Bei der Bedrohung gemaess § 283 Abs. 1 des kor. StGB hadelt es sich z. Z. um die Abgrenzung von Verletzungs- und (abstraktes) Gefaehrungsdelikt einerseits und die Abgrenzung von Vesuch und Vollendung anderseits. Die Auseinandersetzung um diese dogmatische Frage is auf die neuerdings veroeffentlichte Rechssprechung fuer die kor. hoechste Gerichtshof zum Strafrechtliche Sache zuruechzufuehren. Sie is der Meinung, dass die Bedrohung(abstraktes) Gefaehrungsdelikt sei, und dass fuer die Vollendung keine akuelle Beintraetigung von Rechtsgut vom diesen Delikt brauche. Obwohl die ueberwiegende Meinung von Lehre dagen sind, versuche ich hierbei die Einstelung von Rechtssprechung zu unterstuetzen und die Begruendung nue zu verschaffen. Als Ergebnis halte ich es fuer unbegruedet, dass es sich bei der Abgrenzung von Verletzungs- und (abstraktes) Gefaehrungsdelikt auf die Strafbarkeit der Vesuch des betreffenden Delikts einstellt. Darueber hinsaus gehe ich bei der Abgrenzung von Vesuch und Vollendung davon aus, dass es sich nicht darum geht, ob das Verhalten des Taeters den geschuetzeten Rechtsgut beeintraechtigt, sondern daum, ob es den Tatbestand eines Strafgesetzes verwirklicht.

Abgesehen von geringen Unterschieden räumen die Recht-sprechung und die h. M. in Korea die Figur der Mittäterschaft durch Unterlassung, sog. „Mittäter zwischen Unterlassungstäter“ oder „Mittäter der Unterlassung“ ein. Deren Voraussetzung lautet: Alle Garanten unterlassen ihre Handlungspflichten durch einen gemeinsamen Tatentschluss, also Unterlasssungsentschluss. § 18 korStGB regelt die Unterlassung, § 30 korStGB die Mittäterschaft. § 18 lautet: Wer unterläßt, einen Gefahreneintritt abzuwenden, wenn er dafür einzustehen hat, daß die Gefahr nicht eintritt oder wenn er durch seine Handlung eine Ursache des Gefahreneintritts gesetzt hat, ist nach dem eingetretenen Erfolg zu bestrafen. § 30 korStGB lautet: Begehen mehr als 2 Personen eine Straftat gemeinschaftlich, so wird jeder als Täter bestraft. In diesem Aufsatz hat der Autor vor allem die Frage gestellt, ob eine normative Grundlage für die Strafbarkeit wegen Mittäterschaft jeder Garanten in beiden Vorschriften gefunden werden kann, der selbt den Erfolg nicht abwenden könnte, obwohl alle Garanten gemeinschaftlich entschlossen haben, zu unterlassen. Im Ergebnis wird es festgestellt, dass die Mittäterschaft beim Unterlassungsdelikt im kor StGB noch nicht möglich ist, wenn § 18 und § 30 korStGB nicht so geändert wird, dass jeder Garanten verpflichtet ist, alles ihm Mögliche und Zumutbare zu tun, um einen Erfolgseintritt abzuwenden.

The merit of interactive flow of information, convenient popularization of information and massive information share through the internet is a quick and simple obtainment of the required information for everyone and anyone. Due to such characteristic, the probability of copyright violation through internet is increasing. However who is to take the blame as civil liability or criminal responsibility? Recently, The Supreme Court has judged civil procedures and Criminal cases about infringement of Copyright. Especially regarding Soribada service, whether the users who download the share files on P2P basis and the service providers are subject to the liability of copyright infringement. Soribada received a verdict of guilty as to aid and abet violation of the Copyright Act. The Criminal points at issue of Soribada service occasion are as follows. First, whether the service users have infringed the right to reproduce or distribution rights of the record producers. Second, who commits a crime have to cherish intention or at least wilful negligence. And intention of reproducing or distributing violated Copyright Act, includes who is the principal offender. but Soribada program providers don't have intention of the principal offender directly or indirectly. Third, crime commited by ommission demands commission duty and responsible persons are supposed to undertake their obligation. If not, ommission is criminal 'ACT'. but is Soribada program provider legally responsible persons? or What is his duty essentially? Thus, this paper reviews the criminal issues on the copyright violation of the P2P program provider, focusing Sribada occasion. In conclusion, The Supreme Court a judicial precedent 2005do872 regards it as appropriate to be given a decision of not guilty.

