Earnings management is a matter of concern for organizations because it affects the interests of stakeholders. This reduces the quality of information on financial statements of the organizations when the organization performs earnings management behavior. The objective of the article is to examine the impact of corporate governance on earnings management of all Vietnamese listed banks from 2015 to 2019. The article uses time-series data and ordinary least square (OLS) with Eviews 10.0 software to test the regression model. The agency and asymmetry information theory is used to explain the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. The study results show that two variables – the foreign members of the board of directors and audit committee – have an opposite effect on earnings management behavior of Vietnamese listed banks. Therefore, the managers of listed banks need to raise awareness to express responsibility for honest and reasonable information on the financial statements. This creates trust and credibility for stakeholders. Moreover, Central bank of Vietnam should monitor regularly and enforce strict sanctions to limit earnings management behavior of listed banks. This contributes to improving the quality of accounting information in the Vietnamese banking sector to meet the trend of international economic integration.

This study aims to investigate the direct relationship between ownership structure, earnings manipulation, and organizational performance, and then examine the mediating effect of earnings manipulation in the relationship between ownership structure and organizational performance. This study collected and analyzed secondary data published in financial reports related to all insurance organizations listed in the Jordanian market during the study period (from 2009 until 2018). A panel data analysis was conducted, giving a total of 200 observations. The findings of this study concluded that ownership concentration, foreign ownership, and organization size affect organizational performance proxied by ROA, ROE, and EPS, more specifically, ownership concentration and organization size have a positive effect, whereas foreign ownership has a negative effect. At the same time, board of director ownership, organizational ownership, and CEO compensation did not affect organizational performance. Next, the board of director ownership, ownership concentration, foreign ownership, and CEO compensation affect earnings manipulation separately. In addition, earnings manipulation positively affects organizational performance proxied by ROA, ROE and EPS. This means that the higher the earnings manipulation is, the higher the organizational performance is. Finally, earnings manipulation mediates the relationship between ownership concentration and foreign ownership of ownership structure, and organizational performance.

Earnings management behavior is the use of accounting procedures, through accounting policies, to intentionally purposeful control in the provision of information to users. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between ownership structure factors and earnings management behavior of 30 Vietnamese commercial banks. The paper uses the ordinary least square method to examine this relationship and employs time series data of 15 years from 2005 to 2019. The study also uses agency theory an asymmetric information theory. The authors examined six independent variables related to the ownership structure and these variables are typical of Vietnamese commercial banks. The results of the study show that the foreign ownership ratio is an opposite effect, while the ownership concentration variable has a positive effect on earnings management behavior of Vietnamese commercial banks. Based on that, the article proposes a number of policy suggestions for the State bank of Vietnam and Board of directors of commercial banks as well as investors to identify and to limit the earnings management behaviors of Vietnamese commercial banks. This contributes to ensuring information transparency as well as improving the quality of accounting information of Vietnamese commercial banks in the coming years.

This paper investigates the effect of the involvement of the board chairman in the audit committee (AC) on earnings management (EM). It examines Bursa Malaysia-listed companies with the lowest positive earnings for the years 2013 to 2015. The Modified Jones Model by Kasznik (1999) was used to determine discretionary accruals. An AC that includes its board chairman as an ordinary member is associated with greater discretionary accruals. However, a board chairman who is also the chairman of the AC does not seem to influence discretionary accruals. This paper supports the agency theory and policy-makers’ efforts to prevent board chairmen from sitting on ACs. It is the first study that uses the agency theory to describe the association between the board chairman’s involvement in the both AC and EM. This study alerts policy-makers, stakeholders and researchers to the influence of a board chairman serving on the AC in curbing EM. Furthermore, it provides empirical evidence that the majority of Malaysian companies whose board chairmen are involved in the AC appoint the chairman as an ordinary member of the AC. This indicates that executive directors may affect such actions. Hence, more policies are needed to improve AC independence.

The research aims to explore the links among corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, and earnings management, considering vital roles of each component in Vietnam. There were 500 questionnaires provided to the targeted enterprises, where there were 150 enterprises in Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange, 150 enterprises in Hanoi Stock Exchange, and 200 enterprises in the unlisted public company market. Of the distributed questionnaires, only 289 replies offered needed information for analyses. The data derived from these firms was based on their annual or sustainability statements that were retrieved from the websites. This research used a sixyear rolling window to calculate earnings management. To compute that variable, lagged year information was included, so the data from 2011 to 2017 was needed to collect. The empirical results show that corporate governance mechanism is a significant moderation in the positive link between good corporate social responsibility and earnings management. Furthermore, corporate social responsibility and earnings management also play mediating roles in the associations among corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, and earnings management. This project recommends that corporate governance mechanism is an essential driver of the managerial behaviors in social responsibility and ethical accounting practices, which are in turn mediators in the joint research model.

