중국 중부와 동부에서만 기록되어 있던 Sineugraphe stolidoprocta Boursin (중국쌍검은밤나방 신칭)이 우리나라에서 새로이 발견되었기에 보고한다. 이로서 우리나라에 분포하는 Sineugaph2속 은 4종이 되며, 이들 4종의 생식기특징을 도해하고, 국내외 분포 및 형태적 특징을 논하였다.

농업기술연구소, 임업연구원, 강원대학교 곤충계통분류연구센터, 경상대학교 생물과에 소장된 밤나방과 표본을 공정한 결과 확인된 "Quadrifinaee" (Euteliinae, Sarrothripinae, Chloephorinae, Plusiinae, Catocalinae, Ophiderinae, Hypenodinae, Rivulinae and Hypeninae)에 속하는 한국 미기록종을 24종을 보고한다. 이중 12종은 일본에서만 기록이 있우나, 아시아 내륙에서는 처음 기록된다.

A hyperbolic orbit is expanded in terms of F analogous to the eccentric anomaly of an elliptical orbit: τ p s i n q υ a n d τ p c o s q υ are expressed in terms of F. The true anomaly υ is expressed in terms of F, and F in terms of υ .

A procedure for minimizing the environmental burden and maximizing the efficiency of storage sites used for the final disposal of spent fuel has been proposed. In this procedure, fission products (highly mobile and producing heat) are collected, and uranium and TRU-RE (transuranium-rare earth) oxide are independently stored. The possibility and applicability of radiation measurement for monitoring the nuclear materials effectively throughout the process has been simulated and evaluated. For the simulation, the properties of the chemical processes were analyzed, the major radiation emitters were determined, and the production of nuclear materials by chemical reactions were evaluated. In each process, the content of nuclear material was changed by up to 20% to represent abnormal conditions. The results showed that the plutonium peak was matched with the change in the TRU content and the measured signal was changed linearly with respect to the content change of the plutonium. From the neutron measurement, a linear response of the TRU content variation was obtained. In addition, a logic diagram was developed for the nuclear monitoring. The integration of radiation detections is recommended for monitoring the process effectively and efficiently.

In South Korea, the replacement of steam generators began with Kori Unit 1 in 1995, and to date, 20 steam generators have been replaced and are currently stored in intermediate storage facilities. In the future, additional decommissioned steam generators may arise due to measures like the extension of the lifespan of nuclear power plants. In Korea, technological development for dismantling steam generators is underway, and there is no track record of actual dismantling. Although the replaced decommissioned steam generators are stored in intermediate facilities, for site recycling purposes, steam generators, which have relatively lower radiation doses compared to reactor heads and other primary equipment, should be prioritized for dismantling. While there are various specifications for steam generators, those dismantled and stored domestically are of the Recirculation Type. They can be classified into three types: the Westinghouse type WH-51 used in Kori Unit 1, the Fra-51B used in Han-ul Units 1 and 2, and the OPR-1000 used in Han-ul Units 3 and 4. The quantity of U-Tubes varies depending on the specification, but the radiation is concentrated in the primary side components, the U-Tube and Chamber. Since the parts related to the secondary side are not contaminated, they can be disposed of independently after classification. To dismantle a steam generator, it is of utmost importance to first create a scenario regarding where and how the dismantling will take place. Through the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of each scenario, the optimal timing, location, and cutting method for dismantling should be researched. Furthermore, based on those findings, the best scenario should be derived through an analysis of worker radiation exposure and dismantling costs. To achieve this, a 3D simulation software developed by Cyclelife Digital Solutions under the French EDF was utilized to conduct simulations based on different dismantling schedules and methods. As a result, the optimal scenario for dismantling the steam generator was derived.

