The type of radioactive waste that may occur in the process of nuclear power plant dismantling can be classified into solid, liquid, gas, and mixed waste. The amount of these wastes must be defined in the Final Decommissioning Plan for approval of the licensing. Also, in the case of Metal radioactive waste, it is necessary to calculate the generation amount in order to treat radioactive waste at a Radioactive Waste Treatment Facility (RWTF). Since a large quantity of metal radioactive waste is generated during the decommissioning of a nuclear power plant, the application of a metal melter for reduction is considered. The metal waste is heated to a temperature above the melting point and separated into liquid and gas forms. Nuclides existing on the surface of metal waste vaporize in a melting furnace to become dust or collect in sludge. Nonvolatile nuclides such as Co, Fe and Mn remain in ingot, but other nuclides can be captured and reduced with dust and sludge. And the types of melting furnaces to be applied can be broadly classified into Atmospheric Induction Melter (AIM) and Vacuum Induction Melter (VIM). Therefore, this review intends to compare the two types of metal furnaces to be included in RWTF.

The periodic safety review (PSR), for all operating nuclear power plants in Korea, has been conducted in accordance with SSG-25, a guideline suggested by the IAEA, The PSR is performed through the review of the regulatory body after the operator’s self-evaluation. In order to guarantee a high level of safety in consideration of the changed environment, such as operating experience (OE) and technology development, it should be comprehensively and integratedly performed, and it is also carried out every 10 years after the operation permit. However, in case that all or part of the reactor facilities have been permanently shut down, such as Kori Unit 1 and Wolsong Unit 1, Around a half of reactor facilities are not in operation. The periodic safety evaluation may not be conducted for unused parts if there is no safety hazard and if there are some difficulties for applying periodic safety evaluation. In considering that the biggest purpose of PSR safety (by PSR definition of KINS guideline) is to improve and accumulated factors such as aging deterioration, facility change, operation experience, and technological development for operating nuclear power plants. It refers to a comprehensive safety evaluation that is periodically performed during the period of operation of a nuclear power plant. It is necessary to review whether PSR should be performed for a nuclear power plant that is permanently shut down after nuclear power plant operation is terminated. Also, in IAEA SSR 2/2 Rev1, it is defined that PSR is performed during the nuclear power plant operation period. “Requirement 12: Periodic safety review, Systematic safety assessments of the plant, in accordance with the regulatory requirements, shall be performed by the operating organization throughout the plant’s operating lifetime, with due account taken of operating experience and significant new safety related information from all relevant sources”. Recently, Kori Unit 1 and Wolsong Unit 1 were decided to permanently shut down in June 2017 and December 2019, and are currently being prepared for decommissioning. According to the Wolsong decommissioning plan, decontamination and demolition will be completed by 2032. The PSR for permanent shutdown of Kori Unit 1 was submitted to the regulatory body in December 2018 and is under approval review. In the case of the permanent shutdown PSR of Wolsong Unit 1, the project will be launched in May 2023 and the PSR will be submitted to the regulatory body in May 2024. In the case of Wolsong Unit 1, it is necessary to operate the various systems, including the systems related to the spent fuel storage tank, even during the period of permanent shutdown. Such as the heavy water related systems used in common with Wolsong Unit 2, are essential operating systems. Based on Basic Subject Index (BSI), 112 out of 218 systems require operation, indicating that about 50% of systems require operation even after permanent shutdown. Decommissioning of systems and equipment will begin after the transfer to modular air-cooled canister storage (MACSTOR) by the end of 2025, and then in-depth discussions will be needed whether PSR evaluation is meaningful.

