일본정부가 한국정부에 대해 독도문제를 국제사법재판소에 해결하자고 과거 3번에 걸쳐 공동제소를 제의한 바 있었는데, 한국이 모두 거절했다. 본 연구는 공동제소를 제의한 일본의 의도를 분석하게 위해 2005부터 2018년까지 일본국회에서 논의된 내용을 시기별 나누어 조사하여 검토하였다.
2005년 2월 시마네현(島根県)이 ‘죽도(竹島)의 날’을 제정하였고, 한국정부가 이에 항의를 하였을 때, 야당위원이 일본정부에 대해 죽도문제를 국제사법재판소에서 해결해야 한다고 주장했다. 이에 대해 일본정부는 과거 2,3차례 공동제소를 한국에 제안하였으나 거부했다. 그래서 가장 적절한 방법이 어떠한 것이 있는지 검토 중이라고 답변했다. 이처럼 일본정부는 형식적 답변만을 반복하여 현실적으로 제3자의 조정에 의한 해결이 불가능함을 표명했다. 2011년 한국정부가 헬기장 개수공사와 해양과학기지 건설을 계획했다. 일본국회에서 야당위원이 다시 국제사법재판소에서 독도문제를 해결해야한다고 주장했다. 일본정부의 입장은 이전과 동일한 입장을 표명했다. 그러자 야당위원은 공동제소가 불가능하면 단독제소를 해야한다고 주장했다. 이에 대해서도 일본정부는 여러 상황을 고려하여 가장 적절한 방법을 찾고 있다는 답변을 반복했다. 일본정부가 야당위원의 주장에 대해 이 같은 동일한 답변을 계속하는 데는 이유가 있다. 이전 정권들이 한일협정 등에서 외교적으로 한국의 실효적 지배를 묵인해왔기 때문이다. 따라서 일본정부가 정부주도의 ‘죽도의 날’을 제정한다든가, 국제사법재판소에 ‘단독제소’를 할 만큼 일본에 영토적 권원이 존재하는 분쟁지역이 아님을 인정하고 있기 때문이다.
In 2005, Japan’s Shimane Prefecture adopted the ‘Takeshima Day’ ordinance that designated the 22nd of February, the day Dokdo was incorporated into Japan in 1905, as a prefectura lmemorial day. The passage of the ordinance, the Korean reaction and the wide domestic coverage propelled ‘Takeshima’ to the fore of Japan’s domestic debates on South Korea. It transformed the previously obscure and unknown to most Japanese dispute into one of the main symbols in Japan’s nationalistic debates.
Commentators in South Korea but also in the English language media and academia have interpreted this ordinance as another expression of the rising official and popular nationalism in Japan. The process that culminated in the passage of the ordinance however is much more complex than this. The ordinance was adopted against the wish of the government and key membersof the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and, as I will explain below, was directed at Tokyo rather than at Seoul. Furthermore, Japan’s other territorial disputethe dispute with Russia over the South Kuriles/Northern Territories- has played an important role in bringing about the ordinance.
Shimane Prefecture’s Dokdo related activism did not start in 2005 but dates back to the early postwar years. Japan’s defeat in the Asia-Pacific War and the loss of colonies, as well as the occupation brought about a sudden increase in population and shrinkage in fishing areas available for all of Japanese fishermen. Spurred by these developments, Shimane Prefecture, whose fishermen could no longer fish in waters near the Korean Peninsula and where many of former colonizers expelled from the Peninsula have settled, embarked on a campaign urging the Occupation Authorities and the Japanese Government to return Dokdo to Japan. The Japanese government also perceived Dokdo as rightfully belonging to Japan and during preparations for the San-Francisco Peace Treaty lobbied the US to include the rocks in Japan’s territory. The final version of the Peace Treaty however carried no references to Dokdo. While South Korea has effectively administered the rocks since 1952, both the Japanese and the Korean governments have adopted interpretations of the Treaty, favorable to their respective positions.
The dispute over Dokdo’s belonging was one of the main stumbling blocks in Japan-South Korea normalization negotiations that started in 1951. Meanwhile, Shimane Prefecture continued to send petitions to the central government arguing the need to establish Japan’s rights to the rocks. As such in the 1950s, the positions of Matsue (Shimane’s prefectural capital) and Tokyo on the territorial dispute were identical.
However, the conclusion of the 1965 Basic Treaty which normalized relations between Japan and South Korea created a divide in Shimane’s and Tokyo’s relations. As Daniel Roh (2008) has showed in his Takeshima Mitsuyaku (The Takeshima Secret Pact), in early 1960s both the Japanese and the Korean governments came to perceive the issue of ownership over the rocks as relatively insignificant but neither side could compromise for domestic political reasons. As such, they reached a tacit agreement to shelve the dispute. According to the agreement, both governments would continue to hold their respective interpretations regarding ownership of the rocks, but would maintain the status quo and avoid escalation of the dispute.
