When exporting nuclear-related items, export control is required from two perspectives: the control of “Trigger List Items” as controlled by Nuclear Supplier Groups (NSG) and the control of the “Items Subject to the Agreement” as specified in bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements. While Trigger List Items and Items Subject to the Agreement are largely similar, there are some items where they do not overlap. Furthermore, national law for controlling each item is different. The Trigger List Items are governed by the Foreign Trade Act, and the Items Subject to the Agreement (Internationally Controlled Items) are governed by the Nuclear Safety Act. As a result, the detailed procedures and requirements for controlling each item are quite distinct. For the Trigger List Items, export license must be obtained in accordance with the Foreign Trade Act. The details such as responsible authority, the items subject to license, license requirements and procedures, penalties are specified in the Public Notice on Import and Export of Strategic Goods. For the Items Subject to the Agreement, the process and obligations set forth in bilateral agreements and related administrative agreements are fulfilled in accordance with the Nuclear Safety Act. However, in contrast to the Trigger List Items, the details for complying with the agreements are not specified legally. Since most of the Items Subject to the Agreement are fall within the category of the Trigger List Items, the obligations in accordance with the agreements are reviewed and implemented during the export license assessment process. However, if the Items Subject to the Agreement are not are fall within the category of the Trigger List Items, there is a risk of control omission. For example, this applies to cases of exporting tritium and tritium removal facilities, which are not the Trigger List Items, to Canada and Romania. Moreover, since subjects to the agreement and compliance procedures are respectively different for 29 bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements signed with different countries, it is difficult for enterprise to recognize the appropriate procedures and obligations under the agreement by their own. The bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements establish legal obligations between state parties while NSG are non-legally binding arrangements. Therefore, it could be even more necessary to comply strictly with the agreements. Consequently, legal improvements are required for effective implementations of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements. While it may be challenging to institutionalize details of 29 Nuclear Cooperation Agreements, it is essential to legally specify key elements such as the list of items subject to agreements, responsible authority, requirements and procedures for implement the agreement obligations, and penalties. Furthermore, domestic awareness on compliance with Nuclear Cooperation Agreements is lower compared to the system of export license for Trigger List Items. The continuous outreach is also necessary, along with institutional improvements.
The ROK government has developed the Nuclear Export and Control System (NEPS) to implement export control activities. Although it was launched in 2008 as a system that can work with classification, licensing, nuclear material approval, government-to-government assurance, complying with nuclear cooperation agreement (NCA) handled through official documents. In order to enhance systematic management for items subject to NCA, KINAC developed a new module for the procedure (hereinafter referred to as “NCA module”) and opened it in 2022. This paper presents the module’s development background, key features, and current operation status. The NCA module prioritizes functional expansion and flexibility, distinct from other tasks for the following reasons. First, the export control duties of classification, export license, and approval for NM are based on domestic law, leading to predetermined target items, application forms, and processes that change only through statutory amendments. In contrast, the implementation of NCA has numerous procedural variables, varying across countries in scope, content, and procedures. Therefore, if the function is over-standardized, there would be many exceptions that the system cannot resolve in practice. Second, the existing NEPS process entails a one-time decision or approval for each application, while the implementation of the agreement encompasses four related procedures for each item: prior notification, written confirmation, shipment notification, and receipt confirmation. Even some steps may be omitted depending on the case. The other difference is the working process. The implementation of NCA must be initiated from the government, so the existing methods, beginning with the licensee filling a form, cannot be adopted as it is. The NCA module has adopted a new reference numbering system to resolve these challenges. It enables the creation of multiple procedures under one reference number on an item to expand the tasks and make it possible to omit some steps or to reflect case-by-case concerns in each stage. It also provides a consolidated view of multiple notifications related to a single item, ensuring to deal with even long-running tasks without missing any obligations until the final procedure. Moreover, some of the data in the NCA module is extensible by allowing users to manage the list themselves. For example, the system can respond to new agreements by allowing users to add and modify codes that distinguish counterparty countries. As a result, the current NCA module accommodates a variety of implementation scenarios, including split shipments, the procedural omissions, and the modification of additional counterparties, offering enhanced flexibility and adaptability.
A bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) should define what is subject to the agreement and when. Nuclear Materials (NM) are the subject of NCA with almost all countries, and the definition used in these agreements is borrowed from Article 20 of the IAEA Charter. The IAEA’s definition of NM as consisting of special fissionable material and source material and describes the types of material each contains. In order to control the export of NM under national laws and implement NCA, not only the types of NM but also quantitative criteria are required. This is because controlling small quantities of NM is impossible, unnecessary, and would create excessive administrative burdens. For this reason, the NSG guidelines establish a quantitative threshold of NM requiring control. Nevertheless, no quantitative thresholds have been agreed upon for NM subject to a NCA. Whether NM transferred is subject to the NCA is primarily a matter for the supplier states to determine. The supplier states make the decision based on quantitative criteria defined in their own export control laws. ROK identifies NM that require export licenses by reflecting the same criteria as the NSG guidelines in Foreign Trade Laws and its Notifications. Less than 500 kg of Natural Uranium, 1,000 kg of Depleted Uranium, 1,000 kg of Thorium, and 50 effective grams of special fissionable materials do not require an export license and is therefore not subject to NCA. In the US, the quantitative threshold for requiring an export license is different from that of ROK. For example, special fissionable materials that are not Pu are required if the individual shipment exceed 1 effective gram or 100 effective grams per year. The difference in the quantitative thresholds for NM between the two countries mean that the same item may be subject to NCA under US standards, but not under ROK’s. For example, the export of 8 grams of highly enriched uranium (93%) contained in a neutron detector would not be subject to the NCA in ROK, but would be considered NM subject to a NCA and required a special license in the US. Of course, in order to ensure the application of safeguards and physical protection to all NM transferred between the two countries, the agreement may not include a quantitative threshold for NM. However, the absence of such a threshold can lead to different conclusions by the two countries on the same item and make it challenging to control retransfers. The definition of quantitative standards will be necessary in the supplementary administrative arrangement for the practical control and management of NM subject to the NCA.
Under the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements (NCA) and its administrative arrangement (AA), Korea annually exchanges the inventory of subject items (including nuclear materials (NM), non-nuclear materials, equipment, and related information) with US, Canada and Australia. Also, the government performs export control procedures such as notification or prior consent during importing and exporting of relevant items. It makes NCA a means of realizing the nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, it raises difficulties in management because the entity that uses and treats those items are end-user, not the authorities of AA, the government agency of each country. Accordingly, to increase the accuracy and effectiveness of item management at the national level, it is required to establish a system for the individual company that has the NCA items, considering the characteristics of each company. In this study, significant companies are classified into more than three types, and the management system of the items subject to the agreement is analyzed. Each company’s item management status has different characteristics depending on its role (position) within the entire nuclear fuel cycle, the type of facility, its possessed items, the main form of national trade, and the frequency of domestic movement. Those differences lead to diversity in the management systems currently owned by each company. For example, from the perspective of nuclear materials, institutions requiring bulk management have systematically organized their management system and obligation code program compared to the ‘item institutions’ that can track batch history for all facility inventory changes. Although Domestic law imposes only the duty of origin management on NMs, fuel manufacturers or research institutes have established their standard obligation codes to manage multiple obligations. The non-nuclear materials and equipment can be easily tracked and controlled by individual items. However, the management of NCA items is a complicated task involving various processes, from importing goods to using, storing, managing inventory change, selling to others, or fulfilling the obligations of AA when exporting. In particular, when the movement of items within a company or international trade occurs frequently, or when the end-users are diverse, the management difficulties increase. So a system that can accurately convey and track items subject to the AA is needed. In addition, since various entities are related, it is necessary to improve understanding of NCA items to increase the system’s utilization and effectiveness. The comparison result and requirement for system improvement based on the review above will be reflected in the history management system for items subject to NCA under development.
