The effect of various physicochemical processes, such as seawater intrusion, on the performance of the engineered barrier should be closely analyzed to precisely assess the safety of high-level radioactive waste repository. In order to evaluate the impact of such processes on the performance of the engineered barrier, a thermal-hydrological-chemical model was developed by using COMSOL Multiphysics and PHREEQC. The coupling of two software was achieved through the application of a sequential non-iterative approach. Model verification was executed through a comparative analysis between the outcomes derived from the developed model and those obtained in prior investigations. Two data were in a good agreement, demonstrating the model is capable of simulating aqueous speciation, adsorption, precipitation, and dissolution. Using the developed model, the geochemical evolution of bentonite buffer under a general condition was simulated as a base case. The model domain consists of 0.5 m of bentonite and 49.5 m of granite. The uraninite (UO2) was assigned at the canister-bentonite interface as the potential source of uranium. Assuming the lifetime of canister as 1,000 years, the porewater mixing without uranium leakage was simulated for 1,000 years. After then, the uranium leakage through the dissolution of uraninite was initiated and simulated for additional 1,000 years. In the base case model, where the porewater mixing between the bentonite and granite was the only considered process, the gypsum tended to dissolve throughout the bentonite, while it precipitated in the vicinity of bentonite-granite boundary. However, the precipitation and dissolution of gypsum only showed a limited effect on the performance of the bentonite. Due to the low solubility of uraninite in the reduced environment, only infinitesimal amounts of uranium dissolved and transported through the bentonite. Additional cases considering various environmental processes, such as seawater or cement porewater intrusion, will be further investigated.
Bentonite, a material mainly used in buffer and backfill of the engineering barrier system (EBS) that makes up the deep geological repository, is a porous material, thus porewater could be contained in it. The porewater components will be changed through ‘water exchange’ with groundwater as time passes after emplacement of subsystems containing bentonite in the repository. ‘Water exchange’ is a phenomenon in which porewater and groundwater components are exchanged in the process of groundwater inflow into bentonite, which affects swelling property and radionuclide sorption of bentonite. Therefore, it is necessary to assess conformity with the performance target and safety function for bentonite. Accordingly, we reviewed how to handle the ‘water exchange’ phenomenon in the performance assessment conducted as part of the operating license application for the deep geological repository in Finland, and suggested studies and/or data required for the performance assessment of the domestic disposal facility on the basis of the results. In the previous assessment in Finland, after dividing the disposal site into a number of areas, reference and bounding groundwaters were defined considering various parameters by depth and climate change (i.e. phase). Subsequently, after defining reference and bounding porewaters in consideration of water exchange with porewater for each groundwater type, the swelling and radionuclides sorption of bentonite were assessed through analyzing components of the reference porewater. From the Finnish case, it is confirmed that the following are important from the perspective of water exchange: (a) definition of reference porewater, and (b) variations in cation concentration and cation exchange capacity (CEC) in porewater. For applying items above to the domestic disposal facility, the site-specific parameters should be reflected for the following: structure of the bedrock, groundwater composition, and initial components of bentonite selected. In addition, studies on the following should be required for identifying properties of the domestic disposal site: (1) variations in groundwater composition by subsurface depth, (2) variations in groundwater properties by time frame, and (3) investigation on the bedrock structure, and (4) survey on initial composition of porewater in selected bentonite The results of this study are presumed to be directly applied to the design and performance assessment for buffer and backfill materials, which are important components that make up the domestic disposal facility, given the site-specific data.
Currently, there are 25 nuclear power plants (NPPs) in operation in Korea, including 22 pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and three pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs). Two NPPs, including Kori Unit 1 and Wolsong Unit 1, are permanently shut down and awaiting decommissioning. If Kori Unit 2, which is expected to be permanently shut down soon, is included, the number of decommissioning NPPs will be increased to three. Spent fuels (SFs) are continuously generated during the NPP operation, which are stored in an SF storage pool in NPPs to cool down the decay heat emitted from SFs. For safe NPP operation, SFs must be regarded as waste, and a disposal site must be selected to isolate SFs. However, an appropriate site has yet to be selected in Korea. SFs contain long-lived nuclides with a high specific activity. For disposal, it is important to characterize the nuclides in the fuels and delay the migration of the nuclides to the environment when SFs are placed in a future disposal facility. If the disposal container is broken, the nuclides in the fuels escape from the filling material, such as bentonite. These escaped nuclides are dissolved in groundwater and migrate to the surface of the earth. Thus, it is possible to assess the radiological impact, such as the exposure dose during and after the disposal, if the types and characteristics of nuclides in SFs are known. This study investigated the nuclides in SFs and identified exposure scenarios that may occur in the disposal process of SFs and migration characteristics when the nuclides leak into groundwater to propose a dose assessment methodology for workers and the public.