The decommissioning of domestic Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) in Korea is expected to begin with the Kori-1, which was permanently shutdown in 2017. In addition, Wolsong-1 has been also permanently shutdown, and another type will be the decommissioning project following Kori-1. KHNP is promoting operation and decommissioning projects as the owner of NPPs, and the Central Research Institute (CRI) has been developing a Final Decommissioning Plan (FDP) for the decommissioning license document. The FDP consists of 11 major chapters in the order of overview of the project, characteristic evaluation, safety assessment, radiation protection, decontamination & dismantlement activities, waste management, etc. The contents described in each chapter are individual chapters, but there are also parts that consider the connection with other chapters. The CRI, which develops the FDP for the first decommissioning project in Korea, has spent a lot of time and effort considering this and has been proceeding through trial and error until the present stage. Therefore, this study aims to explain the current status of FDP, a license document for domestic decommissioning projects, and the link between major input data in major chapters. It can be said that System, Structure, and Components (SSCs) subject to dismantling are considered as the scope of FDP. Chapters that perform estimations on these dismantling targets may include safety assessments, exposure dose assessments for workers and residents, and waste inventory assessments. Therefore, an important part of performing the estimation works is to consider the entire scope of decommissioning activities, and as a way, it can start from data based on the inventory data. After generating the inventory data, the waste treatment classification for the inventory is designated by reflecting the results of the characterization. In addition, for cost estimation, the cost of decommissioning project is predicted by inputting some data (i.e., UCF) such as work process, number of workers, and time required for each item with data reflected in quantity and characterization. After that, based on these inventory, characterization, and UCF data, accident scenarios and industrial safety evaluation are performed for the safety assessment. The worker exposure dose is estimated by considering the dose rate of the workspace with these data. In the case of the amount of waste, the final amount of waste is estimated by considering the factors of reduction and decontamination. In summary, the main estimation contents of FDP are evaluated by adding elements required for the purpose of each chapter from data combined with inventory, characterization, and UCF, so the contents of these chapters are based on the logic of considering the entire scope of decommissioning in common.

The treatment of solid radioactive waste can be divided into Mechanical (compaction), Thermal (Plasma), Melting (metal), Chemical (e.g. acid digestion) and Biochemical (e.g. bacteria). Among them, industrial thermal technologies include geomelt, Vitrificaion, Hip Ceramic, Incinerator, Pyrolysis, Plasma and Melting. In this study, the characteristics, status and advantages of geomelt vitrification were reviewed. Vitrification has long been considered an ideal choice for high-level radioactive waste by regulators internationally, because of its expected durability over hundreds of thousands of years. Geomelt vitrification is a highly flexible technology for hazardous and radioactive waste treatment. Uses electricity to melt waste materials to either destroy or immobilize contaminants. Final product is identical to natural obsidian very durable and resistant to weathering Geomelt vitrification creates ultra stable glass that is typically 10 times stronger than concrete, and more durable than granite or marble. Its leach resistance is among the highest of all materials in the world. In addition, contaminated soil, sludge, metals, organic matter, and bulky D&D debris can be treated simultaneously without pretreatment steps such as size reduction and sorting. Geomelt vitrification can be deployed in variety of in ground, in container or hybrid in cell treatment. Geomelt vitrification have been treating radioactive waste and hazardous waste since the 1990s, treatment in the U.S., UK, Australia, Japan and other countries. Initially developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in the U.S., GeoMelt vitrification has been used successfully around the world for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in Hanford and at Sellafield in the UK.

Radioactive waste (hereinafter referred to as mixed waste) containing hazardous substances (heavy metals, organic and inorganic waste liquids, asbestos, etc.) has been continuously generated from domestic nuclear power plants, nuclear facilities, and other industrial facilities, and heavy metals were released during the dismantlement of Kori Unit 1 and Wolseong Unit 1. Lead, cadmium, mercury, arsenic), asbestos, decontamination waste liquid (organic/inorganic waste liquid), etc. may be generated. Although hazardous waste related to the nuclear industry continues to be generated, only the regulation direction for hazardous substances is presented in the provisions related to hazardous substances in the delivery regulations for low and intermediate-level radioactive waste and the acceptance criteria for low and intermediate-level radioactive waste disposal facilities. In particular, because there is no clear definition of “hazardousness” and specific standards such as concentration and characteristics for classification of hazardous substances, as well as hazard removal procedures when the hazardousness of radioactive waste is confirmed, no hazardous substances have been delivered in Korea to date and many mixed wastes are stored at each generation facility or at the NPP. As a plan to improve delivery standards related to mixed waste is being prepared recently, it is believed that if the acceptance standards are revised accordingly, it will be possible to confirm the suitability for disposal of drums produced after the establishment of the acceptance standards in 2015. However, it is believed that securing disposal suitability for waste that was packed in 200L drums and compressed under super high pressure in the absence of specific technical standards and regulatory guidelines for the disposal of radioactive waste containing hazardous substances would still remain a difficult problem. In this report overseas acceptance standards related to hazardous waste were reviewed and a plan to secure the disposal suitability of 200 L drums compressed with of super high pressure was proposed.