Derived Concentration Guideline Levels (DCGLs), which represent the residual radioactivity concentration limits, serve as the pivotal criteria for decontamination during decommissioning of nuclear power plants and are essential for license termination. The analysis of radionuclides in various media to check site-specific and radionuclide-specific DCGLs is a resource-intensive and time-consuming processes, and there are some radionuclides that are hard to analyze. In the decommissioning of the Rancho Seco nuclear power plant in the United States, a conservative approach was adopted. Potentially highly contaminated areas on the site were identified by collecting and analyzing soil samples, and radionuclides exceeding the Minimum Detectable Concentration (MDC) were selected as the potential Radionuclide of Concern (ROC), and surrogate DCGLs for hard-to-detect radionuclides were applied to soil samples. For soil samples in the Rancho Seco nuclear power plant, Cs-137 contributed more than 90% of the total radioactivity. DCGLs of the ROC were obtained using the scaling factors through analysis of Cs- 137 for a large amount of soil samples. In Korea, the scaling factor methodology has not been applied to the decommissioning of commercial nuclear power plants. An initial investigation was undertaken to assess the viability of implementing Surrogate Derived Concentration Guideline Levels (DCGLs) in the dismantling of Kori Unit 1, drawing insights from the U.S. nuclear power plant decommissioning experiences. To do this approach, the concentration ratio of radionuclides of interest to key radionuclide in contaminated soil should be known and consistent. But related information is not available at this time. So Surrogate DCGL for representative C-14, Fe-55, Ni-59, Ni-63, and Sr-90 was obtained using the scaling factors applied to radioactive waste data, specifically Decontaminated Aqueous Waste (DAW) and Spent Resin. In order to develop a reliable surrogate DCGLs the Kori Unit 1 site, it is important to analyze the radionuclides in the soil for the Kori Unit 1 decommissioning site to obtain consistent concentration ratio of the radionuclides of concern to the key radionuclides. When a the suitable DCGL is developed, it can be used for FSS planning and prior decision-making ensuring the safe and effective decommissioning of Kori Unit 1 and similar nuclear power plants.

Nuclear safety, security, and safeguards (nuclear 3S) are essential components for establishing robust nuclear environments. Nuclear safety is to protect public and environments from radioactive contamination, which can be caused in accidents. Nuclear security is to protect nuclear facilities from terrorism or sabotage, which related to physical a ttacks or insider threats. And nuclear safeguards is to protect nuclear materials from extortion by a state with a purpose of weaponizing activities. When a new nuclear facility is introduced, it is possible to save abundant amount of resources by considering nuclear 3S in an early stage (design phases). Initially, the international atomic energy agency (IAEA) recommended safeguards-by-design (SBD) approach. The concept of SBD gradually expands to nuclear 3S-by-design (3SBD). Though there are differences in purpose and target subject, each nuclear ‘S’ is closely related with others. When introducing a certain technology or equipment in order to enhance one ‘S’, another ‘S’ also get affected. The effect can be synergies or conflicts. For instance, confidential information in nuclear security is required for a safeguards activity. On the contrary, inspection equipment for safeguards can be used for security. Pyroprocessing is a technology for managing used nuclear fuels. As pyroprocessing is a backend fuel cycle technology, a sensitive nuclear technology, safeguards has taken a large portion of nuclear 3S research in an effort to achieve international credibility and nuclear transparency. As mentioned, there are both synergies and conflicts in integrating nuclear 3S. In this study, we investigate potential challenges in applying nuclear 3S integration to pyroprocessing by addressing synergies and conflicts. This approach will suggest required supplementary methods to build the reliable pyroprocessing environment.

Neutron resonance transmission technique was applied for assaying isotopic fissile materials produced in the pyro-process. In each process of the pyro-process, a different composition of the fissile material is produced. Simulation was basically performed on 235U and 239Pu assay for TRU-RE product, hull waste, and uranium addition. The resonance energies were evaluated for uranium and plutonium in the simulation, and the linearity in the detection response was examined on the fissile content variation. The linear resonance energies were determined for the analysis of 235U and 239Pu on the different fissile materials. For enriched TRU-RE assay, the sample condition was suggested; The sample density, content, and thickness are the key factors to obtain accurate fissile content. The detection signal is discriminated for uranium and plutonium in neutron resonance technique. The transmitted signal for fissile resonance has a direct relation with the content of fissile. The simulation results indicated that the neutron resonance technique is promising to analyze 235U and 239Pu for various types of the pyro-process material. An accurate fissile assay will contribute toward safeguarding the pyro-processing system.

This study presents a methodology to determine the radionuclides of concern that are expected to be found during the final status survey of Kori Unit 1 decommissioning. The methodology involved reflecting the evaluation results of ORIGEN based on reference documents such as NUREG/CR-3474, NUREG/CR-4289, NUREG/CR-0130, WINCO-1191, and representative fuel loading. A list of potential radionuclides of concern was provided by reflecting the list of radionuclides of concern included in the Kori Unit 1 decommissioning plan. To select the radionuclides of concern, we analyzed the approach of US decommissioning plants based on the recommendations of NUREG-1757 Vol.2 Rev.1 and excluded certain radionuclides from the list. The final list of 23 radionuclides of concern was derived by excluding radionuclides that have a short half-life, low specific activity, analytically difficult to measure, inert gases, or naturally occurring radionuclides. This methodology can be applied to other nuclear power plants, such as the Wolsong Nuclear Power Plant, by reflecting the unique characteristics of the reactor.