Criminal Act Article 37 defines the concurrent crimes. The preceding paragraph of Article 37 states coincidence concurrent crimes which is defined as ‘several crimes for which judgement has not become final.' The post concurrent crimes is defined as ‘A crime for which judgement to punish has become final and the crimes committed before the said final judgement' in the latter part of Article 37. The reason for regulating the post concurrent crimes(the latter part of the Article 37, Article 39) besides coincidence concurrent crimes(the preceding part of the Article 37, Article 38) is that the crime for which judgement to punish has become final and the crimes committed before the said final judgement is sentenced as coincident concurrent crime by definition. Therefore, the event which is not noticed to the court cannot be the reason of giving advantage or (especially) disadvantage to the criminal suspect. Amended by Act No. 7623, July, 29, 2005, Criminal Act Article 39 (1) is stated as follows.' In the event there is a crime which has not been adjudicated among the concurrent crime, a sentence shall be imposed on the said crime taking account of equity with the case where the said crime is adjudicated concurrently with a crime which has been finally adjudicated. In this case the said punishment may be mitigated or exempted.' According to the amendment, it is possible to reduce the disadvantage when the criminal suspect is sentenced as post concurrent crime than sentenced as coincidence concurrent crime. The current decision(2006Do8376) represents the first meaningful Supreme Court decision of amended Article 39 (1). The decision includes ambiguous statement such as “deciding coincidentally and considering the equity" and the court may use the discretion in regard to reasonable determination of punishment by applying the previous statement. Therefore, the decision is not subject to restriction of severe application of Article 38 but also the mitigation or the exemption of punishment is considered as the court's genuine discretion. If the criminal suspect who commits a crime for which judgement to punishment has become final(b) and the crimes committed before the said final judgement(a) sentenced as coincident concurrent crime, the decision is not rational and it cannot meet the liability of the regulation. The current article critically examines the interpretation of Supreme Court statement of “deciding coincidentally and considering the equity" and the further conclusion.

The original ruling took into consideration the fact that the accused was a Chaebol owner and applied the concurrent offence punishment provisions and the discretionary sentence reduction system to lower the inferior limit of the penalty, and passed a suspended sentence. In order to divert public criticism, the original ruling also ordered a huge payment as a social contribution fund as a means of a community service order according to article 62-2 of the penal code. But the Supreme Court construed the concept of a community service order in a restrictive manner as ‘work or manual labor that can be imposed by the hour up to 500 hours.' As a result of this construction the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the original judgment that ordered the payment of a social contribution fund as a community service order. The original court maintained the suspended sentence by imposing a 300 hour community service instead of the original social contribution fund payment. Consequently the fairness of the examination of the offence was greatly impaired by lowering the inferior limit of the penalty to 3 years in a case in which the accused was proven guilty of 11 separate offences including one of which the penalty is stipulated as ‘life sentence or imprisonment for more than 5 years.' This ruling disclosed the problematic issues of the concurrent offence punishment provisions and the discretionary sentence reduction system that grant judges excessive discretion on weighing penalties. It is also legislatively meaningful that the case raised issues on introducing new forms of ‘suspended sentence conditional orders' such as fund payment orders or damage recovery orders.