To evaluate the inventory of radionuclides for the disposal of waste generated from nuclear power plants, indirect assessment methods such as the scaling factor method or average radioactivity concentration method can be applied. A scaling factor represents the average concentration ratio between key radionuclides and difficult-to-measure (DTM) radionuclides, while the average radioactivity concentration refers to the average concentration of DTM radionuclides, regardless of the concentration of key radionuclides or within specific ranges of key radionuclide concentrations. These indirect assessment methods can be statistically derived through the analysis of representative drums. This study will address how to apply these scaling factors and average radioactivity concentrations. Firstly, the concentration of gamma-emitting radionuclides will be analyzed using a drum radionuclide analyzer, and the concentration of DTM radionuclides will be determined by applying scaling factors specific to each DTM radionuclide. In the case of using the average radioactivity concentration method, the average concentration of DTM radionuclides will be applied independently of the concentration of gamma-emitting radionuclides. It is crucial to perform radioactive decay correction based on the date of generation or disposal when applying scaling factors or average radioactivity concentration. Additionally, for repackaged 320 L drums, determining which drum among the two 200 L drums inside should serve as the reference is of utmost importance

To safely dispose of highly radioactive spent resin and concentrate waste generated through nuclear power plant operations, it is essential to meet the physicochemical properties requirements of the packages and ensure the accuracy and reliability of radiological characteristics determination. Both spent resin and concentrate are packaged in high-integrity containers (HICs) after drying and are homogeneous waste products generated in the primary system and liquid radioactive waste treatment system. Meeting the physicochemical properties requirements does not appear to be difficult. However, to achieve reliable radiological characterization of high-integrity container packages, it is necessary to take a representative sample and perform accurate radiological analysis. Therefore, this paper discusses the methodology for evaluating the radionuclide inventory of high radioactive resin and concentrate packages, as well as the essential element technology and considerations. For relatively high radioactive resin and concentrate packages, the radionuclide inventory for each package should be evaluated with high reliability through direct radiological analysis of the representative samples collected for each package. This can contribute to the efficient operation of radioactive waste disposal facilities. Radionuclide-specific concentrations directly analyzed for each package will be managed in a database. As analytical data accumulates and direct measurements of high-integrity container package such as the radwaste drum assay system (RAS) become feasible, statistical techniques such as correlation analysis between easy-tomeasure (ETM) nuclides and difficult-to-measure (DTM) nuclides can lead to the development of efficient and reasonable indirect evaluation methods, such as scaling factor and the mean activity concentration method. As for the element technology, a remote representative sampling technique should be developed to safely and effectively take representative samples of highly radioactive materials, including granulated or hardened concentrate waste. Considerations should also be given to determining the sample quantity representing each package, as well as establishing radiation calibration and measurement methods appropriate to the radiation levels of the representative samples.

