The present research examines the Uncertainty-Prediction Asymmetry (UPA) hypothesis, that low certainty incidental emotions, compared to their high certainty counterparts, lead to utility overprediction and to lower forecasting error. Introduction Cognitive appraisals of emotion have been included in the state-of-the-art theory of emotion and decision-making (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015). For instance, Tiedens & Linton (2001) discuss how happiness involves appraisals of high certainty, and sadness involves appraisals of low certainty. In terms of forecasting, systematic processing is generally considered to lead to less forecasting error compared to heuristic processing. Tiedens & Linton (2001) argue that, if accuracy is the ultimate goal the individual needs to rely on more thoughtful processes. Seeking a state of certainty is more cognitively engaging and requires more cognitive resources. But how do people predict future utilities in the first place? Theoretical background Kahneman & Thaler (2006) analyze forecasting as a two-step procedure, encompassing a current prediction as well as a future event. Breaking down the present and future situation allows researchers to assess accuracy and detect how errors occur. Kahneman & Snell (1992) report that people tend to underpredict future utilities. Typically, the experienced utility is higher (i.e. more liked or less disliked) compared to the earlier prediction. In the present paper we argue that emotional uncertainty leads to utility overprediction and thus reduces forecasting error. This hypothesis is in line with the Appraisal-Tendency Framework (ATF-overview in Lerner et al., 2015). According to the ATF, an emotion may trigger a cognitive predisposition to assess future events in line with the central appraisal dimensions that triggered that emotion. Such appraisals provide a perceptual schema for interpreting subsequent situations. In the context of the present research, the certainty-uncertainty cognitive appraisal is hypothesized to trigger a predisposition that affects the utility prediction mechanism and leads to utility overprediction. This hypothesis is also in line with the uncertainty intensification hypothesis (Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009), according to which the uncertainty of experienced emotions makes unpleasant events more unpleasant and pleasant events more pleasant. The present research examines an Uncertainty-Prediction Asymmetry (UPA) hypothesis. In three experimental studies we test the hypotheses that low certainty incidental emotions, compared to their high certainty counterparts, lead to utility overprediction (H1) and to lower forecasting error (H2). Emotional certainty, as an appraisal dimension of emotions, is expected to create a prediction asymmetry through its effect on both predicted utility and forecasting error. The mediating role of heuristic processing in the relationship between emotional certainty and forecasting error is also investigated. Experiment 1 The first experiment examines the hypothesis that low emotional certainty leads to utility overprediction (H1). Eighty postgraduate students were randomly assigned to a high emotional certainty (disgust) vs. a low emotional certainty (fear) condition. Emotion induction involved exposure to pretested video clips (see Han et al., 2012). Following this manipulation, the experimental utility (a small candy bar) was distributed and participants were encouraged to consume it (see Kahneman & Snell, 1992). They were then asked to report on 13-point scales how much they liked the utility and to predict how much they would like it in the future consumption occasion (a week later). The results revealed a significant difference in predicted utility between the high (M = 2.22, SD = 1.33) and low (M =3.65, SD = 1.37) emotional certainty conditions (F = 4.43, p = 0.04, partial eta squared = 0.10). Experiment 2 The second experiment includes a “future event”, that is measures of the utility that was originally predicted, in order to also estimate forecasting error. The experiment therefore tests if (a) the main effect of emotional uncertainty on predicted utility is confirmed (H1) and (b) there is a significant main effect of emotional uncertainty on forecasting error (H2). In addition, this experiment examines whether these effects are independent of the valence appraisal dimension of emotions. Given that Experiment 1 involved two negatively valenced emotions, emotional valence (positive vs. negative) was included in the experimental design. Seventy three postgraduate students participated in a five-consecutive-days experiment. During the first day, participants were randomly assigned to a fear (negative valence, low certainty), disgust (negative valence, high certainty), hope (positive valence, low certainty) or happiness (positive valence, high certainty) condition. Specifically, participants were asked to report an experience in which they had felt this particular emotion through an Autobiographical Emotional Memory Task (AEMT) (as in Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Following this experimental manipulation, the experimental utility (a small chocolate bar) was distributed and they were again encouraged to consume. Subsequently, they were asked to rate how much they liked and how much they would like the utility on the fifth day. Depth of processing was assessed with four items (α=0.77), adjusted from Griffin et al. (2002). Specifically, these items measured the