우리나라는 수출주도형 경제구조를 지니고 있어 세계 무역질서에 능동적으로 대 응할 필요가 있다. 중국의 G2 부상에 따라 미국은 중국을 견제하는 데 외교적 역량을 집중하고 있으며, 이는 지역 질서의 분절화 ․ 진영화로 나타나고 있다. 이러한 진 영화는 역내포괄적동반자협정(Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, RCEP), 포괄적 ․ 점진적환태평양경제동반자협정(Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, CPTPP), 인도태평양경 제프레임워크(Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, IPEF) 등 자유무역협정(FTA) 에서 본격화되고 있다. 우리나라의 통상정책은 중국이 주도하는 FTA인 RCEP에 가입한 이후 일본이 주 도하는 FTA인 CPTPP에 가입할 것인가? 그리고 미국이 주도하는 경제통상플랫폼 인 IPEF에 어느 분야에 참여할 것인가 하는 것이 당면한 과제가 되고 있다. 이러한 문제점을 인식하여 본 논문에서는 RCEP, CPTPP 및 IPEF의 효율적 추진 을 위해 그동안 추진되어왔던 통상정책의 방향 및 성과를 알아보고 RCEP, CPTPP 및 IPEF의 내용과 함께 추진 성과 제고를 위한 해양 ․ 수산분야의 환경조성 및 과제 를 알아보고자 한다.

After President Biden’s first year in office, one big question is whether the Biden trade policy differs from the Trump chaos. My answer is no. I consider Biden’s trade policy to be Trump without the tweets. They both relied on unilateral measures and broadened protectionist ones. In fact, Biden not only relies upon Trump’s actions but also has expanded them. Trade policies have not changed much between Presidents Trump and Biden. In fact, Biden, relying upon Trump’s actions, has kept them in place. There has been a slight change in tune: a little more reconciliation with Europe and the OECD. However, it is extremely difficult to identify any significant difference concerning China, Russia, and Iran. Has Trump’s America First policy morphed into Biden’s America First or worker-centric trade policy? It looks that way. Let’s look at what Trump did, what Biden has done so far, and the challenges ahead.

The Biden administration has moved to refocus the US trade policy on China, acting to promote competition but not thoughtless confrontation. Some actions were strong right out of the gate; that should not have been so surprising, but it still was. If anything, the recently concluded G-7 meeting in Cornwall and the subsequent US-EU summit in Brussels indicate that the Biden administration intends to take a stronger and a more multilateral and diplomatic approach to confront China. This approach was further supported by the US allies at the recent NATO meeting in Brussels. The administration is stressing cooperation with allies and competition with China. Biden’s recent diplomacy demonstrates his overriding preoccupation with China. Moving away from Trump’s dysfunctional and disastrous unilateral measures of confrontation with all can only help stabilize the US-China relations and rebuild the WTO, hopefully.

United States litigation against China in the WTO will be ground zero for the new Trump administration’s aggressive trade policy. Five important facts must be highlighted to better understand the likely actions of the Trump administration. First, heightened judicial advocacy within the WTO will be consistent with both the Bush and Obama administrations’ aggressive use of the WTO’s dispute settlement system. Second, international judicial activism is squarely within the context of unfolding historical changes in international relations. Third, China hawks in the Trump administration will be competing with a number of countervailing forces in the White House, throughout the administration, and in the federal courts. Fourth, the US Congress has the exclusive authority to regulate global trade. However, much of this exclusive authority has been delegated to the president. Fifth, Trump considers trade as a zero-sum transaction, with a focus on the bottom line, to the exclusion of all else.