were to compare and analyze the development progress of the six Gen IV reactor designs over the past 20 years, based on the GIF roadmaps published in 2002 and 2014. The primary focus was to examine the prospects for the reactor designs in relation to spent nuclear fuel burning in conjunction with small modular reactor (SMR), including molten salt reactor (MSR), which is expected to have spent nuclear fuel management potential.

In addition to Korea, various countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and China are designing small module-type reactors. In particular, a small modular reactor is the power of 300 MWe or less, in which the main equipment constituting the nuclear reactor is integrated into a single container. Depending on the purpose, small modular reactors are being developed to help daily life such as power, heating supply, and seawater desalination, or for power supply such as icebreakers, nuclear submarines, and spacecraft propellants. Small modular reactors are classified according to form. It can be classified into light-water reactors/ pressurized light-water reactors based on technology proven in commercial reactors, and non-lightwater reactors based on fuel and coolant type such as Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor, High temperature gas-cooled reactor, Very high temperature reactor and Moltenn salt reactor. SMRs, which are designed for various purposes, have the biggest difference from commercial nuclear reactors. The size of SMRs is as small as 1/5 of that of the commercial reactors. Several modules may be installed to generate the same power as commercial reactors. Because of the individually operation for each module, load follow is possible. Also, The reactor can be cooled by natural convection because the size is small enough. It is manufactured as a module, the construction period can be reduced. Depending on the characteristics of these SMRs, application for safeguards is considered. There are many things to consider in terms of safeguards. Therefore, it is IAEA inspection or other approaches for SMRs installed and remotely operated in isolated areas, data integrity for remote monitoring equipment to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials, verification method and material accountancy and control for new fuel types and reactors. Since SMR is more compact and technical intensive, safeguards should be considered at the design stage so that safeguards can be efficiently and effectively implemented, which is called the Safeguards by design (SBD) in the IAEA. In this paper, according to the characteristics of SMR, we will analyze the advantages/disadvantages from the point of view of safeguards and explain what should be considered.

Since SMR’s reduced reactor radius results in higher neutron leakage, SMR operates at a relatively lower discharge burnup level than traditional Light Water Reactors (LWRs). It may result in larger spent fuel amounts for SMRs. Furthermore, recent studies demonstrated that NuScale reactor will generate a significantly higher volume of low- and intermediate-level waste owing to components located near the active core including the core barrel and the neutron reflector. For spent nuclear fuel simulation, FRAPCON-4.0 was updated. Major modifications were made for fission and decay gas release, pellet swelling, cladding creep, axial temperature distribution, corrosion, and extended simulation time covering from steady-state to dry storage. In this study, typical 17×17 PWR fuel (60 MWd/kgU) and NuScale Power Module (36 MWd/kgU) was compared. NuFuel-HTP2™ fuel assembly, which has a half-length of proven LWR fuel, was employed. Owing to the lower discharge burnup and operating temperature, the maximum hydrogen pickup was 73 wppm and the maximum hoop stress was ~25 MPa. Therefore, hydride reorientation issue is irrelevant to SMR spent fuel. In this context, the current regulatory limit for dry storage (i.e. 400°C and 90 MPa) can be significantly alleviated for LWR-based SMRs. The increased safety margin for SMR spent fuel may compensate high spent fuel management cost of SMRs incurred by an increased amount. The comprehensive analysis on SMR spent fuel management implications are discussed based on simulated SMR fuel characteristics.

Recently, about 70 Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) are being developed around the world due to various advantages such as modularization, flexibility, and miniaturization. An innovative SMR (i- SMR) is being developed in South Korea as well, and the domestic nuclear utility is planning to apply for the Standard Design Approval in 2026 after completing the basic design and standard design. Accordingly, the regulatory body is conducting research on the regulatory system for reviewing the i- SMR standard designs by referring to the IAEA and the U.S. NRC cases. A SMR is expected to many changes not only in terms of cyber security due to new digital technology, remote monitoring, and automatic operation, but also in terms of physical security according to security systems, security areas, and vital equipment. Accordingly, related technical documents issued by the IAEA require nuclear utilities to consider regulatory requirements of security from the design phase by integrating security regulations into SMR licensing. The U.S. NRC has also identified 17 issues affecting SMR design since 2010 (SECY-10-0034), and among them, ‘Consideration of SMR security requirements’ was included as a major issue. Accordingly, the NuScale applicant conducted security assessment and design in consideration of the Design Base Threat (DBT) in the initial SMR design process through the Gap Analysis Report (2012) and the NuScale’s Security System Technical Report (TR-0416-48929), and the NRC developed the Design Specific Review Standard for NuScale (DSRS) and then reviewed the applicant’s security design process, standard design results, and testing criteria for security system (ITAAC). This paper analyzed the case of security review activities during the NuScale standard design review, and through this, it is intended to be used in the development of domestic regulatory system for the i-SMR security review in the future.