According to the analysis of the Korean Radioactive Waste Society, saturation of nuclear power plant temporary storage is expected sequentially from 2031, and accordingly, the need for highlevel radioactive waste disposal facilities has emerged. In order to establish a repository for high-level radioactive waste, the performance and safety analysis of the repository must be conducted in compliance with regulatory requirements. For safety analysis, it needs a collection of arguments and evidence. and IAEA defined it as ‘Safety case’. The Systematic method, which derives scenarios by systematizing and combining possible phenomena around the repository, is widely used for developing Safety case. Systematic methods make use of the concept of Features, Events and Processes (FEP). FEP identifies features that affect repository performance, events that can affect a short period of time, and processes that can have an impact over a long period of time. Many countries, such as Finland, Sweden, Japan, United States, etc., are in process of licensing disposal facilities by using ‘Safety case’. And they then develop their own project-specified FEP lists and employ them for performing safety assessments. However, the systematic procedure for generating scenarios for safety evaluation is not clearly defined. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Standards Series (SSG- 23), the bottom-up method is an approach for conducting safety analysis using Features, Events, and Processes (FEPs). However, the process of how each FEP is utilized to establish a scenario for safety evaluation remains unclear. Additionally, there exists not only a bottom-up approach for generating scenarios using FEPs, but also a hybrid scenario development method that incorporates a top-down approach based on safety functions. Each country address scenario derivation in accordance with the adopted hybrid method. Nevertheless, a challenge arises in its application due to discrepancies between their approach and the hybrid approach specific which we are going on. Hence, this study introduces the FEP integration methodology for generating scenarios based on the hybrid scenario development method using the FEP list.

To prove the long-term safety of deep geological repository, the safety assessment is needed to ensure that the expected performance of repository satisfies the regulatory standards. Scenario development is process of analyzing events and evolutions that can directly or indirectly affect the performance of a disposal system and is a pre-step for quantitative safety assessment. Scenarios are used to identify and define cases to be assessed by numerical modeling, and cases are mainly divided into normal (also called the ‘reference’ and ‘expected evolution’) and abnormal scenarios. Mainly two approaches have been used to set up scenarios. One is a bottom-up approach that starts with features, events and processes (FEPs). This approach can analyze the evolution and events related to the performance of the disposal system in an inductive manner. The other is top-down approach that analyzes the events and evolution of disposal system, focusing on situations that may affect the safety function of the components. This approach starts with a set of intuitively predefined expected failures of safety function. Combining the two approaches is more effective in demonstrating comprehensiveness which is a main challenge of scenario analysis, and almost national radioactive waste management institutions combine top-down and bottom-up approaches for development of scenarios. An approach combining the two approaches is called a hybrid approach, and the detailed method differs from each institution and has not been determined. In this study, some work for constructing the scenario using hybrid approach was performed. Firstly, defining each component’s safety function and screening FEPs according to several rules were performed for a generic repository. Secondly, we extracted performance factors that are considered likely to affect safety functions. And lastly, we integrated FEPs correlated with performance factor to simplify the analysis. These results will be material to construct the scenario using hybrid approach.

To obtain a license for a deep geological disposal repository for spent nuclear fuel, it is necessary to perform a safety assessment that quantifies the radiological impact on the environment and humans. One of the key steps in the safety assessment of a deep geological repository is the development of scenarios that describe how the repository evolves over the performance period and how events and processes affect performance. In the field of scenario development, demonstrating comprehensiveness is critical, which describes whether all factors that are expected to have a significant impact on the repository's performance have been considered. Mathematical proof of this is impossible. However, If the scenario development process is logical and systematic, it can support the claim that the scenario is comprehensive. Three primary approaches are being considered for scenario development: ‘Bottomup’, ‘Top-down’, and ‘Hybrid’. Hybrid approach provides a more systematic and structured process by considering both the FEPs (Features, Events, Processes) and safety functions utilized in the bottomup and top-down approaches. Many countries that develop recent scenarios prefer demonstrating scenario comprehensiveness using a hybrid approach. In this study, a systematic and structured scenario development process of a hybrid approach was formulated. Based on this, sub-scenarios were extracted that describe the phenomena occurring in the repository over the performance period, categorized by period. By integrating and screening the extracted sub-scenarios, a scenario describing the phenomena occurring over the entire period of disposal was developed.

