We conducted safety assessments for the disposal of spent resin mixed waste after the removal of beta radionuclides (3H, 14C) in a landfill facility. The spent resin tank of Wolsong nuclear power plant is generated by 8:1:1 weight ratio of spent ion exchange resin, spent activated carbon and zeolite. Waste in the spent resin tank was classified as intermediate-level radioactive waste due to 14C. Other nuclides such as 60Co and 137Cs exhibit below the low-level radioactive waste criteria. The techniques for separating mixed waste and capturing 14C have been under development, with a particular focus on microwave-based methods to remove beta radionuclides (3H, 14C) from spent activated carbon and spent resin within the mixed waste. The spent resin and activated carbon within the waste mixture exhibits microwave reactivity, heated when exposed to microwaves. This technology serves as a means to remove beta isotopes within the spent resin, particularly by eliminating 14C, allowing it to meet the low-level radioactive waste criteria. Using this method, the waste mixture can meet disposal requirements through free water and 3H removal. These assessments considered the human intrusion scenarios and were carried out using the RESRAD-ONSITE code. The institutional management period after facility closure is set at 300 years, during which accidental exposures resulting from human intrusion into the disposal site are accounted for. The assessment of radiation exposure to intruders in a landfill facility included six human intrusion scenarios, such as the drilling scenario, road construction scenario, post-drilling scenario, and post-construction scenario. Among the six human intrusion scenarios considered, the most conservative assessment about annual radiation exposure was the post-drilling scenario. In this scenario, human intrusion occurs, followed by drilling and residence on the site after the institutional management period. We assumed that some of the vegetables and fruits grown in the area may originate from contaminated regions. Importantly, we confirmed that radiation doses resulting from post-institutional management period human intrusion scenarios remain below 0.1 mSv/y, thus complying with the annual dose limits for the public. This research underscores the importance of effectively managing and securing radioactive waste, with a specific focus on the safety of beta radionuclide-removed waste during long-term disposal, even in the face of potential human intrusion scenarios beyond the institutional management period.

In Korea, Kori Unit 1, a commercial pressurized water reactor (PWR), was permanently shut down in June 2017, and an immediate decommissioning strategy is underway. Therefore, it is essential to understand the characteristics of radioactive waste during the decommissioning process of nuclear power plants (NPP). Because radioactive waste must be handled with care, radioactive waste is treated in a hot cell facility. Hot cell facility handles radioactive waste, and worker safety is essential. In this study, it was dealt with whether or not the radiation safety regulations were satisfied when processing the core beltline metal of the dismantling waste treated at the post irradiation examination facility (PIEF) of the hot cell facility. Core beltline metal used for the pressure vessel in the reactor is carbon steel, and it is continuously irradiated by neutrons during the operation of the NPP. A radiological safety estimation of the behavior of radioactive aerosols during the cutting process within the PIEF was carried out to ensure the safety of the environment and workers. When processing the core beltline metal in PIEF, dominant six nuclides (60Co, 63Ni, 55Fe, 3H, 59Ni, 14C) of aerosol are generated. Accordingly each cutting device, amount of aerosol and value of dose is different. Using a 99.97% efficiency HEPA filter, the emission concentration of the dominant nuclides (60Co, 63Ni, 55Fe, 3H, 59Ni, 14C) in the air source term was satisfied with the emission control standard of Nuclear Safety Commission No. 2016-16. It was confirmed that the radioactivity concentration in the airborne source term inside the PIEF is in equilibrium state, when ventilation is considered. Also, the mass of aerosol and the concentration of airborne source term differed according to the thickness of the saw blade of the cutting tool, and the exposure dose of the worker was different through Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP). At that time, 60Co accounted for 95.4% of the exposure dose, showing that 60Co had the highest impact on workers, followed by 55Fe with 2.7%. The worker’s dose limit is satisfied in accordance with Article 2 of the Nuclear Safety Act and the dose limit of radiation-controlled area is found to be satisfied in accordance with Article 3 of the rules on technical standards for radiation safety management at this time.

