Strategic item export control aims to maintain international peace and safety and serves as a significant nuclear non-proliferation regime that directly impacts a nation’s security. Therefore, establishing an autonomous export control system at the state level is crucial, and one of the most efficient methods to achieve this is by enhancing an export company’s management system. Accordingly, many advanced countries, such as the United States, Europe, and Japan, have operated their own internal compliance programs (CP or ICP) to manage and screen the export of strategic items as a corporate social responsibility and risk mitigation measure. In Korea, which has a high dependence on trade, the need for CP was continuously confirmed, but the system was introduced in 2004, relatively late compared to other advanced countries. So far, the Korean government has made steady efforts to develop and establish the system and is actively encouraging businesses to obtain Compliance Program certification to autonomously manage strategic items. Major technologically advanced countries utilize technology transfer as a tool for economic sanctions, trade security, and strategic technology management, and they continue to strengthen their control regimes. In these countries, CP certification is considered a standard practice for export control among mid-sized and large enterprises. It serves as a vital risk management system that protects companies from unforeseen incidents. However, in Korea, the application of CP under the Foreign Trade Act is limited to dual-use items and does not extend to the nuclear export control system. Therefore, this paper analyzes international cases and CP requirements in countries like the United States, Japan, Europe, and Singapore. As a result of the review, the application of CP into Korea’s nuclear export control could be a coexistence means that can strengthen supply chain control as well as provide benefits not to impede technical research, international trade, and exchanges.

In compliance with the amended export control of strategic items and technology in Jan. 2014, KAERI should pay attention to the export control of ITT (Intangible Technology Transfer). To control an ITT (Intangible Technologies Transfer) effectively and efficiently, the Korean government encourages the R&D institute and universities obtaining the ICP (Internal Compliance Program) from the relevant authority, MOTIE. This means that the exporters can control the ITT by themselves, because the exporters know very well the counterparts of the trading and the exporting items and technologies. In fact, ICP is for export control of dual-use items and technology in Korea. However, KAERI has tried to obtain a license from the authority, MOTIE. In an effort to do so, KAERI completed enacting a new internal self–regulation for export controls in 2016, and proceeded to apply for an ‘AA’ license of ICP in 2017 and obtained the ICP license in 2018 and re-obtained the license in 2021 from the MOTIE. In light of KAERI’s case, to obtain the ‘AA’ license of ICP is one of the best methods to increase the ability of export controls. As of now, there is no R&D institutes sponsored by the Korean government to obtain the ‘AA’ license of ICP except KAERI. KAERI can provide the actual methods as a standard case to the R&D institutes in Korea for obtaining an ‘AA’ license of ICP. According to the internal regulation of KAERI for export control, KAERI implemented an inner self-audit for export control in Nov. 2022. This is the first real self-audit for export control at KAERI. The main purpose of the self-audit is to check the transfer management of ITT and the relationship of relevant office through the interview of the staffs in the ICP organization. KAERI self-audit planed specifically and implemented for the achievement of the basic principal of selfaudit. The specific contents of this self-audit is as follows - The interview of the relevant offices: physical protection office, manpower planning office, manpower management office, nuclear education and training center, technology transfer office and international cooperation office, nuclear control and management office - Building the self-audit checklist considering the characteristics of each office - The confirmation of the inner procedure and the status of management on the export controls Through the interview of the relevant office, KAERI checked the inner procedure and the status of management on the export controls and tried to provide the supplementary measures of each relevant offices. The followings are the main results of the inner self-audit implemented in Nov. 2022. - Generally, the staffs know the meaning and relevant regulation such as foreigner’s management and the intangible technology transfer - Each office reflects the necessities of export controls on the relevant regulation and procedures and make DB for the proper duty. However, there is no indication for export controls on the DB - In the case of foreigner’s temporary visit for simple work and site tour, there is a difficult situation not to be able to check all the visitors by checking the denial lists - If necessary, KAERI may build the TFT (Task force Team) for the efficiency of export controls - Others