According to the “Law on protection and response measures for nuclear facilities and radiation”, Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) licensees should conduct periodic exercises based on hypothetical cyberattack scenarios, and there is a need to select significant and probable ones in a systematic manner. Since cyber-attacks are carried out intentionally, it is difficult to statistically specify the sequences, and it is not easy to systematically establish exercise scenarios because existing engineering safety facilities can be forcibly disabled. To deal with the above situation, this paper suggests a procedure using the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) model to develop a cybersecurity exercise scenario. The process for creating cyber security exercise scenarios consists of (i) selecting cyber-attack-causing initiating events, (ii) identifying digital systems, (iii) assigning cyber-attack vectors to a digital system, (iv) determining and adding type for operator’s response, (v) modifying a baseline PSA model, and (vi) extracting top-ranked minimal cut sets, and (vii) selecting a representative scenario. This procedure is described in detail through a case study, an expected cyber-attack scenario General Transient-Anticipated Transient Without Scram (GTRN-ATWS). It refers to an accident scenario for ATWS induced by GTRN. Since ATWS is targeted for cyber training in some NPPs, and GTRN is one of the most common accidents occurring in NPPs, GTRN-ATWS was chosen as an example. As for the cyber-attack vector, portable media and mobile devices were selected as examples based on expert judgment. In this paper, only brief examples of GTRN-ATWS events have been presented, but future studies will be conducted on an analysis of all initiating events in which cyber-attacks can occur.

Many countries have been developing their own FEP (Feature, Event, Process) lists to formulate radionuclide release scenarios in deep disposal repository of spent nuclear fuels and to assess the safety. The main issue in developing a FEP list is to ensure its completeness and comprehensiveness in examining all plausible scenarios of radionuclide release in a repository of interest. To this end, the NEA International FEP (IFEP) list as a generic reference have been developed and updated through long-term international collaborations. Leading countries advanced in the research field of deep geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuels have comparatively mapped their project-specific FEP (PFEP) lists with the IFEP list. Recently in 2019, NEA has published an updated version of IFEP list (ver. 3.0) which has a different classification system: the IFEP version 3.0 has the five main categories including the waste package, repository, geosphere, biosphere and external factors while the previous IFEP versions were mainly classified into the external, environmental, and contaminant factors. Most leading countries in this field, Finland and Sweden, recently succeeded to obtain the design and/or construction licenses for deep geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Therefore, their PFEP lists should be good benchmark cases to the following countries. However, their PFEP lists have not comparatively mapped with the most recent version of IFEP and thus some gaps may exist in showing completeness and comprehensiveness in comparison to the IFEP version 3.0. In this study, we comparatively map the PFEP lists of Finland and Sweden to the IFEP version 3.0. The comparatively mapped PFEP list could be used as the basis for verifying the comprehensiveness and completeness of the domestic PFEP list currently under development in Korea.

Safety assessment is important for the radioactive waste repositories, and several methods are used to develop scenarios for the management of radioactive waste. The intent of the use of these scenarios is to show how the radio nuclides release can affect the safety of disposal system. It plays an essential role of providing scientific and technical information for performance assessment of safety functions. As important as scenario is, numerous studies for their own scenario development have been conducted in many countries. Scenario development methodology is basically divided into four categories: (1) judgmental, (2) fault/event-tree analysis, (3) simulation, and (4) systematic. Under numerous research, these methods have been developed in ways to strengthen the advantages and make up for the weakness. However, it was hard to find any judgmental or fault/event-tree analysis approach in recent safety assessments since they are not well-systemized and difficult to cover all scenarios. Simulation and systematic approaches are used broadly for their convenience of analyzing needed scenarios. Furthermore, several new methodologies, Process Influence Diagram (PID)/Rock Engineering System (RES)/Hybrid, were developed to reinforce the systematic approach in recent studies. Currently, a government project related to the disposal of spent nuclear fuel is in progress in Korea, and the scenario development for safety case is one of the important tasks. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the characteristics and strengths and weaknesses of the latest scenario development and analysis methods to create a unique methodology for Korea. In this paper, the existing methodologies and cases will be introduced, and the considerations for future scenario development will be summarized by considering those used in the nuclear field other than repository issues. Systematic approach, which is the mostly commonly used method, will be introduced in detail with its use in other countries at the subsequent companion paper entitled ‘Case Study for a Disposal Facility for the Spent Nuclear Fuel’.