The Supreme Court of Korea pronounced that the court is not permitted to order the accused to make a donation and the like as the community service order of the Criminal Law. As there is no regulation about the definition, aim, types, contents, execution procedure of the community service order in the Criminal Law, This existing regulations about the community service order seem to be against the principle of “nulla poena sine lege." But the community service is a word with various meanings, and it is possible to give a concrete form to it by construction and let it be compatible with the principle. In my opinion to make restitution of an illegal profit, that is, make a donation can be a type of “the community service" of the Criminal Law for the following reason. 1) the community service means unpaid work or donation for the public weal in the common acceptation of the word. 2) the Probation Act doesn't provide that the court cannot order the accused to make a donation in the community service order(it just prescribes that the maximum execution limit is 500 hours when the court order the accused to provide unpaid work in the community service order). 3) the interpretation that making a donation can be a type of the community service not only closes a gap between imprisonment and suspended sentence, but also leads to a decision more harmonized with the accused's conditions. 4) the United Kingdom, United States of America, France, Germany, etc also try to interpret and manage the community service variously. The Supreme Court's decision conforms to the principle of “nulla poena sine lege” too rigidly. It’s a great pity that the Supreme Court's decision limit the types of community service.

Während die beiden jeweiligen Gerichte der ersten Instanz den Vorsatz der Täter zur Beihilfe zum Selbstmord bestätigten, lehnen der höhere und Oberste Gerichtshof Koreas(Supreme Court of Korea) diesen ab. Der Oberste Gerichtshof erläuterte die Definition der Tat und des Vorsatzes zur Beihilfe zum Selbstmord. In beiden Urteilen wurden die jeweiligen Täter freigesprochen, da der Entschluss zur Beihilfe, also der Vorsatz, verneint wurde. Nach meiner Ansicht ist allerdings zu prüfen, ob eine Kausalität zwischen dem Akt der Beihilfe und dem Selbstmord selbst besteht, wie es der Verteidiger des Angeklagten im zweiten Urteil behauptete. Bei der Entscheidung über die Strafbarkeit der Beihilfe zum Selbstmord ist zu beachten, dass dieser Tatbestand nicht unter die Beihilfe, die im allgemeinen Teil des Strafgesetzes aufgeführt wird, fällt, sondern einen strafrechtlich gesondert definierten, eigenen Tatbestand darstellt. Wer einem Selbstmord beihilft, macht sich zum Täter. Die Selbsttötung an sich ist hingegen straffrei. Bei der Beurteilung der Strafbarkeit der Beihilfe zum Selbstmord stehen drei gesondert zu prüfende Aspekte in engem Bezug : der tatsächliche Akt des Täters gegenüber dem Selbstmörder, das subjektive Wissen des Täters und das Subjektive Willen des Täters. Hierbei ist allerdings nicht auszuschließen, dass es zu unterschiedlichen Ergebnissen kommen kann, da eine Beurteilung immer subjektive Wertvorstellungen beinhaltet. Meines Erachtens sollten nicht nur die drei Punkte Tat, Wissen und Willen separat geklärt werden, sondern es müsste außerdem die Kasualität festgestellt werden, um eine noch strengere Überprüfung der Strafbarkeit der Beihilfe zum Selbstmord vornehmen zu können. Dies gilt nicht nur für die zwei Urteile, sondern auch für alle zukünftigen Fälle der Überprüfung der Mitwirkungen am Selbstmord, um so den straffreien Bereich der Hilfe zum Selbstmord noch weiter zu vergrößern.

