When exporting nuclear-related items, export control is required from two perspectives: the control of “Trigger List Items” as controlled by Nuclear Supplier Groups (NSG) and the control of the “Items Subject to the Agreement” as specified in bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements. While Trigger List Items and Items Subject to the Agreement are largely similar, there are some items where they do not overlap. Furthermore, national law for controlling each item is different. The Trigger List Items are governed by the Foreign Trade Act, and the Items Subject to the Agreement (Internationally Controlled Items) are governed by the Nuclear Safety Act. As a result, the detailed procedures and requirements for controlling each item are quite distinct. For the Trigger List Items, export license must be obtained in accordance with the Foreign Trade Act. The details such as responsible authority, the items subject to license, license requirements and procedures, penalties are specified in the Public Notice on Import and Export of Strategic Goods. For the Items Subject to the Agreement, the process and obligations set forth in bilateral agreements and related administrative agreements are fulfilled in accordance with the Nuclear Safety Act. However, in contrast to the Trigger List Items, the details for complying with the agreements are not specified legally. Since most of the Items Subject to the Agreement are fall within the category of the Trigger List Items, the obligations in accordance with the agreements are reviewed and implemented during the export license assessment process. However, if the Items Subject to the Agreement are not are fall within the category of the Trigger List Items, there is a risk of control omission. For example, this applies to cases of exporting tritium and tritium removal facilities, which are not the Trigger List Items, to Canada and Romania. Moreover, since subjects to the agreement and compliance procedures are respectively different for 29 bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements signed with different countries, it is difficult for enterprise to recognize the appropriate procedures and obligations under the agreement by their own. The bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements establish legal obligations between state parties while NSG are non-legally binding arrangements. Therefore, it could be even more necessary to comply strictly with the agreements. Consequently, legal improvements are required for effective implementations of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements. While it may be challenging to institutionalize details of 29 Nuclear Cooperation Agreements, it is essential to legally specify key elements such as the list of items subject to agreements, responsible authority, requirements and procedures for implement the agreement obligations, and penalties. Furthermore, domestic awareness on compliance with Nuclear Cooperation Agreements is lower compared to the system of export license for Trigger List Items. The continuous outreach is also necessary, along with institutional improvements.

처분시설은 폐쇄 후 제도적 관리기간 동안에는 처분 부지로의 일반인의 접근을 제한하며 제도적 관리기간 이후에는 부주의 한 인간침입 시에도 처분시설로 인한 방사선적 영향으로부터 침입자를 보호하도록 설계 되어야 한다. 본 논문에서는 처분시 설이 부주의한 침입자에 미칠 수 있는 방사선적 영향을 GENII 프로그램을 사용하여 평가해보았다. 처분고별 적치되는 방사 성폐기물의 종류를 달리하여 평가하고 제도적 관리기간 설정에 따른 침입자에 대한 영향도 분석하였다. 평가결과 제도적 관 리기간을 두지 않아도 폐필터가 적치된 처분고를 제외하고 모두 성능 목표치를 만족하였다. 하지만 폐필터를 적치한 처분고 의 경우 인간침입 평가결과 제도적 관리기간 300년이 되어서야 성능목표치를 만족할 수 있었다. 폐필터와 함께 잡고체 폐기 물을 혼합하여 적치하는 경우 제도적 관리기간을 줄일 수 있었으며, 폐필터는 다른 폐기물과 함께 적치하여 제도적 관리기 간을 줄이는 것이 필요하다. 폐기물 적치시 방사능을 고려하여 처분고 적치방안을 적절히 수립하는 것이 국부적인 방사능의 최대값을 줄일 수 있어 방사선적 안전성을 확보하며 제도적 관리기간을 단축할 수 있어 바람직하다.