Since the 1992 ‘Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’ was agreed, various negotiations and policies have been conducted. There were policies such as CVID, Strategic Patience, Top-Down Approach, Calibrated Practical Approach, Audacious Initiative and the Geneva Agreement, and 9.19 Joint statement by the six-party talks were signed to denuclearize Korean Peninsula. However, starting with the first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea conducted six nuclear tests to develop atomic bombs, boosted fission bombs, ICBMs, and SLBMs to enhance its weapon capabilities. In addition, nuclear security crisis on the Korean Peninsula has been rising day by day as signs of restarting the North Korea’s Yongbyon 5MWe Graphite-moderated reactor were observed and the possibility of a seventh nuclear test have been increased. Since North Korea’s nuclear issue has a lot of influence on international security, especially on the Northeast Asian countries, a realistic denuclearization policy that reflects North Korea’s current domestic situation along with the international situation is needed. It’s been six months since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The war between Russia, which has nuclear weapons, and Ukraine, which gave up its possession of nuclear weapons due to the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program known as the Nunn-Lugar program, is expected to have a significant impact on North Korea, which is considering denuclearization due to UN sanctions on North Korea. Therefore, in this study, based on the war patterns of Russia-Ukraine war, perspective on how it could affect North Korea’s denuclearization is analyzed. Also, significance and limitations of the previous nuclear negotiations, the North Korea’s political regime, the ‘five-year strategy for North Korea’s economic development’ and the ‘five-year plan for North Korea’s economic development’ were analyzed to suggest practical DPRK’s denuclearization policy.

Safety evaluation of high-level radioactive waste disposal facilities including spent nuclear fuel is a very urgent and critical issue, and in order to do so, it is very important to develop a safety case that includes Feature, Event, Process (FEP) analysis, scenario development, and scenario uncertainty evaluation. In the case of Korea, the disposal of spent nuclear fuel is recognized as an unavoidable option, and in the end, Korea’s specific FEP (SFEP) development and safety evaluation according to the scenario should be conducted. Because each country’s situation and environment are different, it is necessary to develop an SFEP based on a generic FEP (International FEP). To this end, an understanding of IFEP is essential. In this study, about 1,000 major terms appearing in the OECD/NEA IFEP are classified to where each of them belongs among F, E, and P, and which FEP each word belongs to, and the correlation between the frequency of occurrence and each term is analyzed. This result will serve as a reference for the results of SFEP analysis such as POSIVA and SKB, which our research team will analyze later. In addition, each term belongs to which academic field, and the most appropriate translation for translating each term into Korean is also described.

Since July 2021, the Korea Radioactive Waste Agency has been conducting a safety case development study for the Korean deep geological repository program. The safety case includes generating scenarios in which radioactive materials from spent nuclear fuel repository reach the human biosphere by combining selective FEPs (Features, Events, and Processes). This safety case should be able to transparently explain the process in which conclusions have been drawn not only to stakeholders but also to the public by presenting safety arguments. The scenario development stage consisting of FEP screening, scenario generation, and uncertainty analysis procedures should have a database management system. Database management system was performed in countries such as Sweden, which obtained approval for the construction of spent nuclear fuel repositories, and the United States, where various preliminary research was carried out. Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute also has experience in designing and operating its own database, which has conducted preliminary research on disposal of the spent nuclear fuel. Currently, the safety assessment of the Korean spent nuclear fuel repository is in the early stages of research, but it is necessary to set up a basic framework for database design while the collection of FEP data from domestic and international preliminary studies is under development, and it is advantageous for efficient database construction and operation. Therefore, this paper presents the current status of database design considering completeness and transparency from the FEP screening stage to the scenario development stage in the safety assessment process of the Korean spent nuclear fuel repository. In this process, the functional requirements that the database should provide, the database schema capable of implementing them, and simple examples are presented together. The objectives of this database design are flexible FEPs management, high integrity and consistency, and expandability for linking with the safety case database. The FEP data to be inputted into the database includes a list of major opened FEPs, including International FEPs from Nuclear Energy Agency, which were referred for PFEPs (Project-specific FEPs), and PFEPs applied to POSIVA's Olkiluoto repository. As an additional function, queries from the database are used to visually express the process of deriving scenarios through Rock Engineering System, a widely known scenario generation methodology.

