The issue of this paper is what is the definite limit of criminal coercion and how it can be determined. Basically, even if an actor gives threat to the victim, of which substance is within the scope of the actor’s right, that threatening expression can be subject to criminal punishment. In that case, if the actor does the act threatened, his act is out of the scope of criminal punishment. Korean Supreme Court has decided that, in consideration of motive and means of a threatening act, it can be wrong. Herewith, the problem is based on what standard the threatening act’s morality can be taken into consideration.Although morality of threatening act can be considered in the aspect of coercion, extortion and threat, is there any difference among them? The invasion on freedom of victim is the primary legal interest in this issue and also the invasion on freedom of actor should be taken seriously. These two aspects of threatening act should be taken to strike a balance in the area of our daily lives and market. Because the flexibility of decision of criminality of a threatening act makes it possible to restrict our legitimate activities too excessively, kinds of wisdom and principle should be invited in this area. We should note that the method of Korean Supreme Court of deciding criminality of verbal threatening is a wide scope of consideration of circumstances of an actor’s motives, means, benefits and disadvantages of his acts, etc. Also, the current interpretation of coercion, extortion and threat in Korean Criminal Code has paid more attention into violation of general morality in our society, rather than personal right to freedom from threatening expression. This interpretation seems to invite so various consideration of immorality of an actor’s threatening act.The standard of consideration of the cases in issue should be more specified. If it cannot be, it should be subject to constitutional review, based on principle of freedom and clarity. In America, If freedom of expression is in issue, the words existing in the provision of criminal punishment should be more rigorously reviewed. In Lewis v. City of New Orleans, the New Orleans’ criminal provision make it an offense “wantonly to cures or revile or to sue obscene or opprobrious language toward……” The supreme court of New Orleans strike down the provision in violation of the First Amendment, because it is too vague and general for the purpose of the Amendment. After the court's decision, the New Orleans legislator revise the provision, that you can be subject to punishment, if you falsely accuse some person of a crime or testify falsely or provide false information. By focusing on the wrongfulness of expression itself, the provision provide some restriction on punishment of an actor who expresses something within his right but with some inappropriate and base motives. Still, there remains flexible possibility of interpretation that must be a great challenge of that area.

This article is a critical review on a case, Supreme Court Decision 2010Do1017 delivered on 2010. 7. 15. In the present case, the intimidated person neither felt fear nor was the subject of the harm threatened. Defendant threatened a person with a notice of harm that he would harm the legal interest of a corporation operated by the intimidated person. Supreme Court held that although the object of intimidation was not the subject of harm threatened, the behavior of defendant constitutes a crime of intimidation on the ground that a corporation can be a subject of harm threatened. Article 283 (1) of Criminal Law stipulates that the meaning of intimidation is “to threat a person” but it remains silent in the meaning and types of legal interest. This is why the concept of intimidation remains in the arena of interpretation. In order to interpret the meaning and the content of intimidation reasonably, it is essential to conduct comparative research on constituent elements of the crime of intimidation, as conducted in this study with provisions of Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Japan. In the case of Korean Criminal law, not surprisingly, a third party including family members of intimidated person can be a subject of harm notified as there is no provision applicable to a situation in which the object of intimidation is not a subject of harm threatened. However, the object of intimidation should be in ‘close relationship’ with the subject of harm threatened. Especially, for a corporation to be an subject of harm threatened, the content of intimidation should be interpreted narrowly, when considering the legislative examples of countries aforementioned which confine the scope of subject of harm threatened. It is thought to be unreasonable to expand the scope of punishment on the crime of intimidation by interpreting the provision to provide no limitation on the content of harm notified. In the present case, intimidated person did not feel fear because the subject of harm threatened was not himself, but his corporation. Even from the standpoint that crime of intimidation is a crime of danger, it is unreasonable to disregard the statement of the victim made in court in judging harmfulness of the notice. Moreover, considering the content of the notice which contained a threat that defendant would accuse the corporation of its illegal practice to the supervising department, Court should have been more cautious in its holdings on the consummation of the crime of intimidation.

Zur Frage der Tatbestandsformen der Bedrohungstatbestand(§ 283 kStGB) spricht die herschende Meinung des Urteils(2007do606, Urt. v. 2007.9.28) die Erkenntnis aus, daß das Rechtsgut der Bedrohung die Freiheit der Willensentschlißung ist und § 283 ein Gefährdungsdelikt ist. Eine tatsächliche Verletzungung der Willensentschlißungsfreiheit braucht also nicht einzutreten. Jedoch kommt es dabei nicht darauf an, ob sich das Opfer durch Drohung mit einem empfindlichen Übels im Einzelfall tatsächlich befürchten läßt. Der Täter muß die von seinem Willen abhängige Begehung eines Übels in Aussicht stellen. Vollendet ist die Tat, wenn die Drohung mit Willen des Täters zur Kenntnis des Drohungsadressaten gekommen ist und dieser den Sinn der Mitteilung verstanden hat. Nach § 286 ist der Versuch strafbar und zB dann gegeben, wenn die Mitteilung den Drohungsadressaten noch nicht erreicht, oder wenn die Mitteilung nicht zur Kenntnis des Drohungsadressaten gekommen ist, oder wenn dieser den Sinn der Mitteilung nicht verstanden hat. Zur Frage, ob § 283 ein konkretes Gefährdungsdelikt oder ein abstraktes Gefährdungsdelikt ist, ließ die herschende Meinung des Urteils unberüht bleiben. Dagegen die minder Meinung des Urteils, gefolgt der wohl überwiegenden Ansichten in der Literatur, sieht § 283 zurecht als ein Verletzungsdelikt. Die Auffassung der Bedrohung als Verletzung der Willensentschlißungsfreiheit scheint mir als plausibel, weil § 283 individuell-konkrete Willensentschlißungsfreiheit schützt und nach § 286 der Versuch der Bedrohung strafbar ist.