The ROK conducts several export procedures, communications in connection with transfers; exchange of information on export plan, shipments, and receipt of nuclear materials, in accordance with bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements (NCA) and Administrative Arrangements (AA) signed with US, Canada, and Australia. Also, the inventory amount of items subject to NCA has reported annually. This study reviewed the export procedures and management methods for spent nuclear fuel subject to NCA. The re-transfer procedures start with obtaining consent from the original exporting country. It is impossible to retransfer nuclear material without consent, whether long-term or individual case-bycase. If the material has multiple obligations, prior consent from all of those countries is required. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the foreign obligated materials correctly. In general, nuclear fuel is subject to multiple obligations of all countries through which the materials have passed during the front-end fuel cycle. Then the new obligations are imposed on those irradiated materials or their by-products after ‘used-in’ or ‘produced through the use of ’ equipment subject to NCA. For example, fuel assemblies manufactured under CANDU fuel fabrication equipment subject to ROK-Canada NCA or burned in nuclear reactors where US equipment is installed have obligations based on Canada or US agreements. In order to impose obligation to irradiated materials, the principle of proportionality is applied as stipulated in each Agreement. According to the AA between US and ROK, nuclear materials used in the equipment transferred under the Agreement and produced through them are differently controlled. After the cycle in the reactor with US-made equipment, uranium in the irradiated fuel is considered a material used in the equipment. So it would be appropriate to apply obligation proportionality according to its origin, regardless the US-made equipment. Meanwhile, the obligation under US NCA is given to the entire amount of produced plutonium in the irradiated fuel. Although the contribution to the production of fuel is to be discussed case-by-case basis in the case of Canadian obligation, applying a similar method is proper. Since the fuel is burned in the form of bundles or assemblies, it is impossible to separate the spent fuel into uranium and plutonium physically. However, as discussed above, to clarify the rights and obligations pursuant to Agreement and ensure accuracy in inventory management, the obligation codes should be imposed on irradiated fuel as not a single item but separated individual substance of materials. Moreover, when an obligation swap occurs for the irradiated fuel, its movement and combustion history should be considered to prevent confusion in confirming multiple obligations and implementing export procedure.
In April 2015, the government of the Republic of Korea and the United States of America signed a new Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA). Subsequently, in April 2016, the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) of the ROK and the Department of Energy (DOE) of the US signed the Administrative Agreement (AA) under the new Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. Accordingly, when Korea imports items subject to the Korea-US agreement, it is required to determine the inventory of imported agreement items and notify the United States of the inventory amount every year. In addition, when re-exporting an agreement item to a third country, prior consent of the original exporting country (USA) must be obtained. Nuclear companies that import items subject to the Korea-US Atomic Energy Cooperation Agreement must report their inventory to the government every year, but the standards and procedures for managing the inventory are not clearly stipulated in the national law. This makes it difficult for the government to verify the adequacy of the report submitted by nuclear companies, adding to the administrative burden on both the government and the companies. Accordingly, it is required for the government to establish and operate a system for history management system for import and export items subject to the agreement so that related information can be recorded and managed at each stage, such as first import of items to Korea, generation, disposal, and exports to third countries. This system provides history management functions such as initial import information record for items imported through import/export procedures according to administrative agreements, change of owned company due to domestic movement, deletion of inventory due to loss/disposal, deletion of inventory due to export or addition of inventory due to derived materials. Through this system, operators can easily manage agreement items, and the government can obtain reliable information on agreement items in close to real-time. In addition, when this system applies to exports of items subject to the agreement, the number of items subject to the agreement exported by Korea can be provided first so that the importing country can more quickly check the items subject to the agreement. It is expected to contribute to securing control of the items subject to the agreement and reducing concerns over nuclear proliferation.