heuristic processing performed during the prediction process. Participants were contacted again on each of the remaining four days and were asked to consume the utility and to complete a short questionnaire (comprising ratings of the consumption experience and of the predicted utility on the fifth day). The results reported here involve only the data obtained on the first and final day of the experiment, and the forecasting error was estimated as the difference between the experienced utility of the last day and the predicted utility of the first day. In line with hypothesis H1, emotional certainty had a significant main effect on predicted utility (F = 6.18, p = 0.002, partial eta squared = 0.08). Specifically, predicted utility in the low emotional certainty condition was higher (M = 2.69, SD = 1.09), compared to that of the high certainty condition (M = 0.78, SD = 1.66). There was no significant interaction effect between certainty and valence. These findings provide further support for our H1 and indicate that emotional certainty influences utility prediction irrespective of the valence of incidental emotions. Moreover, a significant main effect of certainty on forecasting error was observed (F = 4.16, p = 0.045, partial eta squared = 0.06). Forecasting error was lower in the low certainty condition (M = 0.59, SD = 1.28) compared to the high certainty condition (M = 2.19, SD = 1.48). There was no significant interaction effect. Moreover, a mediation analysis revealed that heuristic processing mediated the effect of certainty on forecasting error (p**<0.05). Experiment 3 The previous two experiments indicate that the effects of incidental emotional states on predicted utility and forecasting error may be due to the certainty-appraisal dimension of these emotional states. A possible criticism and an inherent limitation of Experiments 1 and 2 might lie on the possibility that these effects are not independent of the other appraisal dimensions. This is related to a key methodological issue. In Experiments 1 and 2, the induced emotions were different in terms of certainty or uncertainty, but these emotions might have differed in other ways and across other appraisal dimensions as well. To eliminate this possibility and to strengthen our argument, we employ here a manipulation of the certainty appraisal of the same emotion. We therefore compare predicted utility and forecasting error in the same emotional state under conditions of low and high certainty. In Experiments 1 and 2 the emotions induced are strong representatives of each side of the certainty appraisal dimension. However, emotions located in the middle of this dimension provide an interesting opportunity since they might allow us to compare their effects when they are associated with lower or higher levels of certainty. In this experiment we have chosen to focus on the emotional state of sadness. Sadness was selected because it is near the middle of the certainty-uncertainty dimension (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Similar manipulations of sadness have been reported in the literature (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Sixty postgraduate students were randomly assigned to a low vs. high certainty sadness condition. High certainty participants were asked to recall and report an experience or event in which they had felt high certainty sadness (i.e. during which they understood what was happening and could predict what was going to happen next), through an Autobiographical Emotional Memory Task (AEMT) as in Experiment 2. Similarly, low certainty participants were asked to recall and report an event or experience that had generated low certainty sadness. Following the experimental manipulation, the experimental utility (a small chocolate bar) was served. Participants were again encouraged to consume some of it and were asked to complete 13-point ratings of how much they liked it and how much they would like it in the future occasion (a week later). Eight items (α=0.81), adapted from Griffin et al. (2002), measured the heuristic processing performed during the prediction process. Participants also completed ten items adjusted from PANAS questionnaire (Watson et al., 1988). A week later, participants consumed the utility and completed a short questionnaire. The results revealed a significant main effect of certainty on the predicted utility (F = 4.00, p = 0.05, partial eta squared = 0.06). Predicted utility in the low certainty sadness condition was higher (M = 4.21, SD = 1.55) compared to that of the high certainty condition (M = 3.35, SD = 1.78). A significant main effect of certainty on forecasting error was also observed (F = 5.04, p = 0.03, partial eta squared = 0.10). Forecasting error in the low certainty condition (M = -0.10, SD = 1.65) was lower compared to that of the high certainty condition (M = 1.02, SD = 1.81). A mediation analysis revealed that heuristic processing again mediated the effect of certainty on forecasting error (p**<0.05). Conclusion The contribution of this research is mostly highlighted by the counter-intuitive findings that lower certainty emotions lead to judgment with higher accuracy, as well as to an overprediction of utilities, related to their certainty counterparts. Therefore, the current findings provide support for the proposed Uncertainty-Prediction dual Asymmetry (UPA) hypothesis. Future research needs to corroborate these findings, to clarify the mechanisms underlying the observed asymmetry and to identify boundary conditions.