Comprehensive identification and systematic classification of all features, events and processes (FEP) that influence on the performance of a high-level radioactive waste disposal system is essential for safety assessment. Nuclear energy agency (NEA) has been developing and updating the standardized generic FEP list, so-called NEA international FEP list, which may be used as the basis to develop project-specific FEP lists to reflect diverse system and site characteristics in different countries. On the basis, Finland and Sweden have recently got licenses to construct spent nuclear fuel deep disposal facilities. Also in Korea, timely construction of a high-level radioactive waste disposal facility is an urgent issue for stable operation of nuclear power plants. For this end, a FEP list that properly considers for system and site characteristics of Korean high-level radioactive waste disposal facility needs to be developed. In this study, the most recent NEA international FEP list published in 2019 was comprehensively reviewed with focus on the structure of the classification system and the physicochemical mechanisms associated with the key elements. The obtained results will be used for the comparative analysis of domestic and oversea project-specific FEP lists and for the development of a generic FEP list relevant to Korean high-level radioactive waste disposal system.

In South Korea, the master plan for high-level radioactive waste management, announced in 2016, suggested the construction and operation of intermediate storage facilities on a permanent disposal site and specified the adoption of dry storage in consideration of the ease of operation and expansion. As of 2021, the government is again reviewing its overarching policy on the back-end fuel cycles, including intermediate storage and permanent disposal. In the case of dry storage facilities, safety evaluation is being conducted using a combination of deterministic and probabilistic approaches, similar to that of nuclear power plants. The two methods are complementary, of which Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) has the advantage of being able to identify key scenarios affecting safety, but its use in storage facilities has not been highlighted so far. However, depending on the spent fuel management phases such as loading, transportation, and storage, it may be not enough to capture effective and efficient safety evaluation only deterministically, and probabilistic methods may contribute to the evaluation of long-term operation or external events such as an earthquake. There have already been cases where PSA has been performed on a part of the nuclear fuel cycle through previous studies. This paper created the safety assessment model based on open sources such as the released EPRI reports, by targeting arbitrary intermediate storage facilities. The model considered the scenarios for loading, transportation, and storage, with human error respectively. It will be able to be modified and improved to fit domestic and specific intermediate storage facilities in the future.

North Korea claimed to have tested a hydrogen bomb in its fourth nuclear test in 2016, and declared that the hydrogen bomb was completed after the sixth nuclear test in 2017. North Korea’s operation of Yongbyon Graphite-moderated reactor has been thought to be aimed at producing plutonium, but it has been strongly argued that the restart of the Graphite-moderated reactor is, indeed, aimed at supplying tritium recently. Tritium can be used not only to manufacture hydrogen bombs, but also to miniaturize nuclear weapons, making it as a key material for nuclear weapon capability. Since upgrading nuclear weapons and developing hydrogen bombs through the use of tritium by North Korea could pose a major threat to the security of the Korean Peninsula, it is important to accurately evaluate North Korea’s nuclear weapon capabilities through the analysis of nuclear material production scenarios based on its nuclear facilities. However, researches on North Korea’s nuclear materials such as HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) and Pu production has been actively conducted, while no research has been shown on tritium production yet. Therefore, this study aims to evaluate the tritium productivity based on the analysis of hypothetical nuclear material production facilities and possible tritium production scenarios. Basic research was conducted about the existing theoretical methodology for tritium production, the analysis of the global tritium production history, and the analysis of nuclear facilities. Based on this basic investigation, feasible tritium production scenarios were constructed. Subsequently, based on design criteria of an hypothetical Graphite-moderated reactor, possible tritium production scenario was modeled by applying the TPBAR (Tritium Production Burnable Absorber Rod). In addition, the factors such as 6Li concentration, design parameters, material compositions, and the number of TPBARs, which may affect tritium throughput were analyzed in terms of sensitivity study such that the maximum and minimum throughput can be predicted.