As the decommissioning of nuclear power plants progresses, interest in the inevitably generated radioactive waste is also increasing. Especially, because the containers of ILW packages are significantly more expensive than the containers of LLW packages, the special attention should be focused on minimizing the number of the containers of ILW packages. The radiation dose limit for packaging of ILW shall not exceed 2 mSv/h and 0.1 mSv/h on contact and at 2 m, respectively in South Korea. Meanwhile, The DEMplus provides various environmental geometry and all properties such as materials, absorptions, and reflections and the estimation of the radiation dose rates is based on the radiation interactions of the designed 3D geometry model. With the consideration of the radiation dose rate by using DEMplus and its strategy of packaging and cutting plan, the number of containers for ILW packages generated from decommissioning of Reactor Vessel Internal (RVI) of a nuclear power plant that has been in operation for decades was optimized in this paper. The modular shielded containers (MSC) with shielding inserted were used for radioactive wastes that require shielded packaging. In order to verify the accuracy of the estimated radiation dose rate by using DEMplus, the estimated results were compared with those obtained using MicroShield. The trends of the estimated radiation dose rates using DEMplus and the estimation of MicroShield were similar to each other. The results of this study demonstrated the feasibility of using DEMplus as a means of estimating the radiation dose limit in packaging plan of the radioactive waste.

Al-B4C neutron absorbers are currently widely used to maintain the subcriticality of both wet and dry storage facilities of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), thus long-term and high-temperature material integrity of the absorbers has to be guaranteed for the expected operation periods of those facilities. Surface corrosion solely has been the main issue for the absorber performance and safety; however, the possibility of irradiation-assisted degradation has been recently suggested from an investigation on Al-B4C surveillance coupons used in a Korean spent nuclear fuel pool (SFP). Larger radiation damage than expectation was speculated to be induced from 10B(n, α)7Li reactions, which emit about a MeV α-particles and Li ions. In this study, we experimentally emulated the radiation damage accumulated in an Al-B4C neutron absorber utilizing heavy-ion accelerator. The absorber specimens were irradiated with He ions at various estimated system temperatures for a model SNF storage facility (room temperature, 150, 270, and 400°C). Through the in-situ heated ion irradiation, three exponentially increasing level of radiation damages (0.01, 0.1, and 1 dpa or displacement per atom) were achieved to compare differential gas bubble formation at near surface of the absorber, which could cause premature absorber corrosion and subsequential 10B loss in an SNF storage system. An extremely high radiation damage (10 dpa), which is unlikely achievable during a dry storage period, was also emulated through high temperature irradiation (350°C) to further test the radiation resistance of the absorber, conservatively. The irradiated specimens were characterized using HR-TEM and the average size and number density of radiation-induced He bubbles were measured from the obtained bright field (BF) TEM micrographs. Measured helium bubble sizes tend to increase with increasing system (or irradiation) temperature while decrease in their number density. Helium bubbles were found from even the lowest radiation damage specimens (0.01 dpa). Bubble coalescence was significant at grain boundaries and the irradiated specimen morphology was particularly similar with the bubble morphology observed at the interface between aluminum alloy matrix and B4C particle of the surveillance coupons. These characterized irradiated specimens will be used for the corrosion test with high-temperature humid gas to further study the irradiation-assisted degradation mechanism of the absorber in dry SNF storage system.

As the use of nuclear energy has been expanded, issues in a spent nuclear fuel management are raised. Several methods have been proposed and developed to manage spent fuels safely and efficiently. One method is to reduce environmental burden in disposal of spent fuels by decreasing volume of high-level waste. A nuclides management process (NMP) is one example. Through this novel process, it is able to separate highly mobile nuclides (ex. iodine, krypton), high thermal emission nuclides (ex. strontium, barium), and optionally, uranium from spent fuels. Since the NMP is a back-end fuel cycle technology, a reliable safeguards system should be employed in the facility. As international atomic energy agency (IAEA) recommends safeguards-by-design (SBD), it is desirable to investigate an appropriate safeguards approach at a step of technology development. Process monitoring (PM) is a complemental safeguards technology for traditional safeguards technologies which based on mass balance. PM traces nuclear materials indirectly but consecutively by using process parameters such as temperature, pressure, and flow of fluid. These parameters are obtainable by installing appropriate sensors. In a respect of SBD, PM is a promising approach to achieve the safeguards goal, the timely detection of diversion of a nuclear material. However, it is necessary to classify useful process parameters from all available signals which provided from PM in order to properly utilize PM. In this study, we investigated application methods of the PM approach to NMP. NMP consists of several unit processes in series. Firstly, we inspected a principle and a feature of each unit process. Based on the results, we evaluated applicability of the PM approach to each unit process according to effectiveness in enhancing safeguardability. Several unit processes were expected that their safeguards are able to be enhanced by using certain process parameters from PM.