In Korea, 483,102 assemblies of spent fuel have been discharged and stored in sites, as of 2019. However, total capacity for site storage is 529,748 assemblies, and more than 90% is already saturated. Wolsong site, the most saturated site, started to construct more dry storage to extend the capacity in 2020. Spent fuel and high-level waste (HLW) is a big concern in Korean nuclear industry. Then, master plan for management of spent fuel is once announced by Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) in 2016 and reviewed by civil committee in 2019. The core contents of the plan are establishing schedule for construction of HLW management facility in one area, and construction of temporary dry storage in each site, if unavoidable. For HLW management facility, there are three following schedules: siting of Underground Research Laboratory (URL) and Interim Storage by 2020, operation of facilities initiated by 2030, and operation of final disposal facility initiated by 2050. Final repository will be designed as deep geological repository. The concept of deep geological disposal is that spent nuclear fuel is placed in disposal containers that can withstand corrosion and pressure in long-term, permanently isolated from the human sphere of life, and dumped in deep geological media, such as crystalline rocks and clay layer, at a depth of 300 to 1,000 meters underground. The safety assessment of waste disposal sites focuses on determining whether the disposal sites meet the safety requirements of national regulatory authority. This safety assessment evaluates the potential radiation dose of radionuclides from the disposal site to humans or the environment. In this case, the calculation is performed assuming that all engineering barriers of the disposal site have collapsed in a long-term period. Then radionuclides are released from the waste, and migrated in groundwater. The dose resulting from the release and migration of radionuclides on the concentration of nuclides in groundwater. In general, metallic nuclides may exist in water in various ionic states, but some form colloids. This colloid allows more nuclides to exist in water than in solubility. Therefore, more doses may occur than we know generally predict. To determine the impact of colloids, we performed the safety assessment of the Yucca Mountain repository as an example.
국내 고준위 방사성폐기물 심층처분시스템에 대한 프로세스 기반의 종합성능평가체계(APro) 개발을 위하여 사용자 편의성이 향상된 모델링 인터페이스를 구축하였다. APro의 모델링 인터페이스는 프로그래밍 언어인 MATLAB을 이용하여 구축되었고, 다중물리현상 모사가 가능한 COMSOL과 지화학반응 계산이 가능한 PHREEQC를 계산 엔진으로 활용하여 연산 자분리 방식을 적용하였다. APro는 모델링 영역을 기존의 정형화된 처분시스템으로 제한함으로써 모델의 자유도는 낮지만, 사용자 편의성을 향상시켰다. 처분시스템에서 고려되는 주요 현상들을 모듈화하였고, 이를“Default process”와 다수의“Alternative process”로 구분하여 사용자가 선택할 수 있도록 함으로써 모델의 유연성을 높였다. APro는 크게 입력자료 부분과 계산실행 부분으로 구성된다. 기본 입력자료는 하나의 EXCEL 파일에 일정한 포맷으로 정리되고, 계산실행 부분은 MATLAB을 이용하여 코딩되었다. 최종적인 전체 계산 결과는 독립적인 COMSOL 파일 형태로 생성되도록 하여 COMSOL을 이용한 계산 결과의 후처리가 가능하도록 하였다.
국내 원자력발전소의 사용후핵연료는 소내저장시설에 보관되어 있으나 저장시설의 용량 확장이 어려움이 있으며, 연구기관 의 연구로에서 발생하는 고준위 방사성폐기물도 자체 보관중이나 영구적으로 저장할 수 없다. 또한 원전의 해체 시에도 고 준위 방사성폐기물이 발생할 것으로 예상된다. 이에 따라, 본 연구에서는 현재 개발된 사용후핵연료 운반용기를 사용하여 고준위 방사성폐기물을 가상의 관리시설로 철도를 통하여 운반하는 경우에 대하여 작업자 및 운반경로 주변 일반인의 예상 피폭선량을 평가하였으며, 그 결과를 국내 법적기준치와 비교하였다. 또한, 고준위 방사성폐기물의 상하차 작업 시 작업자 와 운반용기 간 거리와 운반사고 시 방사성핵종의 누출율의 변화에 따른 피폭선량의 변화에 따른 피폭선량 추이와 운반에 사용되는 열차의 구성에 따른 운반작업자의 피폭선량 변화를 분석하였다. 본 연구에서 설정한 모든 조건에서의 예상피폭선 량은 국내 법적제한치 이하임을 확인하였다.