선박 건조 시장의 요구를 맞추기 위하여 신속한 건조의 목표로 노력하고 있는 조선소가 선박 정도관리에 대한 요구가 갈수록 높아지고 있다. 선박 건조 공정에서 생산성의 향상과 생산 주기의 단축을 위하여 선박 부재의 정도평가를 전 주기에서 수행해야 하는 것은 중요하다. 선박의 품질을 높이기 위하여 조선소에서 블록의 정도제어를 수행하는 것은 선박의 건조 주기를 단축할 수 있을 뿐만 아니라 건조 비용도 줄일 수 있다. 선박 블록의 정도를 제어하는 중심은 선박 블록 통합 정도관리시스템을 만들어야 한다. 이 시스템은 “Non-allowance Shipbuilding”의 목표로 정도관리의 총괄성, 블록 정도의 향상, 정도관리 과정의 표준화 등이 이루어져야 한다. 일반적으로 정도관리를 수행하는 관리자가 광파측정기를 이용하여 선박 블록의 접합면에 있는 주요 포인트(vital point)를 측정하고 수집하지만 무거운 계측장비를 가지고 블록의 정도관리를 수행하는 것은 불편할 뿐만 아니라 시간도 오래 걸린다. 본 논문에서는 선박 블록의 정도관리 시간을 단축할 수 있는 포인트 클라우드 기반으로 3차원 레이저 스캐너를 이용한 선박 블록 탑재 전에 오차예측 방법을 제안하였다. 이 방법은 ICP(iterative closest point) 알고리즘으로 측정된 포인트 클라우드와 설계된 점들의 비교 작업을 수행한 다음에 허용범위 내의 오차를 만족하는 지를 판단한다.

다 자유도를 가 진 구조계 로 부터 얻어진 동적거동의 측정치를 이용하여 구조물 의 모우드 셰수를 추정 하는 시간영역방볍에 대해 연구하였다. 이를 위해 운동방정식올 실험적 모 우드식으로 변환한 다음 이를 다시 이산시간 영역의 식인 ARMAX식으로 나타내었다. 순차적 예측 오차 방법 을 이용하여 ARMAX 식의 계수들 을 추 정 한 후， 이들로 부 터 구조볼의 모 우 드 계수들을 계산하였다. 지 진 하중을 받는 3충 빌딩 구조볼 의 실험치 를 이용하여 얻은 모 우드 계수들 은 서로 다른 실험 간에 좋은 일치 를 보 였 으 며， 또한 계산된 계수들을 이용하여 다시 구한 구조품 웅답의 시간이력들은 실험치들과 좋은 일 치 를 보였다.

Concrete has recently been modified to have various performance and properties. However, the conventional method for predicting the compressive strength of concrete has been suggested by considering only a few influential factors. so, In this study, nine influential factors (W/B ratio, Water, Cement, Aggregate(Coarse, Fine), Fly ash, Blast furnace slag, Curing temperature, and humidity) of papers opened for 10 years were collected at 4 conferences in order to know the various correlations among data and the tendency of data. The selected mixture and compressive strength data were used for learning the Deep Learning Algorithm to derive a prediction model. The purpose of this study is to suggest a method of constructing a prediction model that predicts the compression strength with high accuracy based on Deep Learning Algorithms.