At the end of 2022 there were 439 nuclear power reactors in operating around the world, including 25 nuclear power reactors of Korea. Domestic nuclear power plants (NPPs) continuously produce low and intermediate-level radioactive waste (LILW) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF). As amount of radioactive waste is increasing and interim storage facilities meet limitation of their capacity, radioactive waste need to be transported. Consequently, the demand for radioactive waste transportation is increasing and the importance of Radiation Risk Assessment Codes (RRACs) for radioactive waste transportation is also on the rise. Considering the domestic situation where all NPPs are located on seaside, the radioactive waste transportation by ship is inevitable and the its risk assessment is very important for safety. Although various researches on radioactive waste transportation risk assessment is being actively conducted, research on domestic radioactive waste maritime transportation is insufficient. In this study, MARINRAD and KM-RAD were used to review on the radioactive waste transportation risk assessment. The result of reviewing shows that MARINRAD used SNF as transporting radioactive materials and ‘SAND87-7067 (1987)’ as nuclide database, whereas KMRAD used LILW and ‘IAEA Technical Report Series-422 (2004)’. To complement these limitations, we present an modernized integrated database by updating data and covering the radioactive materials from LILW to SNF. These results are expected to contribute to the development of RRACs for domestic radioactive waste maritime transportation.

Among the nuclear power plant facility improvement projects, out of a total 10 replacement reactor vessel closure head (RRVCH), five have been replaced, starting with Gori Unit 1, and five, including Hanul Unit 1, Hanbit Units 5 and 6, and Hanul Units 3 and 4 will be replaced in the future. This paper presents the method of treating Latch Housing among radioactive waste generated during the replacement of Hanul Unit 2 (February 2023). Latch Housing controls the control rod by receiving magnetic force from the CRDM’s Coil Stack. Located in the Old Reactor Vessel Head (ORVH) Hot Spot, the range of measured radiation dose rate was 0.3 to 0.8 mSv h-1 (up to 4.5 mSv h-1). The amount of radioactive waste generated was 35.8 Baler-Drum (based on 200L), and the order of treatment was to cut into the Omega Seal of the CRDM, the CRDM and Latch Housing Transfer, the boundary of the CRDM and Latch Housing, the Rod Travel Housing, the Motor Housing and the Latch Assembly, and then transfer and Drumming. In the United States, out of 93 operating reactors, 31 reactor vessel heads have been replaced and 19 reactor vessel heads are scheduled to be replaced. In Korea, 25 reactors are in operation, and two reactors have been permanently shut down. Among them, the nine old reactors for more than 30 years (as of September 2021) are expected to achieve ALARA and reduce radwaste management costs through the management method applied to replace the reactor vessel head.

Structural stability of a waste form can be provided by the waste form itself (steel components, etc.), by processing the waste to a stable form (solidification, etc.), or by emplacing the waste in a container or structure that provides stability (HICs or engineered structure, etc.). The waste or container should be resistant to degradation caused by radiation effects. In accordance with the requirements for the domestic waste acceptance criteria, irradiation testing of solidified waste forms containing spent resin should be conducted on specimens exposed to a dose of 1.0E+6 Gy and other material 1.0E+7 Gy. Expected cumulative dose over 300 years is about 1.770E+6 Gy for spent resin and 0.770E+6 Gy for dried concentrated waste generated from NPPs generally. According to NRC Waste Form Technical Position, to ensure that spent resins will not undergo adverse degradation effects from radiation, resins should not be generated having loadings that will produce greater than 1E+6 Gy total accumulated dose. If it necessary to load resins higher than 1E+6 Gy, it should be demonstrated that the resin will not undergo radiation degradation at the proposed higher loading. This is the recommended maximum activity level for organic resins based on evidence that while a measurable amount of damage to the resin will occur at 1E+6 Gy, the amount of damage will have negligible effect on disposal site safety. Cementitious materials are not affected by gamma radiation to in excess of 1E+6 Gy. Therefore, for cement-stabilized waste forms, irradiation qualification testing need not be conducted unless the waste forms contain spent resins or other organic media or the expected cumulative dose on waste forms containing other materials is greater than 1E+7 Gy. Testing should be performed on specimens exposed to IE+6 Gy or the expected maximum dose greater than 1E+6 Gy for waste forms that contain ion exchange resins or other organic media or the expected maximum dose greater than 1E+7 Gy for other waste forms. This is suggestion as a review result that requirement for irradiation testing of solidified waste forms has something to be revise in detail and definitively.