In nuclear power plant, there were many contaminated tanks dispose of radioactive fluid waste. These tanks are made of stainless-steel, and corrosion can occur when tanks are exposed to radioactive fluid waste containing moisture for a long time. Therefore, those sludge waste including radionuclide should be collected, solidified, and disposed of. If sludge can be melted, sludge can be easily solidified. However, melting points of sludge components (Fe2O3, NiO, Cr2O3) are very high as 1565, 1955, and 2435 , respectively. Therefore, melting sludge is difficult. If a solidification auxiliary material such as cement or asphalt is used to help solidify, solidification can easily occur, but cement and asphalt are vulnerable to heat. Vitrification using glass material can be solidification method, but the waste loading ratio of glass material is higher than 50%. High waste loading ratio is weakness in terms of volume reduction of waste. In this study, ferro frit powder (Na2O, K2O, CaO, Al2O3, B2O3, SiO2, ZnO) is used as solidification auxiliary material. When ferro frit powder mixed with sludge material are melted in sludge material, melted ferro frit powder can stick sludge material and can solidify sludge material without melting. Sludge can be solidified by using ferro frit powder with a smaller waste loading ratio than the vitrification method. However, since the waste loading ratio of the solidification auxiliary material is small, if ferro frit powder is not uniformly distributed between sludge powder, solidification may not be performed properly. Although the mixing ratio between sludge and ferro frit in solidified sludge is same, when the distribution of ferro frit powder in sludge is non-homogeneous, the difference in chemical and physical characteristics as compressive strength and leaching resistance can be observed in solidified sludge. As the ferro frit mixing ratio in the site where ferro frit exists was relatively high, the melting point of the mixed powder (sludge+ferro frit) decreased, and the mixed powder could not maintain its shape and melted. In the case of the area where ferro frit does not exist, since only the stainless-steel oxide sludge exists, sludge was not melted, and the shape was maintained. However, it was confirmed that the leaching resistance was lowered by visually observing the color change of the leachate within a short period of time (about 2 hours) when solidified sludge was immersed in the leachate.

The dose was evaluated for the workers transporting the spent resin drums from a spent resin mixture treatment facility. The treatment technology of spent resin mixture waste based on microwave was developed to compensate for the shortcoming of the existing one. The mechanism of the facility for the treatment is divided into separation, desorption, condensation and adsorption process. The treated spent resin that has passed through the microwave reactor flows into the spent resin storage tank. As the treatment time elapses, if spent resin accumulates in the spent resin storage tank, it is moved to the drum of the volume of 200 L. The drum must be moved by the worker, in which case radiation exposure to the drum transport worker occurs. It requires the dose evaluation for drum transport workers in terms of radiation safety. Dose evaluation was performed in consideration of the change in the composition ratio and weight of the spent resin mixture, where the working time for transportation was considered from 10 to 120 minutes in 10-minute increment. In the case of 100 kg of the spent resin mixture, the dose range was derived as 4.62×10−3 – 5.90×10−2 mSv for the 100 kg of spent resin, 4.72×10−3– 5.58×10−2 mSv for the 80 kg of spent resin and 20 kg of zeolite and activated carbon, and 5.38×10−3 – 6.32×10−2 mSv for the 60 kg of spent resin and 40 kg of zeolite and activated carbon. In the case of 150 kg of the spent resin mixture, the dose range was derived as 6.83×10−3 – 8.20×10−2 mSv for the 150 kg of spent resin, 7.13×10−3 – 8.22×10−2 mSv for the 120 kg of spent resin and 30 kg of zeolite and activated carbon, and 8.28×10−3 – 8.86×10−2 mSv for the 90 kg of spent resin and 60 kg of zeolite and activated carbon. The estimated maximum doses for each weight (100 kg and 150 kg of mixture) were confirmed to be 3.16×10−1% and 4.43×10−1% of the annual average dose limit of 20 mSv for radiation workers.

