China’s economic success and trade expansion since the 1980s is one of the most important economic achievements, which lifted more populations out of extreme poverty than any other time and place in history. This achievement has been made possible by trade-led development policies successfully adopted by China. China also joined the WTO in 2001, after fifteen years of negotiations with its trade partners, and is subject to WTO legal disciplines requiring the transparency of its trade-related decisions and procedures. This article examines China’s economic reform, which led to its accession into the WTO, and reviews China’s trade and development policies under the WTO. In addition, this article discusses China’s participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure. There has been a concern as to whether China will be compliant with the requirements under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). The article shows that China has become an active participant and has maintained well under the terms of the DSU.

Driven by market, consumer preferences and recent climate change discussions, the usage of ‘sustainability’ standards has over the last decade gained ground worldwide. Sustainability standards are largely voluntary, non-mandatory and an increasingly important component of the green economy. While on the one hand the usage of sustainability standards helps achieve several economic and environment objectives, on the other hand they can potentially act as barriers to trade in particular for small producers. This paper examines the potential trade and commercial aspects of sustainability standards in terms of their diversity, cost of incorporation and interaction with supply chains. It considers the compatibility of sustainability standards with the existing trade architecture of the World Trade Organization, drawing on relevant case law developments. Finally, it recommends the usage of international platforms such as the UNFSS and ITC Standards map, to enable product/ service specific information sharing, conformity assessment and business networking.

In the past few years, the Chinese government has put the internationalization of CNY on the map. Besides regular reforms such as facilitating CNY trading settlement and relaxing capital accounts, China deployed the Pilot Free Trade Zone and the One Belt One Road policy to significantly expand investment channels for CNY. It was also considered as a response to the criticism of CNY’s trade-driven model. CNY was developing from a trade currency to an investment currency and now has the potential to be a global reserve currency. The growth of CNY as an international currency could counterbalance the US dollardominated system and contribute to regional and international financial constancy. However, CNY internationalization is a double-edged sword. Inflow surges or disruptive outflows of capitals can give rise to macroeconomic fluctuation. With regard to the potential risks, it is suggested that Chinese authorities adopt more market-based measures and make the best of the international arrangements to protect the domestic financial integrity and stability.

On January 16, 2016, AIIB declared its opening for business. Ever since its announcement by Chinese leaders in 2013, AIIB has been warmly embraced by most countries of the world. But still, neither the US nor Japan have become the AIIB members. Both of them take a rather cautious approach, viewing AIIB more as a challenge to the existing international financial order. By comparison, this paper finds that each country casts similar doubts. The US places its focal point more on ‘China-led’ rather than ‘new MDB.’ Japan focuses more on ‘new MDB’ instead of ‘China-led,’ meanwhile considering how to cope with the dilemma between the US and China. Orienting itself towards a more balanced international economic order, this paper attempts to seek a kind of positive cooperation based on the coordination of tri-lateral interests, thus suggesting the US and Japan to join AIIB as an external supervisor and internal member respectively.

Monopolistic mechanisms can be detected in China in many respects through Chinese internet monopolists would outperform their peers in the US or the EU by. The Chinese government endeavors to keep its Internet industry globally competitive and thus authorities involved in antitrust activities tend to tolerate the oligopolistic structure of the market. This is evidenced most obviously in the repression of competitors in certain fields, e.g., ‘Baidu,’ the ‘Chinese Google,’ in the field of IT-services – leading to a stricter regime of monopoly control in terms of substantial law. However, in the course of enforcement, various legal and practical challenges impede the efficiency of these measures. This paper analyses existing competition law enforcement and proposes effective application of antitrust law for its enforcement in the Internet industry under present Chinese law.

The practice of International Investment Agreements (IIAs) has developed immensly during the past 15 years. In particular, China has gained significant experience in concluding IIAs, adapting to concerns raised following an overflow of investor state disputes. This article analyzes an interesting case-study: an investment promotion agreement signed and negotiated between China and Israel (CIBIT) during the 1990s, however ratified more than a decade later, in 2009, without modifying or updating its contents. This commentary identifies major gaps in the CIBIT, including those concerning its preamble, key definitions of ‘Investment’ and ‘Investor’, standard of protection: FET, MFN, NT, and ISDS provisions, vis-à-vis the wider transformation of international investment law. Special emphasis is given to China’s change in approach to investment and IIAs. The growing economic ties between China and Israel, including recent discussions about a free trade agreement, requires a thorough understanding of the risks and benefits of the CIBIT. Therefore, the commentary concludes with an outline of a strategic roadmap for the future revision of the CIBIT.

Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), known as the ‘economic’ NATO Agreement dominated by the United States, will impose profound influence on the politics, economy, society and intellectual property system in China. There are deep-seated reasons why the US are extremely active to make TPP signed and why China is ruled out in the course of the negotiations. Since China has entered into the WTO, the domestic and international market is closely related, and TPP must have significant impact on China’s international market. With regard to the influence, China shall take efficient measures to cope with, including: dealing with issues appropriately regarding its economic sovereignty, based on its own situations, promoting of negotiations on free trade agreement, keeping on improving the hard and soft power in intellectual property, fully taking advantages of “the Belt and Road Strategy” and exploring new market; and getting ready for constant adaptation to TPP rules and the like.

Even though no international legal instrument explicitly provides the right for States to establish ADIZs, such zones have been unilaterally declared since the 1950s. China’s ADIZ above the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands - a disputed area in the East China Sea and her recent activities in disputed maritime features in the South China Sea have given rise to concerns about other ADIZs that Beijing may possibly establish above this area. In that context, this paper ventures to draw some potential ADIZs, which may be established by China above the South China Sea, and predicts diplomatic and legal reactions from other States.

The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2270 against North Korea’s fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016, and its subsequent rocket launch. This resolution contains tougher sanction measures than any others adopted in the past, but is not expected to effectively stop North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. This essay analyzes the critical loophole of the rule of law in global society regarding nuclear proliferation systems as well as regional governance. It further suggests legal and policy options to resolve this nuclear dilemma. The parties concerned are asked to alter the status quo of hostile co-existence and instead revert to the spirit of the Geneva Agreed Framework.

The two Japanese security laws which came into force on March 29, 2016, have faced severe domestic and international criticism. They are seen as representing a dramatic policy change in violation of due process and international norms, and representing a threat to international peace and security. This paper finds that while the direct implications of the “war” legislation are neither threatening nor without precedent, what the legislative process says about the nature of governance under Abe is deeply troubling. The disdain shown by the Abe administration to due process and constitutional procedures is what threatens domestic and international governance stability.

This paper examines critical issues in the current dispute between Lone Star and South Korea regarding Lone Star’s investment in the Korea Exchange Bank that has culminated in an investor-State dispute claim against Korea before an International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes arbitration panel. It further evaluates the merits and potential outcomes of each issue through careful analogy to preexisting international investor-State dispute awards, textual analysis of the bilateral tax and investment treaties between South Korea and Belgium, and publically available information regarding events during the course of Lone Star’s investments in Korea. In particular, it will address well-covered topics in international investment law such as nationality of corporations, fair and equitable treatment, and discriminatory treatment. It will also investigate burgeoning topics on breach of domestic law by third parties, breach of domestic law in the course of an investment, and the rights of an investor to raise tax-based investment claims.

Regarding warships, customary rules on innocent passage and freedom of navigation codified in the UNCLOS are far from being settled among State Parties. FONOPs impose the US understanding of rules on passage and navigation in each and every sea area, forcefully implementing deregulation in order for the US to create a navyfriendly environment for its worldwide mission. By implementing another agenda of carrying out the new US policy of “Pivot to Asia,” the FONOPs in the South China Sea challenge the very heart of China’s sovereignty, and may bring about adverse effect to the process of peaceful settlement of territorial issues and maritime disputes in the South China Sea region. China believes the US FONOPs in the South China Sea are offensive to its sovereignty. Moreover, their adverse effect to the process of peaceful settlement of territorial issues and maritime disputes in the South China Sea region cannot be ignored.

The USS Lassen’s October 2015 South China Sea freedom of navigation operation was exemplary in some respects and cautionary in others. This article argues the Lassen’s mission to sail within 12 nautical miles of one of China’s artificial islands was a successful albeit exploratory challenge because the operation has helped to clarify maritime claims in the region and garnered international support for continued operations. This paper examines the US Freedom of Navigation Program’s broader goals of benefiting the international community with a rules-based system. It also argues that increased transparency is essential if these goals are to be achieved. This article analyzes China’s unclarified claims in the South China Sea and explores the concept of “psycho-legal boundaries” in relation to the so-called nine-dash line. It concludes by presenting suggestions for plotting a proper path forward for FONOPs in the region with an emphasis on protecting the marine environment.