1. Wer einem anderen einen körperlichen Schaden zufügt, wird nach § 258 des koreanischen StGB. Dann ist der körperliche Schaden das Hervorruffen oder Steigern eines vom Normalzustand der körperlichen Funktion des Opfers nachteilig abweichenden krankhaften Zustandes körperlicher oder seelischer Art. 2. Während die Ausführungsweise der Erpressung nach § 253 des deutschen StGB ausdrücklich bestimmt wird, besteht sie nicht in § 350 KStGB und damit wird das Erpressungsmittel nach h. M und Rechtssprechung als Gewalt oder Drohung ausgelegt. Dabei komme die Ausführungsweise der Erpressung der Raubsausführungsweise gleich, aber ein Unterschied vom Grad der Ausführungsweise bestehe zwischen Raub und Erpressung. Danach wird Spezialität von Raub gegenüber Erpressung angekommen. Jedoch denke ich anders. Erpressung hat eine eigenständige Bedeutung und der wesentliche Unterschied zwischen Erpressung und Raub ist Sein oder Nichtsein von der Vermögensverfügung. In der Lage, dass der koreanischen Gesetzgeber die Ausführungsweise der Erpressung nicht vorschribt, ist es nicht nötig, dass die Erpressungsausführungsweise nur als Gewalt oder Drohung alsgelegt wird. 3. Das koreanische StGB regelt die Konkurrenzen in den §§ 37-40. Angelpunkt dieser Regelung ist die Unterscheidung zwischen Handlungseinheit und Handlungsmehrheit. Wenn eine Handlung mehrere Straftatbestände oder denselben Straftatbestand mehrmals verletzt, liegt Idealkonkurrenz vor, sofern kein Fall der Gesetzeskonkurrenz vorliegt. Mehrere selbständige Handlungen mit einer mehrfachen Gesetzesverletzung führen dagegen zu einer Realkonkurrenz, sofern kein Fall der Gesetzeskonkurrenz vorliegt.

Recently in Korea it is passionately disputed regarding criminal investigation system whether Article 139 of Korean Criminal Code is constitutional or not. Article 139 of Korean Criminal Code says as follows : Article 139(Obstruction of Official Duties for Vindication of Human Rights) A person who, performing police duties or assisting in such duties, interferes with the execution of duties of a public prosecutor concerning the vindication of human rights or who does not follow his instructions concerning the vindication of human rights, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or suspension of qualifications for not more than ten years. Korean Constitutional Court ruled the provisions of the latter part of the preceding article is not against the Constitution. One of judges, Justice Gonghyun Lee, argued that this clause is unconstitutional on the grounds of “void for vagueness." In this review firstly is examined how this article was legislated in 1953 and what problem and criticism has been raised. Then is reviewed whether the provisions of the latter part of the preceding article is unconstitutional on the grounds of “void for vagueness." The Article 12, paragraph (1) of the Korean Constitution prohibited punishing “unless it is so authorized by an Act or without due process of law." This clause requires that criminal statutes should be drafted in a clear and understandable fashion. In this review it is concluded that the provisions of the latter part of Article 139 fails to meet this clarity standard and is unconstitutional on the grounds of “void for vagueness." Lastly, is discussed whether the provisions of the latter part of Article 139 is unconstitutional on the grounds of “void for unnecessary." The Article 37, paragraph (1) of the Korean Constitution required criminal statutes to restrict freedoms and rights of citizens ‘only when necessary.' A punishment should not be more severe than is necessary when punishing someone for a crime. In this review it is concluded that the provisions of the latter part of Article 139 fails to meet this proportionality standard and is unconstitutional on the grounds of “void for unnecessary."

Despite of common opinion that aiding or abetting of false accusation against oneself can not establish a crime, Supreme court adjudged a person who aided false accusation against himself to be guilty recently. With the help of this judgement of conviction and a Practical need of punishing such a crime, prosecution and punishment on a person who commits a this kind of crime would increase rapidly. So in this brief report let us survey how variously this crime can be committed and to what extent it can be constituted. Also we will consider a crime of ‘interference with government official in the execution of his duty' as a substitute.