The Nuclear Safety Act defines items defined in nuclear cooperation agreements with each country as internationally regulated materials and requires that import and export procedures be implemented according to each agreement. In particular, the US, Canada, and Australia, which are major nuclear power suppliers, describe detailed procedures related to imports and exports in administrative agreements attached to the agreement. This paper compares and analyzes the import and export procedures of agreed items in the three major countries and proposes procedures and precautions that nuclear companies should follow for smooth import and export. The import/export procedure, according to the annexed administrative agreement, is divided mainly into Direct-transfer, Indirect-transfer, and Re-transfer. Direct transfer refers to direct import and export between countries that have signed an agreement. The four-step process of prior notice, written confirmation, shipment notice, and receipt confirmation is commonly required for direct transfer. However, in the case of Canada, if the previously related information is the same, the shipping notification and receipt confirmation procedure may be omitted. Australia only defines items included in the notification without a separate form in the administrative agreement. Indirect transfer means transferring items originating from the other two countries that signed the agreement through a third country. All three countries stipulate that item transferred by indirect transfer are also subject to the agreement, and Canada stipulates separate advance notifications and shipping notifications for indirect transfer. Australia manages indirect transfers by including information from third countries in the exchange-related information between the two countries. The US does not have a specific procedure for indirect transfer, but it is presumed that it was omitted because it was difficult to confirm the time of shipment when the US exports through a third country. Re-transfer is a procedure to obtain consent from the original exporting country in advance when exporting items held in Korea to a third country. There are two types of consent based on re-transfer, the long-term consent method, and the individual case-by-case method. Long-term consent is a method of long-term consent for re-transfer to an agreed-upon country by agreeing in advance on a list of countries where re-transfer is possible. In the long term, the procedure will be reflected in domestic laws in detail and managed through an IT-based management system so that operators can smoothly implement such complex import and export procedures.
이 연구는 북한 핵위협에 대한 대응과 미래 한반도 통일과정에서 한·미·중 3 개국의 공조체제와 협력구상에 관한 것이다. 북핵문제와 한반도 통일문제에서 한·미·중의 공조와 협력 및 역할과 책임에 있어서 한국은 민족분단의 당사자 이고, 미국은 국제문제의 책임국가이자 북한과는 적대적 미수교국이라는 점이며, 중국은 전통적 사회주의 우호관계의 당사국이자 북한 후견인 당사국이라는 점을 지적할 수 있다. 북한의 핵무기와 탄도미사일 등의 전략무기는 국제적 문제로서 향후 김정은의 돌발적 행동에 대비하기 위해서는 한·미·중 3국의 적극적인 공조와 협력 등 대응방안이 모색되어져야 할 시점이다. 그러나 북핵 문제의 로드맵에 있어서 G2체제의 미국과 중국의 인식과 대응방법은 유엔안 보리결의사항인 대북제재 이행에서 미묘한 차이를 보이고 있다. 미국은 북핵 위협에 대해 한미동맹차원에서 공동위협에 기반한 대북제재와 대북군사력 억제정책을 강력히 추진한 반면, 중국은 북핵위협에 대해 미국의 한반도개입에 대한 안보불안 등으로 북핵해결 과정에서 소극적인 입장을 보이고 있다. 북한 은 체제생존 차원에서 중동국가들과 전략무기 거래를 지속적으로 해 온 전례 국가라는 점에서 세계평화유지 차원에서라도 중단된 6자회담 다자안보 채널 가동 등 압박과 외교협상의 현실적 방안으로 전환해야 한다. 한반도 통일문제 는 남북한 당사자의 문제가 전제되어야 함에도 남북한은 민족적 문제를 강대국에 논리에 편승하려는 기현상을 보이고 있다. 그럼에도 북핵과 남북통일문 제는 민족 당사자문제로서 국제적 지지를 확보하지 못한 북한의 해법보다는 한국주도의 평화적 해법에 더 설득력이 있어 보인다. 하지만 한·미·중은 한반 도 평화정착을 위한 북한에 대한 ‘대북제재’와 ‘북한과의 대화’라는 투트랙 전략을 전방위적으로 강구해 나갈 필요성이 있으며, 북한자체의 경제적 자생력 을 꾸준히 향상시키는 지원노력을 지속적으로 추진해 나가야 한다.
동아시아 지역에서의 원자력 수요는 경제 발전을 뒷받침하기 위해 급격히 증가하고 있다. 9.11 사태 이후 전 세계적으로 핵비확산은 세계적인 현안이 되고 있으며 이와 함께 타 지 역과는 달리 동아시아 지역에서는 향후 10년 후 몇몇 국가들이 원자력을 새로이 도입하려는 움직임이 있다. 이와 같은 현안에 대처하기 위해 공급 확약과 핵비확산을 목적으로 새로운 지역적인 다자간 원자력 협력 체제가 제안되었다. 이러한 새로운 제안은 신뢰성 증진, 자발적 참여 및 동기 부여의 원칙을 바탕으로 하고 있다. 또한 동아시아에서 다자간 체제를 실행하기 위해 단계적인 접근 방법을 제안하고 있다.