대상판례에는 두 가지 문제가 있다. 첫째, 대상판례는 숫자 세기를 잘못하고 있다. 전문진술 상황은 매체가 하나인 경우고 재전문진술은 매체가 두 개인 경우다. 조서는 그것 자체로 매체 2개, 즉, 수사기관과 조서를 포함하고 있기 때문에 숫자를 셀 때 둘로 세야 한다. 이건 우리가 선택할 수 있는 문제가 아니라 전문법칙을 채용한 모든 나라에서 지켜야 하는 정의에 관한 문제다. 둘째, 제316조 제1항은 ‘공판준비 또는 공판기일에서의 진술’이라고 규정함으로써 공판정에서의 진술에 적용되는 조항임을 명확히 하고 있다. 수사기관에서 진술한 자에 대해서 적용되는 규정이 아니다. 수사기관 앞에서 진술하면서 진술자가 자신이 경험한 바가 아니라 피고인이 진술한 것을 그대로 되뇌어, 결과적으로 피고인의 방어권 보장에 문제가 생길 수는 있다. 그 문제의 해결 방법은 원진술자를 불러서 같은 진술을 반복 하게 하거나, 최소한 성립의 진정을 인정하게 하면 되는 것이다. 그럼으로써 제316조의 취지를 충분히 구현할 수 있다. 그렇지 않고, ‘조서 상 진술도 전문진술이니까 바로 제316조 제1항이 적용된다,’라고 결론을 내리는 것은 특별한 실익도 없이 문제를 복잡하게 만든다. 조서 안의 진술을 진술, 전문진술, 재전문진술로 나누는 것이기 때문이다. 지금 생각해 보면, 두고두고 아쉬운 것은 제310조의2를 도입할 때 지금 위치에 둘 게 아니라 제314조와 제315조 사이에 두지 못한 점이다. 그랬다면 제311조와 제314조까지는 조서규정으로 남고, 제315조와 제 316조는 전문법칙의 예외로 분리되었을 것이다. 즉, 우리 법은 직접주의의 원칙에 따라 조서의 증거능력도 제한하고, 영미에서 수입한 전문법칙도 갖춘, 피고인의 방어권 보장에 충실한 법이 되었을 것이다. 그런데 조서규정 앞에 전문법칙 규정을 둠으로써 모든 게 헝클어져 버렸다. 조서가 전문법칙의 예외로 읽히는 이상한 상황을 맞게 된 것이다.

This paper argues that neither the classical semantic treatment of the propositional attitudes (Hinttikka 1969) nor the previous semantic analyses of the hearsay or reprotative evidentials fit into the semantics of the English hearsay evidentials. This is mainly because not only is the notion of the compatibility that is employed in the semantics of propositional attitudes inappropriate for that of hearsay evidentiality, but they can be interpreted to convey an assertion, in which the speaker commits to the truth of the embedded proposition, and a proffering, in which the speaker does not. In order to account for the different interpretations, this paper develops an analysis of the English hearsay evidential, which is along the lines of that proposed by Krazter (1991), by positing different ordering sources for each of the interpretations. The introduction of the different ordering sources into the semantics of the hearsay evidentials plays the role of indicating whether or not the speaker commits to the truth of the proposition expressed by the embedded clause.

So-called Wang-jaesan decision (2013do2511) was declared by ‘Korean Supreme Court’ (hereafter ‘KSC’) in July, 2013. The decision had a lot of important substantial and procedural issues in criminal spheres. However, what I have tried to concentrate in this review are only two issues, the one is the issue of the authenticity of electronic evidence (or digital evidence), the other is the issue of the application of ‘the Korean version hearsay rule’ (hereafter ‘KHR’) of the electronic evidence. The methodology of this review is the comparative analysis of the Wang-jaesan decision from the perspective of Federal Rules of Evidence (hereafter ‘FRE’). In Wang-jaesan decision KSC defined the concept of integrity of electronic evidence as ‘the contents of the digital data have not been altered in any manner from the moment that were seized’ or ‘that evidence wasn’t changed after it was captured or collected.’ The meaning of this concept is different from the meaning of the traditional ‘exactness of utterances’(成立의 眞正) of article 312, 312 of KHR. That concept was made from the unique Korean modern legal history. However, it cannot deal with so many hard cases properly. Therefore I suggest in chapter Ⅰ, Ⅱ, Ⅲ, Ⅳ that We Korean legal scholars and practitioners should adopt the concept of authentication something like FRE, even though Korean Criminal Procedure Law does not have clear stipulations about it. In chapter Ⅴ, Ⅵ I did comparing analyses about the applications of KHR by KSC since 1990’s up to the 2010’s. I found that KSC has adopted enormously FRE when there were no clear stipulations in Korean Criminal Procedure Law. This is a kind of interesting phenomenon which deserves to be analyzed from the perspective of comparative law and global legal transplant of evidence rule.

Introducing hearsay rule in 1961, the words of provisions that provide the authentication and attendance of the declarant as exceptions of principle of the court's self-experience, were used as exceptions of the hearsay rule. It results in confusion of the elements of the hearsay rule with the elements of the authentication in the jurisprudence. Many literatures insist and place emphasis on the elements of the authentication as the elements of exceptions of the hearsay rule. With this confusion and misunderstanding, it became very difficult to understand the hearsay rule and many improper interpretations result from this confusion. In the future, the discussion which distinguish the elements of the hearsay rule from the elements of the authentication should be made actively and lead the academy and practice.