La Cour de cassation coréenne, dans un jugement du 6 juillet 2006, a déclaré que la demande de suivre les enquêteurs au commissariat de police pour y effectuer une confrontation n'avait pas eu lieu que sur la seule volontarité du prévenu sur le fondement du principe d'enquête non coercitive énoncé par l'article 199 du code de procédure pénale. Toutefois, cet article ne comporte pas ce principe mais exige seulement la nécéssité d'enquête et la légalité de mesure coercitive. En fait le caractéristique fondamentale de l'enquête non coercitive ne consiste pas dans la spontanéité de l'accord dès lors que l'examen de la légalité doit porter sur la nécéssité d'enquête au regard de la rationnalité. Il faut noter également que la Cour a résolu par ce jugement des arguments concernants l'admissibilité de l'interpellation sans contrainte pour nécessité de l'enquête différente de l'interpellation effectuée aux contrôles d'identité dont la caractère est d'ailleurs jugé une mesure de police administrative non pas judiciaire. Pour garantir la spontanéité de l'acoord, la Cour exige l'information préalable d'un droit de refuser à la demande de suivre au commissariat de police. Pourtant cette obligation n'est pas prévue dans le texte procédural. Au contraire, elle a été supprimée par le législateur en 1991 en occasion de la modification de la loi sur l'exécution des missions policières. L'exigence de la propre volontarité ne répond pas à la réalité de l'enquêtes non coercitive et conduit les enquêteurs à préférer les mesures coercitive en raison de la sévérité du contrôle exercé par la Cour. Cette contradiction ne pourrait pas contribuer à la protection des droits de l'homme au cours des enquêtes policières.

The Criminal Procedure Act of Korea has not had an explicit provision for the right to the presence of counsel during interrogation until the Article 243-2 of the revised Act took effect on and after January 1, 2008. Whether being in custody or not, a suspect is entitled to have counsel present during interrogation. But while the right to counsel has been the constitutional right, there was discussions on the content and extent of the right. the Article 34 of the previous Act provided the right to counsel for only a suspect in custody and the Article 243 of the previous Act had prescribed only an investigation officer or policeman as those who could be present during interrogation. So the question that a suspect could have a counsel present during interrogation was raised in the practice and the academic circles of law. Many of them had denied the right to the presence of counsel during the interrogation. In November 2003, the Supreme Court of Korea had held that a suspect in custody had the right to the presence of counsel during interrogation. And in September 2004, the Constitutional Court of Korea had determined to confer the right on a suspect without custody. There were advances of the right to counsel through these decisions in Korea. After the 2007 criminal procedure reform, the Act has an explicit provision for the right. Therefore, a suspect is entitled to have a counsel present during the course of investigation and is allowed to get advice from the counsel. Also the counsel is allowed to be present with the client during interrogation. However, unlike the right of a suspect, the right of a counsel is not granted by the Constitution of Korea but by the Criminal Procedure Act of Korea.

The right to counsel is regarded as a basic right not only for a suspect under custody but also for a non-arrested suspect as well. It is a constitutional right founded in Section 1 and 4 of Article 12, and Article 27 of Constitution. The right to counsel includes the right entitled to have the presence of counsel during interrogation by law-enforcement. The Criminal Procedure Law revises to guarantee all suspects have rights to counsel during interrogation. The right to counsel is a constitutional right which is materialized at a subordinate criminal procedural law. Therefore, it shall be differentiated from other statutory rights not directly derived from Constitution. According to the Criminal Procedure Law, the right to counsel during interrogation can be exercised by both suspects and counsels. However, such a right entitled to a counsel is not a constitutional right, which shows distinctive difference from a suspect-originated right to counsel.