A sample size calculation algorithm was developed in a prototype version to select inspection samples in domestic bulk handling facilities. This algorithm determines sample sizes of three verification methods satisfying target detection probability for defected items corresponding to one significant quantity (8 kg of plutonium, 75 kg of uranium 235). In addition, instead of using the approximation equation-based algorithm presented in IAEA report, the sample size calculation algorithm based on hypergeometric density function capable of calculating an accurate non-detection probability is adopted. The algorithm based the exact equation evaluates non-detection probability more accurately than the existing algorithm based on the approximation equation, but there is a disadvantage that computation time is considerably longer than the existing algorithm due to the large amount of computational process. It is required to determine sample size within a few hours using laptop-level performance because sample size is generally calculated with an inspector’s portable laptop during inspection activity. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the calculation speed of the algorithm based on the exact equation. In this study, algorithm optimization was conducted to improve computation time. In order to determine optimal sample size, the initial sample size is calculated first, and the next step is to perform an iterative process by changing the sample size to find optimal result. Most of the computation time occurs in sample size optimization process performing iterative computation. First, a non-detection probability calculation algorithm according to the sample sizes of three verification methods was improved in the iterative calculation process for optimizing sample size. A computation time for each step within the algorithm was reviewed in detail, and improvement approaches were derived and applied to some areas that have major effects. In addition, the number of iterative process to find the optimal sample size was greatly reduced by applying the algorithm based on the bisection method. This method finds optimal value using a large interval at the beginning step and reduces the interval size whenever the number of repetitions increases, so the number of iterative process is less than the existing algorithm using unit interval size. Finally, the sample sizes were calculated for 219 example cases presented by the IAEA report to compare computation time. The existing algorithm took about 15 hours, but the improved algorithm took only about 41 minutes using high performance workstation (about 22 times faster). It also took 87 minutes for calculating the cases using a regular laptop. The improved algorithm through this study is expected to be able to apply the sample size determination process, which was performed based on the approximate equation due to the complexity and speed issues of the past calculation process, based on the accurate equation.

In addition to Korea, various countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and China are designing small module-type reactors. In particular, a small modular reactor is the power of 300 MWe or less, in which the main equipment constituting the nuclear reactor is integrated into a single container. Depending on the purpose, small modular reactors are being developed to help daily life such as power, heating supply, and seawater desalination, or for power supply such as icebreakers, nuclear submarines, and spacecraft propellants. Small modular reactors are classified according to form. It can be classified into light-water reactors/ pressurized light-water reactors based on technology proven in commercial reactors, and non-lightwater reactors based on fuel and coolant type such as Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor, High temperature gas-cooled reactor, Very high temperature reactor and Moltenn salt reactor. SMRs, which are designed for various purposes, have the biggest difference from commercial nuclear reactors. The size of SMRs is as small as 1/5 of that of the commercial reactors. Several modules may be installed to generate the same power as commercial reactors. Because of the individually operation for each module, load follow is possible. Also, The reactor can be cooled by natural convection because the size is small enough. It is manufactured as a module, the construction period can be reduced. Depending on the characteristics of these SMRs, application for safeguards is considered. There are many things to consider in terms of safeguards. Therefore, it is IAEA inspection or other approaches for SMRs installed and remotely operated in isolated areas, data integrity for remote monitoring equipment to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials, verification method and material accountancy and control for new fuel types and reactors. Since SMR is more compact and technical intensive, safeguards should be considered at the design stage so that safeguards can be efficiently and effectively implemented, which is called the Safeguards by design (SBD) in the IAEA. In this paper, according to the characteristics of SMR, we will analyze the advantages/disadvantages from the point of view of safeguards and explain what should be considered.

The measurement activities to evaluate material balance of nuclear material are usually performed by operator. It is because that the IAEA does not have enough manpower to carry out nuclear measurement accountancy of all nuclear materials in the world. Therefore, the IAEA should consider scenarios which facility operator tries to divert nuclear material for misuse by distorting measurement record. It is required to verify the operator’s measurement data whether it is normal or not. IAEA measures inventory items using their own equipment which is independent of facility operator equipment for verification. Since all inventory lists cannot be verified due to limited resources, the number of items to be verified is determined through statistical method which is called as sample size calculation. They measure for the selected items using their own equipment and compares with operator’s record. The IAEA determines sample size by comprehensively considering targeted diverted nuclear material amount and targeted non-detection probability and performance of measurement equipment. In general, the targeted diverted nuclear material amount is considered significant quantity (plutonium: 8 kg, uranium-235: 75 kg). If the targeted non-detection probability or the performance of the verification equipment is low, the sample size increases, and on the contrary, in the case of high non-detection probability or good performance of verification equipment, even a small sample size is satisfied. It cannot be determined from a single sample size calculation because there are so many sample size combinations for each verification equipment and there are many diversion scenarios to be considered. So, IAEA estimates initial sample size based on statistical method to reduce calculation load. And then they calculate non-detection probability for a combination of initial sample size. Through the iteration calculation, the sample size that satisfies the closest to the target value is derived. The sample size calculation code has been developed to review IAEA’s calculation method. The main difference is that IAEA calculates sample size based on approximate equation, while in this study, sample size is calculated by exact equation. The benchmarking study was performed on reference materials. The data obtained by the code show similar results to the reference materials within an acceptable range. The calculation method developed in this study will be applied to support IAEA and domestic inspection activities in uranium fuel fabrication facility.