The post-closure safety assessment of a repository is typically conducted over an extensive timescale from ten thousand to a million years. Considering that biosphere ecosystems may undergo significant changes over such lengthy periods, it is essential to incorporate the long-term evolution of the biosphere into the safety assessment. Climate change and landscape development are identified as critical drivers with the potential to impact the hydrogeological and hydrogeochemical characteristics of the biosphere. These changes can subsequently alter the migration patterns of radionuclides through the biosphere and influence human exposure doses. Therefore, this study formulates scenarios within the context of long-term biosphere evolution. We examine biosphere assessment processes employed in other countries and conduct a comparative study on scenario conditions. For example, biosphere assessment in Finland has identified sea-level changes and land-use alterations as significant factors in the long-term evolution of the biosphere. These factors are linked to Features, Events, and Processes (FEPs) associated with climate change and human activities. Sea-level changes are related to FEPs regarding climate change, land uplift, and shoreline displacement, while land-use changes are based on human activity-related FEPs (e.g., crop type, livestock and forest management, well construction, and demographics). Based on the literature review, this study has configured long-term evolution scenarios for the safety assessment of a deep geological repository for spent fuels.

Copper, mainly used as a material for outer canister, generates various corrosion products under aerobic and anaerobic conditions in the operational and/or post-closure phases of the deep geological repository. These products could affect performance of engineering barrier system (EBS) through interaction with surrounding bentonite that makes up the buffer and backfill materials. Accordingly, in this study, we suggested research items to be conducted to minimize degradation of EBS due to copper corrosion products, based on the phenomenological review results for copper corrosion mechanisms and interaction between resultant product and bentonite in the deep geological disposal environment. During the post-closure phase, condition in the disposal facility changes form aerobic to anaerobic over time, and thereby, causes and products of copper corrosion vary. Under aerobic condition, copper corrosion is mainly induced by oxygen (O2) in the repository, chloride (Cl-) and carbonate (CO3 2-) ions from groundwater flowing into the facility, resulting in corrosion products such as cuprite (Cu2O), tenorite (CuO), atacamite (CuCl2·3Cu(OH)2) and malachite (Cu2CO3(OH)2). And, copper corrosion under anaerobic condition is primarily due to hydrogen sulfide (H2S) and sulfate (SO4 2-) in groundwater flowing into the facility, leading to formation of chalcocite (Cu2S) and covellite (CuS) as corrosion products. Depending on environment of the disposal facility, copper corrosion products are dissolved and ionized to Cu2+ in groundwater, and subsequently adsorbed on the nearby smectite. Then, it causes a cation exchange reaction with exchangeable cations in the interlayer of smectite. As a result of reviewing the previous experiments, it was confirmed that Cu2+-exchanged bentonite has a slightly reduced basal spacing and swelling capacity. From the results as above, there is a possibility that performance of EBS may be degraded due to copper corrosion products. To minimize its effect of degradation in the domestic facility, items to be further studied are as follows: (a) Method for reducing copper corrosion such as selection of appropriate material and structure for the canister, and (b) How to control dissolution of copper canister product into groundwater through predicting type and ionization process. The results of this study could be directly used to developing design concept of EBS for the domestic disposal facility and to establishing roadmap of future R&D programs.