From that point onwards, the perceptions of the dispute in Tokyo and Matsue diverged. While officially adhering to the position that Dokdo is illegally occupied by South Korea, Tokyo’s interests changed from attempts to retrieve the territory to a policy that aimed at keeping ‘Takeshima’ away from the domestic public discourse. Contrastingly, in late 1960s, Tokyo embarked on an extensive domestic campaign related to the Northern Territories. The purpose of the campaign was to consolidate the public opinion around the ‘Northern Territories’ issue and through this to divert domestic nationalism away from the US and the American bases on Okinawa towards the Soviet Union. The campaign involved extensive educational activities, establishment of numerous memorials on Hokkaido and the enactment of the national ‘Northern Territories Day’ in 1981. This extensive campaign has managed to transform ‘Northern Territories’ from an issue that until 1970s was of interest mainly to former residents of the four islands into a national symbol.
However the extensive attention paid by the central government to ‘Northern Territories’ from late 1960s, created a visible contradiction in Japan’s policy related to territorial disputes. On one hand, Japan’s official position on both of the disputes remained identical: both Dokdo (Takeshima) and South Kuriles (Northern Territories) were argued to be illegally occupied by South Korea and the Soviet Union respectively. In terms of domestic policy however, the central government has invested heavily in the Northern Territories campaign but, with rare exceptions, has kept silent on Dokdo and did not allocate any resources to it.
The bilateral fishing agreement that accompanied the 1965 normalization treaty enabled Japanese fishermen to fish in waters near the rocks and, while from late 1970s the Korean authorities prevented them from entering the 12 miles zone near the rocks, the agreement solved most of Shimane’s fishing related grievances. The duplicity in Tokyo’s position however has created a sense of victimhood and injustice among Shimane’s prefectural elites and became the main stimulant in Dokdo related activism. At the same time, Tokyo’s ‘Northern Territories’ campaign informed and shaped prefecture’s own campaign and the nature of their demands from the government.
The 2005 ‘Takeshima Day’ ordinance was an integral part of Shimane Prefecture’s five decades long Dokdo related campaign. Certain actions of the Korean government such as the issuance of the second Dokdo memorial stamp in 2004 served as the immediate trigger for Shimane Prefecture’s 2004 memorandum that became the basis for the 2005 ordinance. These actions however were interpreted through the lens of victimhood and injustice caused by Tokyo. Thus the memorandum demanded from Tokyo to adopt certain domestic polices related to the ‘Northern Territories’ such as the national day and a governmental body in charge of developing and coordinating related policies, to the Dokdo issue as well. The prefectural ordinance was a response to Tokyo’s denial to accommodate Shimane’s demands and was adopted despite requests from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the government not to do so.
Today, both ‘Northern Territories’ and ‘Takeshima’ are important symbols in Japan’s nationalism directed at its neighbors. The processes that led to emergence of these national symbols however are quite different. In a somewhat ironic fashion, Tokyo’s successful attempt to raise the visibility of ‘Northern Territories’ in the domestic discourse, facilitated the emergence of ‘Takeshima’ as another national symbol-against the desire of the central government.
18세기 울릉도・독도로 건너간 어민들은 전복 진상지 어민들로 육지와 멀리 떨어진 외양 항로 중심지에 위치한 전라남도 여수시 거문도・초도・손죽도어민들이었다. 이들은 뛰어난 항해기술을 이용 하여 전국을 무대로 중개지 무역을 하며 울릉도・독도에서 생산된 어획물을 전국에 유통시켰다. 이렇게 18세기부터 울릉도・독도어장 으로 건너간 전라도어민들의 어로 활동은 여러 가지 자료에 확실 히 나타나 있음에도 불구하고 일본은 무주지선점론을 근거로 대한 제국 칙령 41호의‘석도는 관음도이거나 독도는 아니다’라고 주 장하고 있다. 시마네현 죽도문제연구회에서는 1903년 독도에 갔다고 하는 나카이 요사부로의 관련 자료를 수집하여 나카이의 독 도 인식을 연구하였고 이케우치 사토시는 울릉도인들의 어업활동 을 검토하여‘울릉도인들은 독도에 갈 수 없었기 때문에 석도는 독도가 아니다’라고 주장하였다. 이케우치의 경우‘석도는 독도 가 아니다’라고 자신있게 주장할 수 있었던 것은 개척기 이주한 경상도어민의 어로 활동을 염두에 두고 울릉도로 건너간 전라도어 민들의 어로 활동을 배제시켰기 때문이었다. 따라서 그는 전라도 어민들은 개척기 울릉도에 이주한 주민들과 어떤 교류도 없었고 독도의 전라도 방언‘독섬’이 울릉도인들에게 전파되지 않았음을 입증하려 하였다. 이것은 죽도문제연구회가 고지도연구를 통하여 석도를 울릉도 주변의 관음도라고 주장하여 자기모순에 빠진 것처 럼, 개척기 조선인들의 어로 활동을 연구하면서 전라도어민들의 어업 활동을 배제함으로써 동일한 모순에 빠지고 있음을 알 수 있 다.