This research is conducted to investigate the impact of provincial governance quality on earnings management in the context of Vietnam. The sample of this study was 52 construction materials companies listed on Vietnamese stock market for the period of 2015 - 2017. Consistent with previous research, this paper used discretionary accruals to obtain the discretionary abnormal accruals for measuring earnings management. We employ the data from nationwide surveys of provincial governance quality measured by the provincial competitiveness index. The multiple regression models were estimated to test the impact of the both provincial competitiveness index and ten sub-indices on earnings management of listed companies. This study provided the first empirical evidence for the impact of provincial institution quality and earnings management in Vietnam. The results showed that in the companies with loss, provincial competitiveness index has a negative effect on earnings management. The results also indicated that informal charges index; transparency index and proactivity index have statistical significant negative effect on earnings management. By unfolding the relation between aggregated index and several sub-indicators institution factors and earnings management our findings shed lights on how provincial governance environment can influence on firms level earnings management behavior in the case of Vietnam.

The paper aims to investigate the linkage among prior financial performance, organizational reputation and earnings quality. Firstly, it examines the influence of prior financial performance on organizational reputation and on earnings quality. Secondly, this research explores the moderating role that prior financial performance plays in the causal relationship from organizational reputation to earnings quality. Thirdly, the mediating role of organizational reputation in the effect of prior financial performance on earnings quality is analyzed. The empirical findings show that, prior financial performance positively affects both earnings quality and organizational reputation that in turn partly mediates the causal connection from prior financial performance to earnings quality; whereas prior financial performance imposes a positive moderation in the influence of organizational reputation on earnings quality. This research is expected to provide scholars and practitioners with a thorough understanding of the complex link among prior financial performance, organizational reputation and earnings quality. That helps them to deliver good decisions on the investment of suitable resources in maintaining and enhancing their organizational reputation, which assures a higher quality of reported earnings that in turn improves involved stakeholders’ confidence in their firm. This likely leads the firms to gain better performance in the future.

Purpose To mislead shareholders – about a firm’s actual economic performance, managers frequently manage dividends. Earnings management also affects performance reviews. Managers attempt to manage reported earnings caused by current economic events to accurately reflect their current performance. Research design, data, and methodology – The sample consisted of 312 company-years from companies in the pharmaceutical distribution industry listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. A study period from 2004 to 2014 was selected. In this study, a model for measuring the performance of the net profits to total assets of a division of Jones was used to measure earnings management. Results – This study found a negative correlation between corporate performance and earnings management. Conclusions – The results for the earnings management company indicated a significant inverse relationship. Therefore, the company’s performance weakened as its earnings management activity increased. In other words, the results showed that the company’s performance-based accruals earnings management, the actual management of profits, and the general level of earnings management had significant inverse relationships. Thus, as the company’s profits declined, earnings management activity increased.

The purpose of this study is to analyse whether the capability assesment index to perform services as well as creditratings for the governmental procurement bidding influence earnings management behaviour using discretionary accrualsand real earnings management in the construction waste disposal industry. For this study, out of the 530 population(interimdisposal service companies for construction waste) across the country, the final sample of 144 companies is selected foran analysis period of six years, starting from 2008 to 2013. The modified Jones model (1995) is used to measure earningsmanagement and the Kothari et al. model (2005) reflecting return on total assets (ROA) is also applied to produce thediscretionary accruals. In addition, earnings management through real activities is measured by the model developed byRoychowdhury (2006) and the method developed by Cohen et al. (2008) is adopted to calculate the measurement ofintegration of real earnings management. Overall, our empirical results of the analysis show that the capability assessmentindex to perform services as well as credit ratings significantly influence earnings management behaviour in theconstruction waste disposal industry. First, the managers of companies having higher assessment index report increasedprofits through adjusting both discretionary accruals and real earings management. Second, the managers of speculativeenterprises which rank lower credit ratings use higher income-increasing discretionary accruals. These research findingsimply that the regulatory authorities should properly consider the earnings management behavior of the construction wastedisposal service industry in setting the qualification standards for the governmental procurement bidding. The usefulnessof this study results can be highlighted by alerting the industry managers that improper earnings management practicesnot only decrease the successful bidding chances of the companies involved but also deteriorate long-term firm valuesin the market.

Purpose - Our goal was to determine whether there is a relationship between actual profits’ deviation from the profits expected in earnings per share’s adjustment announcements and the degree of apparent earnings management in annual financial statements. Research design, data, and methodology - The samples consisted of 133 companies from ten industries. The companies were selected among those listed in the stock exchange, and their data were examined covering the two-year period from 2008 to 2010. Tests were conducted using a regression model and SPSS statistical software. Results - The findings indicate the following. There is no significantly positive relationship among the last earnings per share’s adjustment forecast, the first earnings forecast per share, and earnings management. Moreover, the amount of the latest earnings per share’s adjustment forecast relative to its first forecast is not associated with the companies’ discretionary accruals items. Finally, the hypothesis that a relationship exists between companies’latest adjustments of their earnings per share and earnings management was tested the results indicate that there is no such relationship. Conclusions - The study’s results suggest that the amount of earnings per share’s adjustment is not a motivation for earnings management.