The natural barrier system surrounding the geological repository for high-level radioactive waste plays a crucial role in preventing or delaying the leakage of radionuclides. Therefore, the natural barrier should ensure low permeability to prevent groundwater flow into the engineered barrier system throughout the repository’s lifetime. Crystalline rock, considered as the host rock for the geological repository in Korea, exhibits low intact rock permeability, but the crystalline rock often contains the multiple discontinuities due to its high brittleness that can allow the unexpected fluid flow. Therefore, the long-term hydraulic behavior of the discontinuity should be characterized while considering additional thermal, mechanical, and chemical effects. In comparison to thermal, hydraulic, and mechanical processes, the chemical processes on the discontinuities progress relatively slowly, resulting in limited researches to include these chemical processes. This research introduces mechanisms the involving coupled thermal-hydraulic-mechanicalchemical processes focusing on the rough fracture surfaces and asperities. The chemically-induced changes in mechanical and hydraulic properties are described based on pressure solution and precipitation concepts. A comprehensive review of laboratory tests, field tests, and numerical simulations is conducted related to the chemically-induced coupled processes in fractured rock. Laboratory tests, in particular, concentrate on microscopic changes in fracture asperities induced by pressure solution to analyze chemically-induced aperture changes. The TOUGHREACT, an integral finite difference method program for thermal-hydraulic-chemical simulations, is generally employed to model the chemical response of pressure solution and precipitation on fracture surfaces. The TOUGHREACT includes a module to describe effective porosity and permeability changes based on the modified cubic law, so the real-time change of the fracture permeability can be reflected during the flow simulation. Considering the coupled thermal-hydraulic-mechanicalchemical processes of discontinuity, it becomes evident that the chemical processes under repository conditions (long-term, high temperature, and high pressure) can disturb the hydraulic performance of the natural barrier, so further research is required to characterize the chemically-induced coupled processes for assessing the long-term performance of the natural barrier system.

For the sake of future generations, the management of radioactive waste is essential. The disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is considered an urgent challenge to ensure human safety by storing it until its radioactivity drops to a negligible level. Evaluating the safety of disposal facilities is crucial to guarantee their durability for more than 100,000 years, a period sufficient for SNF radioactivity to become ignored. Past studies have proposed various parameters for forecasting the safety of SNF disposal. Among these, radiochemistry and electrochemistry play pivotal roles in predicting the corrosion-related chemical reactions occurring within the SNF and the structural materials of disposal facilities. Our study considers an extreme scenario where the SNF canister becomes compromised, allowing underground water to infiltrate and contact the SNF. We aim to improve the corrosion mechanism and mass-balance equation compared with what Shoesmith et al. proved under the same circumstances. To enhance the comprehensibility of the chemical reactions occurring within the breached SNF canister, we have organized these reactions into eight categories: mass diffusion, alpha radiolysis, adsorption, hydrate formation, solidification, decomposition, ionization, and oxidation. After categorization, we define how each species interacts with others and calculate the rate of change in species’ concentrations resulting from these reactions. By summing up the concentration change rates of each species due to these reactions, we redefine the mass-balance equations for each species. These newly categorized equations, which have not been explained in detail previously, offer a detailed description of corrosion reactions. This comprehensive understanding allows us to evaluate the safety implications of a compromised SNF canister and the associated disposal facilities by numerically solving the mass-balance equations.

Notice of the NSSC No.2021-14 defines the term ‘Neutron Absorber’ as a material with a high neutron absorption cross section, which is used to prevent criticality during nuclear fission reactions and includes neutron absorbers as target items for manufacture inspection. U.S.NRC report of the NUREG-2214 states that the subcriticality of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in Dry Storage Systems (DSSs) may be maintained, in part, by the placement of neutron absorbers, or poison plates, around the fuel assemblies. This report mentions the need for Time-Limited Aging Analysis (TLAA) on depletion of Boron (10B) in neutron absorbers for HI-STORM 100 and HISTAR 100. Also, this report mentions that 10B depletion occurs during neutron irradiation of neutron absorbers, but only 0.02% of the available 10B is to be depleted through conservative assumptions regarding the neutron flux or accumulated fluence during irradiation, which supports the continued use of the neutron absorbers in the SNF dry storage cask even after 60 years of evaluated period. There are several types of commercially available neutron absorbers, broadly classified into Boron Carbide Cermets (e.g., Boral®), Metal Matrix Composites (MMC) (e.g., METAMIC), Borated Stainless Steel (BSS), and Borated Al alloy. While irradiation tests for neutron absorbers are primarily conducted during wet storage systems, there are also some prior studies available on irradiation tests for neutron absorbers during dry storage systems. For examples, there is an analysis of previous research on high-temperature irradiation test of metallic materials and identification of limitations in existing methodologies were conducted. Furthermore, an improvement plan for simulating the high-temperature irradiation damage of neutron absorbers was developed. In report published by corrosion society summarizes the evaluation results of the degradation mechanisms for Stainless Steel- and Al-based neutron absorbers used in SNF dry storage systems.