On November 15, 2008 the Korean Supreme Court made a landmark decision to exclude illegally obtained physical evidence. It also adopted the “fruit of poisonous tree" doctrine, which excludes the derivative evidence obtained through the first tainted evidence. This Article reviews the Supreme Court's two decisions that applied the “fruit of poisonous tree" doctrine. First, the Decision of March 12, 2009 provides more specific standards to decide whether to exclude “tainted fruits." It requests comprehensive evaluation of all the circumstances regarding the collection of the first tainted evidence: the reasons and degree of process violation, the possibility of avoiding the violation, the causation between process violation and evidence collection, and the willfulness or negligence of law enforcement officers. Then, it does not exclude the physical evidence obtained without warning the suspect of the right to silence. This Article argues that the right to silence is the most crucial legal instrument to protect a suspect, particularly when the suspect is under interrogation without his/her counsel; it is a grave violation for a police officer not to warn a suspect of the right; in this case, exceptions of the “fruit of poisonous tree" doctrine are not applicable; so the physical evidence obtained without warning a suspect of the right to silence should be excluded. In the Decision of October 23, 2008 the Supreme Court held that the fingerprints on the illegally seized bottles and cups are admissible even if the seizure of the bottles and cups is illegal. This Article argues that such a view may weaken the constitutional request for warrant for search-and-seizure; the illegal seizure of the bottles and cups contaminates the evidentiary power of the fingerprints. In this case, however, the consent of the victim who is the owner of the bottles and cups is reasonably inferred, so the seized bottles and cups are admissible and the fingerprints on them are also admissible.

The right to remain silent is a basic right of the defendant or suspect guaranteed by the constitution and criminal procedure law. It is important to notify the right to the defendant or suspect so that he can excercise the right properly and effectively. It is appropriate to exclude the statement made by the suspect if the Miranda right notice is not given to him. However, once the police officer give the Miranda warning to the suspect, the statement after the notice can be admissible by the purged taint exception rule except that the officer abuse the rule. In addition to that, even if there is a breach of notification, the real evidence should be admissible. It is because the purpose of Miranda rule is to protect the statement not the real evidence. According to newly revised Korean Criminal Procedure Code, the range of exclusion can be interpreted very widely. However, we must be careful when we apply the rule to the real case in order to seek the balance between the human rights and social safety.

Counts in the prosecution schold be specified by crime time, place and methode. It is required not only for defendants to protect their procedual rights but also for courts to limit the scope of the trials. Illegal drug investigations were not generally supported by the crime victim or witness assistance as most of the drug-related crimes were committed in covert. Therefore, effective institution and support of a public action requires the testing for drug use as an essential element in the nation's battle against drug abuse and drug-related crime. Hair analysis for abused drugs has been recognized as a powerful tool to investigate exposure of subjects to these substances. However, it was difficult to estimate precisely the time of drug administration from the position of drug along the hair shaft. Even if the activity is to happen at some unspecified time, the court’s rejection of the case related to unspecified drug abuse may continue to pose significant problems for the integrity and impartiality of the judicial system, which is making it almost impossible for law enforcement agencies operating to bring about significant reductions in the abuse of illegal drug. Hair analysis results have been admitted as scientific evidence of drug use. The unresolved scientific issues should not obstruct the admissibility of strongly positive test results but also may not be explanatory for the entire case, even though specific questions need to be answered and the laboratory results may give strongly positive.

The criminal procedure commonly provide for the joinder of defendants, whereby two or more persons may together be prosecuted in a single trial. Assume a case in which defendants A and B have been lawfully joined for trial, but at that trial the prosecution intends to offer against A a confession by him stating, in effect, that he and B committed the crime. That right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him would be violated if A, by his confession, was a witness against B but could not be cross-examined. So to speak, where the powerfully incriminating judicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused sideby- side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the judge in a joint trial. In fact, it seems to me that “interlocking” bears a positively inverse relationship to devastation. A codefendant' confession will be relatively harmless if the incriminating story it tells is different from that which the defendant himself is alleged to have told, but enormously damaging if it confirms, in all essential respects, the defendant' alleged confession. It might be otherwise if the defendant were standing by his confession, in which case it could be said that the codefendant' confession does no more than support the defendant' very own case as corroborating evidence. But it might be otherwise if the defendant denies about his confession, in which case it could be said that the codefendant' confession is required as corroborating evidence that supports the defendant' very own case.

