According to the development of computer, many people recently record their statements with computer. Therefore new issue about the admissibility of the statements recorded in computer file floats on the legal horizon. From the viewpoint of the anglo-american hearsay rule, this issue could be easily cleared by the rule and exception. In principle, hearsay rule say that out of court statements be inadmissible for the evidence of the truthfulness of the contents of the statements and call this out of court statements hearsay. Hearsay rule focuses on the statements, not the method by which this statements are recorded or transferred. As the result, the out of court statements recorded in computer file are hearsay when they are given as evidence for the truthfulness of the contents of the statements But hearsay rule know many exceptions which make the out of court statements admissible. At first, hearsay statements by the defendant are admissible as a exception of hearsay rule. Secondly, hearsay statements by the third party are admissible when there is necessity and guarantee of trustworthiness. There are many categories and general exceptions which represent this necessity and guarantee of trustworthiness. On the other hand, there is another point for the admissibility of the evidence. It is the authentication. Authentication can be given by many methods, as example, by testimony of the declarant, by the testimony of the third party who knows the evidence or other objective materials. From this point of view, we can consider § 313① and § 315 possible clauses for the admissibility of private statements in computer file. At first, § 313① require the authentication be made by the declarant's oral testimony. The Court says that this testimony is the one in which the declarant admit the statements to be made by himself. According to the explanation, the admissibility is decided only by the declarant's subjective admission. This result is unreasonable because the issue of admissibility should be decided by the objective facts. Therefore the testimony of the declarant in § 313① should be construed as all the statements in court and the authentication be decided by all the statements of the declarant in court objectively considered with other facts and materials. And § 315. 3. provides general clause of guarantee of trustworthiness as exception of hearsay rule. This guarantee of trustworthiness as a condition for admissibility is relatively lower level of reliability than the reliability for the selection from the admissible evidences for trusting the facts asserted. The selection from the admissible evidences is for the fact finder, for example, trial jury. not for the leader of the procedure. But in the Court' decision, the Court seems to be unable to distinguish this guarantee of trustworthiness as a condition for admissibility from the issue of selection from the admissible evidences for trusting the facts asserted. So the Court's decision is inappropriate and the statements recorded in computer file should have been admitted.

Diese Arbeit ist gegen das Urteil vom Obersten Gericht(2005.4.15, 2004do8701) ausgebildet. Es geht hier um die Frage, welche Voraussetzungen notwendig sind, damit die dem wesentlichen Geschäft begleitende Geschäftssache unter dem Tatbestand des Geschäftshindernis subsumiert werden kann, besonders ob die einmalige Geschäftssache ebenso wie der Umzug der Fabrik in der Gesellschaft zum 'Geschäft' gehört, das im Strafrecht §314-Ⅰ bestimmt ist. Nach meiner Analysierung ist das Oberste Gericht der Auffassung, dáß die dem Hauptgeschäft begleitende einmalige Geschäftssache zum sogenannten 'Geschäft' gehört werden kann, wenn dieselbe zwei Bedingungen, erstens die enge Beziehung mit dem Hauptgeschäft und zweitens die Dauerhaftigkeit erfüllt. Es ist aber meiner Meinung, dáß solche Stellung des Obersten Gerichts problematisch in mancher Weise ist, und deshalb unannehmbar ist.

The right to remain silent is a basic right of the defendant or 녀spect guaranteed by the constitution and criminal procedure law. It is important to notify the right to the defendant or suspect so that he can excercise the right properly and effectively. The timing of notification and the content of the right to remain silent are closely related. The investigator should notify the suspect or defendant of this right before conducting any questioning that could incriminate the suspect or defendant. Considering the Punishment of Minor Offenses Act which punishes the defendants and suspects who do not cooperate in identification process, they may not exert their right to remain silent during that procedure as legally guaranteed rights. Identification itself isn't a disadvantageous thing to the suspect or defendant. There are many countries which impose a penalty on the suspect or defendant who doesn't state his or her identification. In addition to that, even if there is a breach of notification, the statement should be admissible by the standing theory or for impeachment purpose. According to newly revised Korean Criminal Procedure code, notification is not required until the identification process has finished during the investigation process. And if the suspect or defendant initiates a voluntary statement, the statement should be admissible without the "Miranda" warning.