While many countries consider direct disposal of the spent nuclear fuels, they need to consider long-term disposal scenarios with severe accidents such as the contact between underwater and the spent nuclear fuel due to large defect of the canister. Radionuclides releases rapidly with contacting water or slowly with dissolution of UO2 matrix. The former is known as the ‘Instant Release’, and the latter is ‘Congruential Release’. Even though the instant release fractions (IRF) are much smaller than the congruential ones, IRF has to be treated carefully due to the fact that the instant releases lead to much larger value of the exposure dose rates than the congruential ones which proceed very slowly. It is known that the exposure dose rates by the instant releases are ~25 times larger than the one by the congruent release. The radionuclides from UO2 matrix migrate to the grain boundary, make bubbles, and make tunnels, which leads to instant releases of some radionuclides. The radionuclides in the gap between UO2 pellet and cladding can be also instantly released. In addition, the radionuclides in the crud are instantly released. But in this paper, nuclides from the crud are not regarded, due to the lack of the leaching data. Meanwhile, there’re some nuclides that released from the construction materials like the cladding, the Rod Cluster Control Assembly (RCCA), or the other metal parts. In this work, IRF values for major IRF nuclides such as Cs, I, Cl, Se for the reference PWR spent fuels of South Korea were evaluated based on the rationale from literatures’ review. In particular, these evaluations were done as the function of fission gas release (FGR), average discharge burnup, and fuel dimensions. In addition, the values of IRF for the other nuclides were also suggested based on the other institutes.

In the contemporary digital age, the rapid pace of technological advancement has elevated concerns regarding unauthorized technology transfers. These illicit transfers not only pose economic threats but also have the potential to compromise national security, strain international relationships, and impede technological innovation. Recognizing these challenges, the United States, as a technological leader, has implemented stringent laws and regulations to counteract such activities. Unauthorized technology transfer or disclosure is treated seriously within the United States. It can be subject to various laws, including export control regulations, economic sanctions, and Nonproliferation laws. Export control measures such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), targeting defense items, and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), focused on dual-use items, are enforced. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulations oversee U.S. trade sanctions. At the same time, the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Non-proliferation Act (INKSNA) penalizes those aiding proliferation activities in these countries. Such unauthorized transfers could undermine global security by violating international agreements like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States employs a multi-faceted approach to counter these threats, including international partnerships, strengthened export controls, diplomatic efforts, and rigorous enforcement. Beyond the legal aspects, unauthorized technology transfer carries significant economic, national security, and global trade implications. Intellectual property (IP) theft can result in economic losses, national security risks, and strained trade relations. Legal protections against IP theft encompass Patents, Trade Secrets, Copyright, and Trademark Acts. In conclusion, unauthorized technology transfers and IP theft present multi-faceted challenges with far-reaching implications for global security, economic prosperity, and international relations. The comprehensive approach taken by the United States, which combines legal measures, diplomatic engagement, and collaborative efforts, serves as a valuable example that South Korea can learn from and enhance to keep technological advancements and ensure a secure digital future.

