The digitization of ship environments has increased the risk of cyberattacks on ships. The smartization and automation of ships are also likely to result in cyber threats. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has discussed the establishment of regulations at the autonomous level and has revised existing agreements by dividing autonomous ships into four stages, where stages 1 and 2 are for sailors who are boarding ships while stages 3 and 4 are for those not boarding ships. In this study, the level of a smart ship was classified into LEVELs (LVs) 1 to 3 based on the autonomous levels specified by the IMO. Furthermore, a risk assessment for smart ships at various LVs in different risk scenarios was conducted The cyber threats and vulnerabilities of smart ships were analyzed by dividing them into administrative, physical, and technical security; and mitigation measures for each security area were derived. A total of 22 cyber threats were identified for the cyber asset (target system). We inferred that the higher the level of a smart ship, the greater the hyper connectivity and the remote access to operational technology systems; consequently, the greater the attack surface. Therefore, it is necessary to apply mitigation measures using technical security controls in environments with high-level smart ships.

KINAC (Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control) is entrusted with the NSSC (Nuclear Safety And Security Commission) to conduct threat assessments for nuclear facilities. As part of the threat assessment, DBT (Design Basis Threat) must be established every three years, and a threat assessment report must be developed for DBT establishment. This paper suggests a method for collecting and analyzing cyber threat information for the development of a cyber security threat assessment report. Recently, cyber threats not only in the IT (Information Technology) field but also in the ICS (Industrial Control System) field are rapidly increasing. As cyber threats increase, threat information including related attack techniques is also increasing. Although KINAC is conducting a threat assessment on cyber security at nuclear facilities, it cannot collect and analyze all cyber threat information. Therefore, it is necessary to determine a reliable source of threat information for threat assessment, and establish a strategy for collecting and analyzing threat information for DBT establishment. The first method for collecting and analyzing threat information is to first collect threat information on industrial fields with high similarity to nuclear facilities. Most of the disclosed cyber threat information is in the IT field, and most of this information is not suitable for closed-network nuclear facilities. Therefore, it is necessary to first collect and analyze threat information on facilities that use networks similar to nuclear facilities such as energy and financial sector. The second method is to analyze the attack technique for the collected threat information. The biggest factor in DBT reset is whether there is a new threat and how much it has increased compared to the existing threat. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze which attack technique was used in the collected threat information, and as part of the analysis, a cyber attack analysis model such as a kill chain can be used. The last method is to collect and manage the disclosed vulnerability information. In order to manage vulnerabilities, it is necessary to analyze what assets are in the nuclear facility first. By matching the reported vulnerability with the CDA (Critical Digital Asset) in the facility, it is possible to analyze whether the CDA can be affected by a cyber attack.As cyber threats continue to increase, it is necessary to analyze threat cases of similar facilities, attack techniques using attack models, and vulnerability analysis through asset identification in order to develop a threat assessments report.

In weapon assignment studies to defend against threats such as ballistic missiles and long range artillery, threat assessment was partially lacking in analysis of various threat attributes, and considering the threat characteristics of warheads, which are difficult to judge in the early flight stages, it is very important to apply more reliable optimal solutions than approximate solution using LP model, Meta heuristics Genetic Algorithm, Tabu search and Particle swarm optimization etc. Our studies suggest Generic Rule based threat evaluation and weapon assignment algorithm in the basis of various attributes of threats. First job of studies analyzes information on Various attributes such as the type of target, Flight trajectory and flight time, range and intercept altitude of the intercept system, etc. Second job of studies propose Rule based threat evaluation and weapon assignment algorithm were applied to obtain a more reliable solution by reflection the importance of the interception system. It analyzes ballistic missiles and long-range artillery was assigned to multiple intercept system by real time threat assessment reflecting various threat information. The results of this study are provided reliable solution for Weapon Assignment problem as well as considered to be applicable to establishing a missile and long range artillery defense system.

The two Japanese security laws which came into force on March 29, 2016, have faced severe domestic and international criticism. They are seen as representing a dramatic policy change in violation of due process and international norms, and representing a threat to international peace and security. This paper finds that while the direct implications of the “war” legislation are neither threatening nor without precedent, what the legislative process says about the nature of governance under Abe is deeply troubling. The disdain shown by the Abe administration to due process and constitutional procedures is what threatens domestic and international governance stability.