The mechanical safety of the container designed according to the IP-2 type technology standard was analyzed for the temporary storage and transportation of Very-Low-Level-Waste (VLLW) for liquid occurring at the nuclear facilities decommissioning site. The container was designed and manufactured as a composite shielding container with the effect of storing and shielding liquid radioactive waste using High Density Polyethylene (HDPE) and eco-friendly shielding material (BaSO4) with corrosion and chemical resistance. The main material of the composite shielding container is HDPE and BaSO4, the material of the cover, cage and pallet is SUS304, and the angle guard is elastic rubber. The test and analysis requirements were analyzed for structural analysis of container drop and lamination test. As test requirements for IP-2 type transport containers should be verified by performing drop and lamination tests. There should be no loss or dispersion of contents through the 1.2 m high free-fall drop and lamination test for a load five times the amount of transported material. ABAQUS/Explicit, a commercial finite element analysis program, was used for structural analysis of the drop and lamination test of the transport and storage container. (Drop test) It was confirmed that the container was most affected when it falls from a 45-degree slope. Although plastic deformation was observed at the edge axis of the cover, it was evaluated that the range of plastic deformation was limited to the cover and cage, and stress within the elastic limit occurred in the inner container. In the analysis results for other falling direction conditions, it was evaluated that stress within the elastic limit was generated in the inner container except for minor plastic deformation. In the case of on-site simulation evaluation, deformation of the inner container and frame due to the drop impact occurred, but leakage and loss of contents, which are major evaluation indicators, did not occur. (Lamination test) The maximum stress was calculated to be 19.9 MPa under the lamination condition for a load 5 times the container weight, and the maximum stress point appeared at the corner axis of the pallet. The calculated value for the maximum stress is about 10%, assuming the conservative yield strength of SUS304 is 200 MPa. It was evaluated that stress within the limit occurred. In the case of on-site simulation evaluation, it was confirmed that there was no container deformation or loss of contents due to the load.

The optimum vitrification conditions of the radioactive waste using high-temperature furnace and HIP (Hot Isostatic Press) were studied for the successful reduction of the solidification volume, radioactive level, satisfying the disposal criteria such as leaching rate and compressive strength. Vitrification is receiving attention for the solidification disposal of intermediate and low-level radioactive wastes for its chemical-physical stability and leachability. Its principle is to trap the radioactive material in a fixed structure of the glass type materials, such as Boron Trioxide, Silicon Dioxide and Phosphorus Pentoxide. Sludge targeted in this study is assembly of materials while sludge is stored in the stainless-steel tank before disposal, which consists of Fe3O4 (14.9wt%), Fe2O3 (3.8wt%), and Cr2O3 (6.3wt%), cement paste (25wt%) and detergent/shower sludge (50wt%). The detergent/shower sludge generated from the washing the clothes that were worn during the work at the laboratory and nuclear power plant contains organic materials that are vulnerable to chemical reactions, therefore, immobilization of organic material by the incinerating step, which can also immobilize the radioactive substance, was applied. Its composition – containing Cs-133 and Co-59 substitution for Cs-134 and Co-60 that are radioactive – was analyzed by XRD before and after the mineralization of the sludge using high temperature furnace in different temperature, to identify the remaining element and the features of the mineralized sludge. Targeted sludge was vitrificated using Hot Isostatic Press in with different pressure and temperature conditions, to find out the optimum vitrification conditions. Vitrificated waste was evaluated in many aspects - leaching evaluation following ANS16.1, compressive strength evaluation of 3.44 MPa (waste disposal criteria), volume reduction before and after the sequence.