The ROK government has developed the Nuclear Export and Control System (NEPS) to implement export control activities. Although it was launched in 2008 as a system that can work with classification, licensing, nuclear material approval, government-to-government assurance, complying with nuclear cooperation agreement (NCA) handled through official documents. In order to enhance systematic management for items subject to NCA, KINAC developed a new module for the procedure (hereinafter referred to as “NCA module”) and opened it in 2022. This paper presents the module’s development background, key features, and current operation status. The NCA module prioritizes functional expansion and flexibility, distinct from other tasks for the following reasons. First, the export control duties of classification, export license, and approval for NM are based on domestic law, leading to predetermined target items, application forms, and processes that change only through statutory amendments. In contrast, the implementation of NCA has numerous procedural variables, varying across countries in scope, content, and procedures. Therefore, if the function is over-standardized, there would be many exceptions that the system cannot resolve in practice. Second, the existing NEPS process entails a one-time decision or approval for each application, while the implementation of the agreement encompasses four related procedures for each item: prior notification, written confirmation, shipment notification, and receipt confirmation. Even some steps may be omitted depending on the case. The other difference is the working process. The implementation of NCA must be initiated from the government, so the existing methods, beginning with the licensee filling a form, cannot be adopted as it is. The NCA module has adopted a new reference numbering system to resolve these challenges. It enables the creation of multiple procedures under one reference number on an item to expand the tasks and make it possible to omit some steps or to reflect case-by-case concerns in each stage. It also provides a consolidated view of multiple notifications related to a single item, ensuring to deal with even long-running tasks without missing any obligations until the final procedure. Moreover, some of the data in the NCA module is extensible by allowing users to manage the list themselves. For example, the system can respond to new agreements by allowing users to add and modify codes that distinguish counterparty countries. As a result, the current NCA module accommodates a variety of implementation scenarios, including split shipments, the procedural omissions, and the modification of additional counterparties, offering enhanced flexibility and adaptability.

Proton exchange membrane fuel cells (PEMFCs) are an auspicious energy conversion technology with the potential to address rising energy demands while reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The stack’s performance, durability, and economy scale are greatly influenced by the materials used for the PEMFC, viz., the membrane electrocatalyst assembly (MEA) and bipolar flow plates (BPPs). Despite extensive study, carbon-based materials have outstanding physicochemical, electrical, and structural attributes crucial to stack performance, making them an excellent choice for PEMFC manufacturers. Carbon materials substantially impact the cost, performance, and durability of PEMFCs since they are prevalently sought for and widely employed in the construction of BPPs and gas diffusion layers (GDLs)) and in electrocatalysts as a support material. Consequently, it is essential to assemble a review that centers on utilizing such material potential, focusing on its research development, applications, problems, and future possibilities. The prime focus of this assessment is to offer a clear understanding of the potential roles of carbon and its allotropes in PEMFC applications. Consequently, this article comprehensively evaluates the applicability, functionality, recent advancements, and ambiguous concerns associated with carbonbased materials in PEMFCs.

몰입은 내적동기와 관련성이 큰 개념으로 스포츠심리학에서 스포츠 수행에 있어 긍정적인 요소 로 여겨진다. 몰입과 중독의 상관관계에 대한 연구들이 선행되었지만, Flow와 Commitment의 개념이 혼동 돼 사용되었다. 또한 몰입이 장기적으로 미치는 영향에 대해서는 충분한 연구가 이루어지지 않았다. 따라 서 본 연구는 선행연구들을 통해 몰입의 중독성을 확인하였으며, 기존의 연구들과 다르게 장기적으로 몰입 이 내적동기를 저하시킬 수 있다는 새로운 가설을 제시하고자 한다. 적응수준 이론과 한계효용체감의 법칙의 관점에서는 몰입을 통해 얻는 만족감이 지속적으로 감소하게 된다. 어느 시점에서 이러한 개인의 발전은 한 계를 느끼게 되며, 몰입을 경험하지 못하는 시점에 도달하게 된다. 하지만 개인은 몰입을 다시 경험하고자 하는 욕구가 존재하므로 지속적으로 노력할 것이다. 그러나 몰입 경험의 실패로 이어질 때 반복적인 실패는 슬픔으로 작용하여 내적동기를 약화시키게 된다. 따라서, 본 연구를 통해서 몰입의 부정적인 요소와 장기 적인 관점에서 미치는 영향에 대한 연구들이 필요하다고 사료된다.