‘Act on the Punishment of Sexual Crimes and Protection of Victims thereof' has been punishing picture-taking by using camera or mechanical devices which induces sexual desires of others, or shame of those opened to shooting in order to block the phenomenon of fetishism. But it is difficult to find consistency in the application and interpretation of that law in a series of recent cases. It is because of the impossibility of victim identifying and distinguishing, the degree of open space and symbolism of body which influence on the sexual desire of others or physical or sexual shame. But the above factors are not proper elements to deny inducing sexual desire of others or sexual shame. The most basic element is the victim's intention. And it is natural that we can know the danger of routine judgement of sexual desire and sexual shame by going through a two-step judging process. In addition, the concept of sexual desire, or the shame in the crime of illegal picture-taking is criminal sexual desires of himself or others or sexual shame beyond mere curiosity, or simple shame and disgust. When a normal average person feels a weak fundamental human shame against sexual morality in society as a personal existence, if it is not destroyed, the notion of sex exists for sound moral values is injuried, sexual desire or the shame in the crime of illegal picture-taking is acknowledged. The concept of sexual desire or the shame in the crime of public indecency and obscene thing is to destroy humanity, human dignity or blatantly distort the representation of gender, people's dignity and value of sexual vice seriously. Those are only interested in sexual appeal, and reveal a naked act of normal sexual shame and hurt the good mind of public and the notion of sexual morality. In this sense, the concept of sexual desire or the shame in the crime of illegal picture-taking is a broad sense of sexual desire or the shame unlike that of in the crime of public indecency and obscene thing. The current judging criteria which judge the cause of sexual desire or shame by the body parts is overly alienated with the goals of ‘Act on the Punishment of Sexual Crimes and Protection of Victims Thereof' and norms reality and the situation of our society. So the criteria has to be replaced as more comprehensive and precise scale which consider society's sexual morals notions, gender culture, the victim's intention, sex, age, relationship with criminals, filming the context of post-war conduct, both before and after shooting the victim's attitude, filmed parts of the body, kind of clothes and state of wearing.

The case in this study has positive attitude in understanding the meaning of irresistible state when it comes to rape. This case offered explicit standard of cause and effect between the victim’s disability and irresistible state when offender is in charge of rape. When incidents occur, the victims are deemed able to make certain choices. Because their capacity is clearly vulnerable to external pressures and influences, and their ability to express that choice is undermined by imbalances of power in any given relationship. When the mental disabled victims do not understand what the sexual assault means exactly, it means that they do not have the power of sexual atonomy.

In the year of 2008, 404 criminal cases by the Korean Supreme Court are registered on the homepage of that court. 4 cases are decided by the counsel of all judge members, one of which was on the criminal procedure and the other 3 were on the criminal law. The cases which are reviewed in this paper is as follows; First, the cases by the counsel of all the judges of the supreme court. Among these are Supreme Court 2008. 6. 19. 2006 Do 4876. Supreme Court 2008. 4. 17. 2004 Do 4899, Supreme Court 2008. 4. 17. 2003 Do 758. Second, the cases relationg to the general principles of criminal law. Among theses are Supreme Court 2008. 3. 27. 2008 Do 89, Supreme Court 2008. 11. 27. 2008 Do 7311, Supreme Court 2008. 10. 23. 2005 Do 10101, Supreme Court 2008. 11. 13. 2008 Do 7143, Supreme Court 2008. 9. 11. 2006 Do 8376, Supreme Court 2008. 3. 27. 2007 Do 7874, Supreme Court 2008. 4. 11. 2007 Do 8373, Third, the cases relating to the individual crime provisions. Among these are Supreme Court 2008. 7. 10. 2008 Do 2422, Supreme Court 2008. 3. 27. 2008 Do 917, Supreme Court 2008. 10. 23. 2008 Do 6080, Supreme Court 2008. 4. 24. 2006 Do 9089, Supreme Court 2008. 12. 24. 2008 Do 9169, Supreme Court 2008. 10. 23. 2008 Do 5200, Supreme Court 2008. 3. 13. 2006 Do 3558.