수색은 압수와 함께 행하여지는 것이 통례이고, 실무상으로는 근래에 이르기까지 압수수색영장이라는 단일영장이 발부되어 왔으나 최근 서울중앙지방법원의 영장재판에서 법원은 구체적인 이유설시 없이 수색영장만 발부하고 압수영장은 전부 기각하는 취지로 판단하였다. 그러나 압수영장과 수색영장의 분리를 전제한 법원의 위와 같은 판단은 미국등 선진 제국에서 압수영장과 수색영장이 하나의 영장으로 발부되는 실무와 배치될 뿐만 아니라 수색이 자기목적적인 제도가 아니라 압수를 전제로 하는 것이라는 압수수색의 제도취지와도 부합하지 않는다. 또한 위 재판에서 법원의 의도가 수색영장에 의한 수색을 통해 압수물을 최대한 한정한 후 압수를 함으로써 국민의 재산상 침해를 억제하려는 것이라고 하더라도 현재 실무상 법원의 영장 발부 절차가 신속하게 이루어지지 않고 있는 상황에서 수색을 먼저 실시한 후 압수영장을 청구하도록 하는 것은 수사현실을 도외시한 것이다. 그리고 비록 형사소송법의 해석상 영장을 발부할지 여부에 대하여 법관의 재량을 인정한 것으로 해석된다고 하더라도, 위와 같은 재량은 결코 자유재량일 수 없고 합리적인 범위 내로 제한된다고 할 것이다. 따라서 기본권 제한의 정도가 큰 수색이 허용된 이상 수색과 불가분적으로 연결되어 있고, 수색보다 기본권 제한의 정도가 적은 압수는 당연히 허용되어야 할 것이며, 수사기관의 수사 필요성에 관한 1차적인 판단이 존중되어야 할 것이다. 결론적으로 압수영장과 수색영장의 분리를 전제로 한 서울중앙지방법원의 최근 재판은 압수수색영장에 관한 비교법적 고찰과 압수수색제도의 취지 등에 비추어 볼 때 부당하고, 이처럼 사실상 압수영장을 전부 기각하는 재판에 대하여는 기각 이유를 설시하도록 하고, 이에 대한 불복절차를 마련해야 할 것이다.

The accused took a cash card from its owner and threatened to harm the latter if he would not divulge the password to him. He then withdrew money from an ATM several times over. The crime of the accused consists of the following three steps: 1) forcibly taking a cash card; 1) forcibly taking a cash card; 2) threatening to harm the owner of the cash card if he would not divulge the password to him; and 3) inserting the cash card in the ATM card slot and entering the password to withdraw the money in the account. If the crime of the accused that was described above were subdivided into the above three steps, the following conclusions would be established: (1) forcibly taking a cash card falls within the crime of robbery; (2) threatening to harm the holder of a cash card if he does not divulge the password to the accused falls within the crime of coercion; and (3) inserting the card in the ATM card slot and entering the password to withdraw cash from the account falls within the crime of theft. There is no objection that the act of forcibly extracting a password from the owner of the cash card in (2) is included in the act of forcibly taking the cash card, thus establishing the crime of robbery. However, whether the crime of theft in (3) can be considered distinct or separate from the crime of robbery in (1) is the core issue of this case. The Supreme Court adjudged that withdrawing cash from an ATM using someone else’s cash card that was forcibly taken from the latter consists of the crime of theft and can be considered separate or distinct from the crime of robbery because the accused threatened to harm the victim if he would not cooperate. As such, the resistance of the victim was repressed when his cash card was being forcibly taken from him. Therefore, the victim did not give his consent to the accused to withdraw money from his ATM account using his cash card. It is, however, thought of as inappropriate to completely separate such act of theft from the preceding act—the “improper acquisition of a cash card”—even though the succeeding act, withdrawing cash from an ATM, falls within the crime of theft. Considering the characteristics of a cash card, it can be said that the act of forcibly taking a cash card should be considered a means or method of withdrawing cash from an ATM.