The feasibility study of synthesizing graphene quantum dots from spent resin, which is used in nuclear power plants to purify the liquid radioactive waste, was conducted. Owing to radiation safety and regulatory issues, an uncontaminated ion-exchange resin, IRN150 H/OH, prior to its use in a nuclear power plant, was used as the material of experiment on synthesis of graphene quantum dots. Since the major radionuclides in spent resin are treated by thermal decomposition, prior to conducting the experiment, carbonization of ion-exchange resin was performed. The experiment on synthesis of graphene quantum dots was conducted according to the general hydrothermal/solvothermal synthesis method as follows. The carbonized ion-exchange resin was added to a solution, which is a mixture of sulfuric acid and nitric acid in ratio of 3:1, and graphene quantum dots were synthesized at 115°C for 48 hours. After synthesizing, procedure, such as purifying, filtering, evaporating were conducted to remove residual acid from the graphene quantum dots. After freeze-drying which is the last procedure, the graphene quantum dots were obtained. The obtained graphene quantum dots were characterized using atomic force microscopy (AFM), Fourier-transform infrared (FT-IR) spectroscopy and Raman spectroscopy. The AFM image demonstrates the topographic morphology of obtained graphene quantum dots, the heights of which range from 0.4 to 3 nm, corresponding to 1–4 graphene layers, and the step height is approximately 2–2.5 nm. Using FT-IR, the functional groups in obtained graphene quantum dots were detected. The stretching vibrations of hydroxyl group at 3,420 cm−1, carboxylic acid (C=O) at 1,751 cm−1, C-OH at 1,445 cm−1, and C-O at 1,054 cm−1. The identified functional groups of obtained graphene quantum dots matched the functional groups which are present if it is a graphene quantum dot. In Raman spectrum, the D and G peaks, which are the characteristics of graphene quantum dots, were detected at wavenumbers of 1,380 cm−1 and 1,580 cm−1, respectively. Thus, it was verified that the graphene quantum dots could be successfully synthesized from the ionexchange resin.

The mixing powder of vitrification material and metallic oxide sludge was solidified by hot isostatic press method and was tested to check whether the solidified waste disposal acceptance criteria were met or not. From various contaminated tank in nuclear power plants, and other nuclear energy facilities, radioactive sludge based on metallic oxide can be generated. The most of tank consist of stainless steel can be oxidated by the long-term exposure on oxygen and moisture, and then can be made sludge layer based on metallic oxide on the inner wall of contaminated tank. Radioactive sludge waste should be solidified and disposed. Melting and hardening is the most basic method for solidification. The melting points of metallic oxide of stainless steel as Fe3O4, NiO, Cr2O3 are 1597, 1955, 2435, respectively. Those are very high temperature. To melt these metallic oxides, a furnace capable of raising the temperature to a very high temperature is required, which requires a lot of thermal energy, which may lead to an increase in disposal cost. Therefore, it is necessary to lower the melting point and solidify non-melted metallic oxide powder by adding vitrifying material powder as Na2O, SiO2, B2O3. The more vitrification material is added, the easier it is to solidify the sludge based on metallic powder at a low temperature, but there is a problem in that the total waste volume increases due to the addition of vitrification material. In this study, the mixing ratio and temperature conditions that can fix the sludge while adding a minimum amount of vitrification material will be confirmed. Mixing ratio conditions of the vitrification material and sludge powder are 10:90, 15:85, 20:80, 25:75. To fix the metallic oxide sludge by melting only the vitrification material without completely melting the metallic oxide, compression by external pressure is required. Therefore, the HIP (Hot Isostatic Pressing) method was used to solidify the metallic oxide sludge by simultaneously heating and pressurizing it. Because the softening points of most of vitrification based on Na2O, SiO2, B2O3 are ranged from 800 to 1000, temperature conditions are 800, 900, 1000. Since the compressive strength for disposing of the solidified materials was 3.4 MPa, the maximum pressure condition was set to 5000 psi (about 34 MPa), which is 10 times 3.4 MPa. And optimal mixing ratio, temperature, pressure conditions that meet the solidified waste disposal acceptance criteria will be found.

The structural safety of prototype transport and storage containers for very low-level radioactive liquid waste was experimentally estimated for its localization development. Transport containers for radioactive liquid waste have been researched and developed, however, there are no standardized commercial containers for very low-level radioactive waste in Korea. In this study, the structural safety of the designated IP-2 type container capable of transporting and temporarily storing large amounts of very low-level liquid waste, which is generated during the operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, was demonstrated. The stacking and drop tests, which were conducted to determine the structural integrity of the container, verified that there was no external leakage of the contents in spite of its structural deformation due to the drop impact. This study shows the effort required for the localization of the technology used in manufacturing transport and storage containers for very low-level radioactive liquid waste, and the additional structural reinforcement of the container in which the commercial intermediate bulk container (IBC) external frame was coupled.