Multisided platforms (e.g. eBay, Airbnb, Facebook, Apple’s iOS etc.) are marketplaces to facilitate direct interactions between two or more customer or participant groups and enable the value to customers on one side of a platform typically to increase with the number of participating customers on another side (Hagiu, 2014). Platform is a business model to have the more knowledge of its customers and become more networked (Weill & Woerner, 2015). Collaborative consumption platforms (CCPs) are marketplaces to facilitate sharing activities such as the form of renting, lending, trading, bartering and swapping of goods or services based on Möhlmann’s (2015) definition. The rise of information and communications technology (ICT) such as the internet or mobile apps enables an easy access on CCP, which facilitates peers to trade and decrease transaction costs (Möhlmann, 2015). Although CCPs can create better customer experience than traditional business model, there is asymmetric information among peers, which results in lemons. Boudreau and Hagiu (2008) suggested that platforms owners should reduce lemons problems by establishing technical standards and interfaces, rules and procedures, defining the division of tasks, providing support and documentation and sharing information as non-priced instruments. Some attempts have been made in order to demonstrate online service failure or lemons on the web (Holloway & Beatty, 2003). In the Holloway and Beatty’s study (2003), the typology of online service failures has been provided and demonstrated how online retailers could manage their online service failures effectively. The solution to reduce information problems is signaling of trust about quality such as price, adverting, and warranties (Boulding & Kirmani, 1993). Trust in CCPS is to trust in other peers within the platform to share (Möhlmann, 2015). If a CCP cannot control opportunistic behaviors of peers, the peers participating in the CCP can be harmed as well as the CCP will fail to encourage more peers to participate and thus the social value of the CCP may decrease. It is important to understand decision making process of peers in CCPs and consider the motivations to use CCPs and the contexts at the same time. Enjoyment and economic benefits have a direct impact on behavioral intention to participate in CC in the motivation model by Hamari and his colleagues (2015). We suggest the motivatio ns such as enjoyment or economic benefits can be fit by the specific signals of peers in CCPs. The consumers with different motivations to use CCPs can perceive signals for trust differen tly. The more people pursue hedonic value for CCP, the more they tend to make a decision de pending on heuristics rather than elaborate cognitive process. The more people pursue utilitar ian value for CCP, the more they tend to make a decision depending on elaborate cognitive pr ocessing. We conduct two experiments to examine the fit between motivations and signals of CCPs. The interaction effect between motivations to use CCPs and types of signals is investigated through ANOVA test. People to use CCPs for enjoyment have more usage intention when they are exposed by more reviews rather and CCP with low governance power. On the other hand, People to use CCPs for convenience have more usage intention when they are exposed by high review quality and CCP with strong governance power rather than low governance. Social marketers and public policy makers seek to spread CC for the sake of fostering sustainable consumption behavior and promoting public sharing events (Möhlmann, 2015). Sharing and collaborative consumption can be solutions against global warming, rising fuel and raw material prices, growing pollution, and other anticipatable trends (Belk, 2014). CCPs strive to make people participate to create value of their CCPs based external crosseffect by providing various signals for peers with different motivations. Thus public policy makers should foster CCPs rather than encourage people directly to participate. In addition, public policy makers should give CCPs self-regulation that can decide the types of governance and policies to reduce lemons market problems. Our research contributes to the literature on market failures in CCPs by highlighting the importance of the fit between the motivations to use CCPs and signals. Although people have motivation to participate in CC, they are not willing to participate in CCPs without trust of other peers or goods and services. Thus CCPs need to provide peers with proper signals.

This essay discusses the enhancement of the KMV model to achieve greater accuracy in predicting default risk and mitigating the effects of asymmetric information in the financial market. Due to the existence of the problem of asymmetric information persists, with some market participants possessing more information than others. This imbalance disrupts the normal market operation, complicates financial regulation, and reduces market stability. Rating agencies have made efforts to disclose and predict default risks to provide more information to the market. Still, traditional models’ prediction accuracy has struggled to meet the market’s evolving demands. To address these challenges, this essay analyzes an improved model, the SIZE-PSO-KMV model. This model builds on the KMV model but introduces a differentiation between large and small firms. By doing so, it refines default risk predictions, thereby alleviating information asymmetry. Enhanced accuracy empowers financial regulators to make more informed decisions and helps prevent future financial crises. The SIZE-PSO-KMV model’s validity is established through rigorous testing, including a comparison with other KMV models and out-of-sample tests. The results demonstrate that this model significantly outperforms traditional KMV models in predicting default risk. Additionally, it adapts to the size of firms, acknowledging that large and small firms face distinct default risk profiles.

The more liquid the capital market, the more attractive it will be for investors to place their money in the capital market. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the factors that influence stock liquidity of manufacturing sector companies listed on the stock exchange in Indonesia. The independent variables used in this study are forward-looking information disclosure, institutional ownership, foreign ownership, and board activity with information asymmetry as an intervening variable and stock liquidity as the dependent variable. The population of this study is manufacturing sector companies listed on the Indonesian stock exchange (IDX). Samples are selected based on the random sampling method, and the number of samples is calculated based on the Slovin formula. The sample was 59 manufacturers, and data was annual reports (for 2 years) and stock transactions from 2016 to 2017. The results of the study showed that forward-looking information disclosure had a significant effect on information asymmetry. Information asymmetry and foreign ownership have a significant impact on stock liquidity, whereas information asymmetry mediates the relationship between forward-looking disclosures and stock liquidity. Furthermore, the accuracy of information about the certainty of business activity both now and in the future can instill confidence in stakeholders in interacting and cooperating.

The Indonesian government launched a new people's business credit program as part of a package of economic policy and deregulation. The interest rate is set lower than the average of the current loan interest rates, especially when compared with rural bank interest rates. To capture the social spatial aspects, quota sampling is applied to ten areas that divided based on the social culture. Further, the method utilized in this research is logit models, which designed to analyse the determinants of asymmetric information particularly on the rural bank and small micro enterprises. The study was conducted in East Java as the province with the largest number of rural banks in Indonesia. Based on the estimation of asymmetric information model to the respondent of rural banks and small businesses, the result shows that adverse selection can be avoided by strengthening the information about prospective borrowers. Regarding moral hazard, rural banks and small businessmen argued that the imposition of the collateral to the debtor has an important role to avoid moral hazard. Rural bank respondents stated that the KUR program with low-interest rates has affected their business development. The results implied the need of broadening the collaboration schemes between this people’s business credit program and rural banks.

This study aims to examine the dynamics of price changes and trading volume of Kuala Lumpur Options and Financial Futures Exchange (KLOFFE) from 2000 to 2008. With augmented analysis, our results support two hypotheses. First, under information spillover, our findings support noise traders’ hypothesis as the time span for variance of past trading volume to cause variance of current return is found to be asymmetric under bull and bear markets. Second, looking at the dynamic relation between volume and volatility of price changes, our findings support Liquidity-Driven Trade hypothesis as past trading volume and subsequent volatility of return exhibit positive correlation. In terms of investors’ behavior in response to the news, we find that investors are more risk taking in bull market and more risk reverse in bear market. Our study suggests that investors should adjust their strategy in the futures market in a dynamic manner as the time span of new information arrival is not consistent. Also, uninformed investors with information asymmetry should expect noninformational trading from informed investors to establish their desired positions for better liquid position.