Article 9(1) of the Punishment of Tax Evaders Act (“PTEA”) stipulates that any person who evades tax obligations through fraud of other wrongful conduct shall be punished under the PTEA. So far, most of discussions surrounding Article 9(1) of the PTEA were focused on the meaning of “fraud” or “wrongful conduct.” In the case at hand, the focus was on the meaning of “tax evasion.” There has been much controversy and debate over this issue. The debate centers on the issue of whether a person who has properly reported the tax base and therefore cannot be said to have interfered with the tax authorities’ ability to impose and determine tax liabilities, but instead has hindered the collection of the tax, can be punished under the PTEA. In the recent Supreme Court Decision 2005 Do 9546 delivered February 15, 2007 the court ruled that even if there was no interference of the imposition or determination of tax, if there was interference of collection of tax, then the conduct should also be punished. The author of this paper fully agrees with the Supreme Court's decision for the following reasons: First, the legislative purpose of the PTEA is to secure the state’s tax revenues as well as realize the spirit of fairness and justice in tax collection. Moreover, although anyone can report tax returns properly, if that person deliberately attempts to avoid the collection of tax, that conduct cannot go unpunished. Tax returns, in the end, serve the purpose of facilitating tax collection. Second, on a practical level, hindrance of the imposition /determination of tax and the hindrance of collection are both unlawful behavior that bring on the same result, and therefore should be treated alike. In conclusion, the recent Supreme Court decision is significant in that it clarifies the interpretation of “tax evasion” as stipulated in Article 9(1) of the PTEA. More importantly, this interpretation is in accordance with the principle of the legal principle of Nullum crimen sine lege.

Excessive self-defense is applicable if an act of self-defense exceeds the reasonable limits and lacks requisite appropriateness. Excessive self-defense is not punishable under Article 21, Clause 3 of Criminal Law, if it is caused by fear, astonishment, excitement or confusion under anxious circumstances such as during night time. According to Article 21, Clause 2, in case of excessive self-defense under extenuating circumstances, either a reduced sentence or is unpunishable. The illegality and liability of excessive self-defense under Article 21, Clause 3 are reduced and besides its liability is expirated because it can not be expected that an offender acts within legal boundaries under such circumstances. Under Article 21, Clause 2, the illegality and liability are reduced and it is unpunishable because it lacks the necessity for punishment. Excessive self-defense is a complicated matter connected with criminal liability, illegality and sentencing. It is not easy to grasp the nature of excessive self-defense and its applicable range because it borders on self-defense and mistaken self-defense, and is indistinguishable from them. The Supreme Court has not clarified its stand on the requisites of excessive self-defense. The Supreme Court has interpreted not only the requisite appropriateness of self-defense, but also the requisites of excessive self-defense strictly. It ruled a decision upon the above mentioned first case as excessive self-defense and the second case as self-defense. However, it should have ruled that self-defense was justified regarding the first case and ruled the second case as mistaken excessive self-defense with either reduced liability or an expirated sentence.

It is not related to construction of Article 62② whether “suspension of execution of a part of a imprisonment” is admitted or not, because a concept of ‘a part’ in Article 62② and a concept of ‘a part’ in suspension of execution of a part of a imprisonment are different. The question of “suspension of execution of a part of a imprisonment” is related to construction of Article 62①. While article 62① provide requisites for suspension of execution of sentence, Article 62② provide only suspension of execution of a part of sentence in case of concurrent imposing of punishment by article 62①. Therefore, it is difficult to comprehend that article 62② provide another requisites for suspension of execution of sentence as article 62①. And it is unreasonable to interpret “… the execution of the sentence may be suspended” as “… the execution of the whole of a sentence may be suspended” in article 62①. Because a concept of ‘a part’ in suspension of execution of a part of a sentence and a concept of ‘a part’ in Article 62② are different essentially, and because a concept of ‘the whole’ in suspension of execution of a part of a sentence and a concept of ‘the whole’ in Article 62② are different essentially. And ‘a sentence’ has two meaning: a sentence against a crime and a sentence against several crimes. Therefore, it is unreasonable to interpret that ‘a sentence’ in article 62② and in suspension of execution of a part of a sentence have same meaning. It is proper that suspension of execution of a part of a imprisonment is solved by not interpretation but legislation, because it is of great no advantage to the accused.

