해양안전심판원은 해양사고가 발생하면 그 원인을 규명하고 재결결과에 따 라 관련 당사자인 해기사들을 징계할 수 있다 이러한 해양안전심판원의 재결 은 사고관련 당사자에게 직접적인 효력을 미침은 물론이고 후속적인 민사 및 형사소송에까지 중요한 영향을 미친다 또한 재결은 해양안전심판원의 심판관 에 의하여 행하여진다 심판관은 재결을 행함에 있어서 증거를 기준으로 하여 심증을 형성하고 이는 현행 해양사고의조사및심판에관한법률 제 조의 규정에 의거하여 증거의 증명력은 심판관의 자유로운 판단에 따른다 는 규정을 근거 로 증거의 증명력을 인정한다 본 연구에서는 충돌사고와 관련하여 상반된 결과를 보여주는 중앙해양안전심판원과 부산지방해양안전심판원의 재결결과를 분석한 후 민사소송법과 형사소송법을 참고로 하여 심판관의 증명력 인정범위 에 대한 기준을 제시해 보고자 노력하였다 그 연구결과로서 해양안전심판의 특성에 비추어 기본적으로 의 증 명력 인정범위내의 증명력보강에 의한 상승가능성 포함 의 해석상의 기준을 제시하였다 다만 해양사고는 그 경중을 분리할 수 있는 뚜렷한 기준을 제시하는 것이 사실상 불가능하다 또한 본질적으로 행정심판의 성질을 가지는 해양안전심판 이 범죄에 대한 형벌을 부과하는 절차인 형사소송법과 동일한 정도로 증명력 인정범위를 강력하게 제한할 필요는 없다는 점과 직권주의에 의한 관여가 전 혀 없이 중립적인 입장만을 견지해야하는 민사소송법상의 입증보다는 더 엄 격해야 한다는 점은 인정해야 한다 이에 따라서 일단 자유심증주의가 규정되어 있는 이상 심판관의 증명력 인 정범위를 완벽하게 고정시키는 것이 어렵다고 할지라도 민사소송법과 형사소 송법의 증명력 인정범위에 대한 기준을 참고로 하여 증거의 확보가 어려운 해양사고에서 객관적인 사실인정을 위해서는 증명력 인정범위에 대한 기준으 로서의 수치화의 제시가 어느정도 필요하다는 점은 분명하다 이러한 관점에 서 본 연구의 증명력 인정범위에 대한 기준의 제시와 증명력 보강에 대한 해 석방향의 제시는 후속연구를 위해서도 필요하다고 판단된다

In this case, the Supreme Court of Korea gives very important opinion for the evidence law in general, ① Lowering of the probative power of the statesment in the protocol of investigative agent in the light of the weakness of the written record ② Unrecognizing the proof value of the statements where the cross-examination lacks. First, With indicating the inaccuracy of the record in the light of statements in fact, lowering of the probative power of the statesments in the protocol of investigative agent in general is inappropriate. In order to complement such a weakness, the law provide the strict provisions for the protocol drawing up. Furthermore, this kind of view falls into difficulty in answer to the question, “Can be the lowering problems all solved, if we, for the complement of such weakness, record the total statements or record them in tapes or video tapes?” This problem is not for statement in the protocol, but for the probative power of the out of court statement. Probative power is the thing which should be judged in each case individually with considering total situation with relation to the situation in which the statements were made, contents of the statements and comparison with other evidences. By the way, the problem of confrontation has important meaning from the new tendency which views the problem in other way than hearsay approach. But the method of the Court leads to the confusion with the meaning or the standard because of the termonology which the Court has used, that is , substantial proof value and inadmissible. Recently, the problem of confrontation is understood as a procedural right of the defendant in the criminal procedure and there is an American approach and a European Union approach. In my opinion, Considering our constitutional provision and criminal procedure, the European Union solution is proper. The admissiblity of the statements made in the situation in which the defendant cannot confront the speaker should be judged be the standard of the fairness of the process, that is, the question, “Would it harm the fairness of the process in the whole to admit the statements?” By the judgement, it would give an important ground to see the resposibility of the investigative agent for the nonconfrontation situation. But the responsibility of the investigative agent should not be an absolute ground for the inadmissibility of the statements, but would be the ground for prudent judgement of the probative power considering whether the substantial parts of the statements could be confirmed by other materials, when the statements are the only one important evidence to support the charge. Furthermore, Because the time of the confrontation is not limited to the trial, it would be useful to evaluate the provision in our criminal procedure for the interrogation with confrontation by the public attorney and investigative officer and to use it as a meaningful tool for guaranteeing the chance of confrontation of the defendant.

The criminal procedure commonly provide for the joinder of defendants, whereby two or more persons may together be prosecuted in a single trial. Assume a case in which defendants A and B have been lawfully joined for trial, but at that trial the prosecution intends to offer against A a confession by him stating, in effect, that he and B committed the crime. That right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him would be violated if A, by his confession, was a witness against B but could not be cross-examined. So to speak, where the powerfully incriminating judicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused sideby- side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the judge in a joint trial. In fact, it seems to me that “interlocking” bears a positively inverse relationship to devastation. A codefendant' confession will be relatively harmless if the incriminating story it tells is different from that which the defendant himself is alleged to have told, but enormously damaging if it confirms, in all essential respects, the defendant' alleged confession. It might be otherwise if the defendant were standing by his confession, in which case it could be said that the codefendant' confession does no more than support the defendant' very own case as corroborating evidence. But it might be otherwise if the defendant denies about his confession, in which case it could be said that the codefendant' confession is required as corroborating evidence that supports the defendant' very own case.