In the contemporary digital age, the rapid pace of technological advancement has elevated concerns regarding unauthorized technology transfers. These illicit transfers not only pose economic threats but also have the potential to compromise national security, strain international relationships, and impede technological innovation. Recognizing these challenges, the United States, as a technological leader, has implemented stringent laws and regulations to counteract such activities. Unauthorized technology transfer or disclosure is treated seriously within the United States. It can be subject to various laws, including export control regulations, economic sanctions, and Nonproliferation laws. Export control measures such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), targeting defense items, and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), focused on dual-use items, are enforced. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulations oversee U.S. trade sanctions. At the same time, the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Non-proliferation Act (INKSNA) penalizes those aiding proliferation activities in these countries. Such unauthorized transfers could undermine global security by violating international agreements like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States employs a multi-faceted approach to counter these threats, including international partnerships, strengthened export controls, diplomatic efforts, and rigorous enforcement. Beyond the legal aspects, unauthorized technology transfer carries significant economic, national security, and global trade implications. Intellectual property (IP) theft can result in economic losses, national security risks, and strained trade relations. Legal protections against IP theft encompass Patents, Trade Secrets, Copyright, and Trademark Acts. In conclusion, unauthorized technology transfers and IP theft present multi-faceted challenges with far-reaching implications for global security, economic prosperity, and international relations. The comprehensive approach taken by the United States, which combines legal measures, diplomatic engagement, and collaborative efforts, serves as a valuable example that South Korea can learn from and enhance to keep technological advancements and ensure a secure digital future.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been exporting weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to the volatile Middle East and Africa. It is expecting that military illicit activities would isolate DPRK economically, as it has been placed on multiple sanctions lists, including UN sanctions, multilateral export control regime sanctions, and country-specific sanctions. However, DPRK funds its WMD programs through various sanctions evasion activities. DPRK’s primary sanctions evasion activities include obtaining foreign currency, acquiring dualuse or restricted technology, smuggling, and money laundering, which are global in scope. This study analyzes the sanctions evasion activities used by DPRK to acquire economic, material, and technological resources for its WMD program and devises ways to disrupt these evasions effectively. First, the international community should strengthen export controls by encouraging states with weak export control regimes to join international organizations and conventions to limit DPRK arms and technology exports. Second, states should improve their intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities by sharing information on DPRK’s evasion activities and working together. This will help identify and counter DPRK’s evasion techniques and networks. Third, the international community should strengthen cooperation on DPRK’s evasion efforts. This can be done by strengthening cooperation with states and entities that enforce international sanctions and by working with relevant agencies such as customs, immigration, and police to track and interdict the movement of funds and assets used for evasion. Fourth, publicize DPRK’s illicit activities and apply diplomatic pressure. Diplomatic pressure can lead to more states and entities to enforce sanctions. In conclusion, these strategies are expected to deter DPRK’s illicit activities; but to sanction DPRK effectively, it is essential to continue to adjust and refine the strategies in response to DPRK’s evolving sanctions evasion efforts. The results of this research are expected to prevent WMD proliferation through DPRK by blocking or reducing the risk of sanctions evasion.

This study examined the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s illegal trade in UNsanctioned items as revealed in the UN panel of experts report in order to estimate the types of illegal trade in nuclear items, one of the UN-sanctioned prohibited items, and to find efficient ways to block it. Also, The research revealed that DPRK secretly imports UN-sanctioned prohibited items without going through customs through maritime transshipment, conceals or disguises them through identity laundering by falsifying documents at customs clearance, and makes various attempts to escape the international community’s surveillance, such as using a combination of methods such as Re-Flagged and Double-Flagged for identity laundering, and concealing them without operating the Automatic Identification System (AIS) at sea. The DPRK’s Illicit trade cases have been divided into two types of transactions: those that violate customs clearance procedures by providing false information to customs through disguise or concealment, and those that do not go through normal customs procedures, such as smuggling. To block customs violations, technical measures such as increasing the number of inspections of container ships or improving the accuracy of inspections are required, while to block smuggling, since it does not go through physical inspections, there are ways to monitor it through satellite images or strengthen border enforcement such as airport bays and land routes. As a result, DPRK’s nuclear items are designated as sanctioned items under UN resolutions, and it is assumed that DPRK and its networks will attempt to trade illegally through a combination of customs clearance violations and non-customs clearance violations, depending on the circumstances. Furthermore, since DPRK is subject to extensive sanctions from the international community, including the UN, in connection with its nuclear weapons program, illegal trade continues, and efforts should be made to block illegal trade through physical inspection at customs clearance.

The concept of catch-all controls is not new, having been developed in the US and EU over 30 years ago and legislated about 20 years ago. It is a system that controls what is not in an item based on the end-user and end-use rather than the strategic items defined by the existing multilateral export control regimes. Most importantly, the controls are based on end-user or end-use. Catch-all controls are the best tool to solve the problems of traditional list based controls. Technological advances, emerging technologies, and globalization have made standard export controls insufficient. Catch-all controls are optimized to control non-compliant, under-specified, partial, and intangible technology transfers. Catch-all controls have been adopted and implemented in the four multilateral export control regimes (MECR) and are also reflected in legislation in the United States and the European Union. The NSG has a catch-all provision in INFCIRC/254/Part2 Paragraph 5, the AG has a catch-all condition in the Guidelines, and the MTCR has a catch-all provision in the Guidelines Paragraph 7. Korea has also implemented catch-all controls reflected in the Foreign Trade Act of 2004. However, there are still many challenges of catch-all controls. First, the problem with catch-all controls is that there are different cases in different countries for list controls, and there are too many cases in other countries to control what is not on the list. Second, there is very little international legal enforcement for failing or missing catch-all controls. Finally, information about these catch-all cases is not uniformly available. For catch-all control, Korea currently consolidates the list of traders of concern including UN sanction list and denial list of MECR, provides a correlation table of significant items and countries requiring catch-all control for stakeholders, and organizes and operates a coordination committee for traders of concerns. In the future, Korea should strengthen the monitoring of other countries’ catch-all control cases and participate in international cooperation meetings to disseminate Korea’s best practices.

고분자 전해질 막 연료전지(polymer electrolyte membrane fuel cell, PEMFC)는 환경오염물질 배출이 없는 친환경 에너지 변환 장치로 주목을 받고 있다. PEMFC의 구성요소 중 고분자 전해질 막(polymer electrolyte membrane, PEM)은 음 극에서 발생되는 수소이온을 양극으로 전달하는 역할과 동시에 분리막으로써 연료의 투과를 차단하는 역할을 수행하는 핵심 소재이다. 대표적으로 NafionⓇ과 같은 과불소화계 고분자 전해질 막이 상용화 되어있지만 높은 단가 및 분해 시 환경오염물 질이 배출되는 단점이 존재하여, 이를 대체할 탄화수소계 고분자를 활용한 전해질 막 개발에 관한 연구들이 수행되고 있다. 높은 수소이온 전도도를 가지며 동시에 우수한 물리⋅화학적 안정성을 갖는 탄화수소계 고분자 기반 전해질 막을 개발하기 위해 가교 구조가 도입된 전해질 막을 개발하는 연구들이 보고되고 있다. 본 총설은 가교 전해질 막을 제조하기 위해 이온교 환 작용기가 도입된 탄화수소계 고분자를 활용하여 다양한 종류의 가교 전해질 막을 제조하는 방법에 대해 논하였다.