Recently, many people live or travel abroad by various reasons. In this global era, we cannot only require the witness to come to homeland for testifying in court. It is necessary to provide a new method to take a reliable evidence which can solve the case with the witness staying abroad. In this case, the Prosecutor's Office try to give a new method by requesting the Consul in Japan to hear the witness and record the statements. According to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Consul can hear the people of the Consul's nation. German Consular Relations Law provides that the admissibility of out of court statements recorded by Consul is regulated according to the institution which makes the request. Therefore, if the request comes from court, the statements recorded by the Consul according to the request are treated as statements recorded by Judge. From this point of view, the Prosecutor's Office insisted that the out of court statements recorded by Consul in Japanese be treated as the out of court statements recorded by Judge in deciding the guarantee of trustworthiness. But the Court construed that the statements recorded by Consul as the statements recorded by private person. Worse than this, the Court denies the guarantee of trustworthiness as the condition for the admissibility for the evidence. But this guarantee of trustworthiness as a condition for admissibility is relatively lower level of reliability than the reliability for the selection from the admissible evidences for trusting the facts asserted. The selection from the admissible evidences is for the fact finder, for example, trial jury. not for the leader of the procedure. But in this case, the Court seems to be unable to distinguish this guarantee of trustworthiness as a condition for admissibility from the issue of selection from the admissible evidences for trusting the facts asserted. So the Court's decision is inappropriate and the statements recorded by Consul should have been admitted.

In der oben geschilderten Rechtsprechung kommt es darauf an, ob derjenige eine täuschungsgleiche Handlung(Computerbetrug) begeht, der die ihm vom Kontoinhaber überlassene Code- oder Scheckkarte samt Geheimnummer absprachewidrig zu Abhebungen an Geldautomaten benutzt. In der Lehrmeinung und der Rechtsprechung sind also umstritten die Fälle, in denen der Dritte die Code- oder Scheckkarte zwar im Auftrag des berechtigten Kontoinhabers verwendet, jedoch einen höheren als den miteinander vereinbarten Betrag abhebt. Nach der Rechtsprechung sollte die abredewidrige Anhebungen an Geldautomaten als Computerbetrug angenommen werden. Nach anderen Ansichten sollte es als Diebstahl, Untreue oder Unterschlagung angesehen werden. Als Ergebnis hat diese Arbeit vorgeschlagen, dass das abredewidrige Verhalten des Täters im Innenverhältnis zum Karteninhaber diesem gegenüber allenfalls eine Untreue darstellt. Vor allem wird es als Grundlage solcher Auslegung vorgelegt, dass es der Reduktion des Merkmals der „unbefugten Verwendung (sog. Eingabe und Veränderung) von Daten“ auf die betrugsspezifischen oder täuschungsgleichen Fälle bedarf. Das „Täuschungsgleiche“ der unbefugten Datenverwendung ist darin zu sehen, dass die Befugnis des Dritten zur Inanspruchnahme der Leistung seines Beziehungspartners zu den Grundlagen des jeweiligen Geschäftstypus gehören muss und dass sie nach den Anschauungen des Geschäftsverkehrs mit der Code- oder Scheckkarte auch beim Schweigen der Beteiligten als selbstverständlich vorhanden vorausgesetzt wird. Mit anderen Worten muss die unbefugte Datenverwendung Täuschungswert im Sinne des § 347 korStGB haben. Wer aufgrund einer ihm erteilten Bankvollmacht treuwidrig Geld für eigene Zwecke abhebt, täuscht aber nicht die Bank, sondern begeht allenfalls Untreue gegenüber dem Kontoinhaber.

In 2007, 511 criminal cases of the korean supreme court are registered on the homepage of that court. 4 cases are decided by the counsel of all judge members, one of which was on the crimial procedure and the others were on the criminal law. In this paper are reviewed several cases including two criminal cases by the supreme court counsel of all judge memberst and 1 case by the consititutional court. I. Cases by the counsel of all the judges of the supreme court. 1. Supreme Court 2007. 9. 28. 2007 Do 606. These cases are on the distinction of the completion from the attempt of the crime of threat 2. Supreme Court 2004. 4. 19. 2005 Do 7288. This case is on the amount of profit by property crimes. 3. Constitutional Court 2007. 11. 29. 2005 Heonga 10 This case is on the unconstitionality of the provision that punishes the employer because of the crime by the employee. II. Individual Cases In this paper, following cases are reviewed. 1. Supreme Court 2007. 8. 23. 2007 Do 4818. 2. Supreme Court 2007. 2. 8. Do 2006도7900 3. Supreme Court 2007. 12. 14. Do 2005도872 4. Supreme Court 2007. 2. 8. Do 2006도6196 5. Supreme Court 2007. 6. 29. Do 2005도3832 6. Supreme Court 2007. 1. 25. Do 2006도5979 7. Supreme Court 2007. 3. 15. Do 2006도9453 8. Supreme Court 2007. 5. 10. Do 2007도1375 9. Supreme Court 2007. 9. 20. Do 2007도5507 10. Supreme Court 2007. 3. 15. Do 2006도2704 11. Supreme Court 2007. 10. 12. Do 2005도7112 12. Supreme Court 2007. 3. 29. 2006 Do 9182

특가법 제5조의4 제6항은 새로운 구성요건을 규정한 것이 아니라, 상습 ‘특별누범’의 가중에 관한 특별규정으로서 이 규정이 적용될 경우에는 일반누범의 가중이 이루어져서는 안되는 것으로 해석할 것이다. 다만 법정형을 별도로 정한 본조 제5항의 경우와는 달리 제6항의 형은 가중되고 있으므로, 위 조항의 특별누범의 요건을 충족하는데도 위 조항으로 기소되지 아니한 경우에 법원은 직권 적용을 하여서는 아니되고, 공소장 변경을 요구하는 등으로 피고인의 방어권을 보장하여야 할 것이다.

형사재판에서 피고인이 제출한 증거에 대한 증거능력과 증거조사에 관한 연구이다. 국민 참여재판의 출범 및 개정 형사소송법의 시행에 따라 피고인이 제출하는 증거의 중요성이 증대되고 있다. 형사재판에서 공소 제기된 범죄사실에 대한 입증책임은 어디까지나 검사에게 있다. 따라서 피고인이 제출하는 증거는 알리바이 등 공소 범죄사실에 반대되는 사실을 입증하기 위한 증거이든, 공소 범죄사실에 대한 진술증거의 신빙성을 탄핵하기 위한 탄핵증거이든, 모두 그 성질은 탄핵증거라고 보는 것이 합당하다. 그러므로 원칙적으로 증거능력을 필요로 하지 아니하고 탄핵증거로서 증거조사를 하면 족하다. 연구 대상 판례는 이러한 판단을 전제로 하고 있다.

The defendant in this case withdrew 50,000 Won from a cash dispenser by using a cash card given by the card owner, who asked the defendant to withdraw 20,000 Won. The defendant gave 20,000 Won to the card owner, but took 30,000 Won for himself. The prosecutor accused the defendant of committing "fraud by using a computer" in Article 347-1 of the Penal Code, but the trial court held him not guilty in that the object of "fraud by using a computer" was limited to "property interest" different from "property." Appealing to the higher court, the prosecutor accused the defendant of committing "theft" in Article 329 of the Penal Code. However, the appeal court held him not guilty in that a cash dispenser was supposed to give cash to a cash card user if provided with a correct password; the bank, the occupier of the cash dispenser, could not be considered to have an intention of giving cash to a card user after reviewing the scope of the entrust between the card owner and the card user; therefore, the defendant did not withdraw cash against the intention of the bank. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court held the defendant committed "fraud by using a computer" in Article 347-1 of the Penal Code, providing when the defendant withdrew 50,000 Won, he did not commit "theft" while he acquired "property interest," which is 20,000 Won. This article reviews legal dogmatic issues of this case. First, it compares this new decision by the Supreme Court with its previous decisions where it held the defendant committed "theft" in that he withdrew cash from a cash dispenser by using a cash card without any entrust from the card owner. Second, it analyzes two important aspects of the case: whether the defendant in this case withdrew cash against the intention of the bank or not; why 20,000 Won in this case should be interpreted as "property interest," not "property."

Der Gesetzgeber geht davon aus, daß der Erwachsene, der strafrechtliches Unrecht verwirklicht, normalerweise schuldfähig ist. Er regelt daher nicht die Schuldfähigkeit, sondern deren ausnahmsweises Fehlen(Schuldunfähigkeit). Nach dem § 10 kor. StGB wird nicht bestraft, wer wegen einer psychiatrischen Störung ohne Einsichts- und Steuerungsfähigkeit handelt. Zu den psychiatrischen Störungen gehören die krankhafte seelische Störung, Schwachsinn und die tiefgreifende Bewußtseinsstörung. Momentan passierten in Korea einige schwere Sexualdelikte gegen Kinder. Deshalb kommt “Pädophilie” bei der Schuldfähigkeitsbeurteilung in Beracht. Aber unser Gericht anerkannt Pädophilie nicht als eine psychiatrische Störung. Die um die Entwicklung objektiver Abgrenzungskriterien bemühten psychiatrischen Klassifikationssysteme sind für die rechtliche Schuldfähigkeitsbeurteilung zwar nicht verbindlich und enthalten insbesondere keine Angaben darüber, ob und inwieweit die bescriebenen Defekte die Schuldfähigkeit des Täters beeinträchtigen. Aber wenn die solche Störung(Pädophilie) Krankheitswert hat, müssen ihre möglichen Auswirkungen auf die Einsichts- und Steuerungsfähigkeit beurteilt werden.

Zur Frage der Tatbestandsformen der Bedrohungstatbestand(§ 283 kStGB) spricht die herschende Meinung des Urteils(2007do606, Urt. v. 2007.9.28) die Erkenntnis aus, daß das Rechtsgut der Bedrohung die Freiheit der Willensentschlißung ist und § 283 ein Gefährdungsdelikt ist. Eine tatsächliche Verletzungung der Willensentschlißungsfreiheit braucht also nicht einzutreten. Jedoch kommt es dabei nicht darauf an, ob sich das Opfer durch Drohung mit einem empfindlichen Übels im Einzelfall tatsächlich befürchten läßt. Der Täter muß die von seinem Willen abhängige Begehung eines Übels in Aussicht stellen. Vollendet ist die Tat, wenn die Drohung mit Willen des Täters zur Kenntnis des Drohungsadressaten gekommen ist und dieser den Sinn der Mitteilung verstanden hat. Nach § 286 ist der Versuch strafbar und zB dann gegeben, wenn die Mitteilung den Drohungsadressaten noch nicht erreicht, oder wenn die Mitteilung nicht zur Kenntnis des Drohungsadressaten gekommen ist, oder wenn dieser den Sinn der Mitteilung nicht verstanden hat. Zur Frage, ob § 283 ein konkretes Gefährdungsdelikt oder ein abstraktes Gefährdungsdelikt ist, ließ die herschende Meinung des Urteils unberüht bleiben. Dagegen die minder Meinung des Urteils, gefolgt der wohl überwiegenden Ansichten in der Literatur, sieht § 283 zurecht als ein Verletzungsdelikt. Die Auffassung der Bedrohung als Verletzung der Willensentschlißungsfreiheit scheint mir als plausibel, weil § 283 individuell-konkrete Willensentschlißungsfreiheit schützt und nach § 286 der Versuch der Bedrohung strafbar ist.