During the operation of the nuclear power plant, various radioactive waste are generated. The spent resin, boron concentrates, and DAW are classified as a generic radioactive waste. They are treated and stored at radioactive waste building. In the reactor vessel, different types of radioactive waste are generated. Since the materials used in reactor core region exposed to high concentration of neutrons, they exhibit higher level of surface dose rate and specific activity. And they are usually stored in spent fuel pool with spent fuel. Various non-fuel radioactive wastes are stored in spent fuel pool, which are skeleton, control rod assembly, burnable neutron absorber, neutron source, in core detector, etc. The skeleton is composed of stainless 304 and Inconel-718. There are two types of control rod assembly, that are WH type and OPR type. The WH type control rod is composed of Ag-In-Cd composites. The OPR type control rod is composed of B4C and Inconel-625. In this paper, the characteristics and storage status of the non-fuel radioactive waste will be reported. Also, the management strategy for the various non-fuel radioactive waste will be discussed.

The segmentation of activated components is considered as a one of the most important processes in decommissioning. The activated components, such as reactor vessel and reactor vessel internals, are exposed to neutron from the nuclear fuel and classified to intermediate, low, and very low-level wastes. As it is expected, the components, which are closed to nuclear fuel, exhibit higher degree of specific activity. After the materials were exposed to neutrons, their original elements transform to other nuclides. The primary nuclides in activated stainless steel are 55Fe, 63,59Ni, 60Co, 54Mn, etc. The previous study indicates that the specific activity of individual nuclide is strongly depends on the material compositions and impurities of the original materials. The 59Co is the one of the most important impurities in stainless steel and carbon steel. In this paper, the relationship between individual nuclides in activation analysis of activated components was studied. The systematic study on specific activity of primary nuclides will be discussed in this paper to understand the activation tendency of the components.

Dry active waste (DAW) contains substantial amount of cellulose related materials. The DAW are usually classified as low and/or very low-level waste. In Korea, three types of disposal facilities have been considered: silo, engineering barrier, and land-fill. Currently, only the silo type disposal facility is in operation. Around 27 thousand drums were disposed in silo. Massive amount of cement concrete is used in construction of silo. The ground waste, which flow through the concrete structure, shows higher pH than as it is. It is generally known that the pH of silo is ~12.47 in Korea, when considering construction material, filling material, and property of ground water. It is expected that the cellulose in DAW will be partially transformed to isosaccharinic acid (ISA). It is generally accepted that the ISA plays a negative role in safety analysis of disposal facility by stimulation of specific nuclides. Various factors affect the degradation of cellulose containing radioactive waste, such as degree of polymerization, pH of disposal condition, interaction between concrete structure and ground water, etc. In this paper, the disposal safety analysis of cellulose containing radioactive, usually paper, cotton, wood, etc., are studied. The degradation of cellulose with respect to degree of polymerization, pH of neighboring water, filling material of silo, etc. are reviewed. Based on the review results, it is reasonable to conclude that the substantial amount of DAW could be disposed in silo.

Metal waste generated during the dismantling of a nuclear power plant can be contaminated with radionuclides. In general, the internal structure is very complex. Thus, metal waste requires various cutting processes. When metal waste is cut, aerosols are generated. Aerosols are generally various particles of very small size suspended in the working area and remain for a considerable period. This may cause internal exposure of workers due to inhalation of radioactive aerosols generated when cutting radioactive metal waste. This study investigated various cutting processes and the size distribution of aerosols generated during the cutting process. The cutting process is normally classified into thermal cutting, mechanical cutting, and laser cutting. Thermal cutting includes plasma, flame, and oxygen cutting. Mechanical cutting includes mechanical saws, cutters, nibblers, and abrasive water jets. Stainless steel, carbon steel, aluminum, and copper are commonly used as cutting materials in nuclear power plants. The size of the aerosol generated from cutting showed a very diverse distribution depending on the cutting methods and cutting materials. In general, aerosol size is distributed within 0.1-1 μm. This size distribution is different from the 5 μm aerosol size suggested by the ICRP Publication 66 Lung model. These results show that it is necessary to conduct further studies on the size of aerosols generated when decommissioning nuclear power plants.

Transport packages have been developed to transport the decommissioning waste from the nuclear power plant. The packages are classified with Type IP-2 package. The IAEA requirements for Type IP-2 packages include that a free drop test should be performed for normal conditions of transport. In this study, drop tests of the packages were performed to prove the structural integrity and to verify the reliability of the analysis results by comparing the test and analysis results. Half-scale models were used for the drop tests and drop position was considered as 0.3 m oblique drop on packages weighing more than 15 tons. The strain and impact acceleration data were obtained to verify the reliability of the analysis results. Before and after the drop tests, radiation shielding tests were performed to confirm that the dose rate increase was within 20% at the external surface of the package. Also, measurement of bolt torque, and visual inspection were performed to confirm the loss or dispersion of the radioactive contents. After each drop test, slight deformations occurred in some packages. However, there was no loss of pretension in the lid bolts and the shielding thickness was not reduced for metal shields. In the package with concrete shield, the surface dose rate did not increase and there was no cracks or damage to the concrete. Therefore, the transport packages met the legal requirements (no more than a 20% increase of radiation level and no loss or dispersion of radioactive contents). Safety verifications were performed using the measured strain and acceleration data from the test, and the appropriate conservatism for the analysis results and the validity of the analysis model were confirmed. Therefore, it was found that the structural integrity of the packages was maintained under the drop test conditions. The results of this study were used as design data of the transport packages, and the packages will be used in the NPP decommissioning project in the future.

Bentonite is a potential buffer material of multi-barrier systems in high-level radioactive wastes repository. Montmorillonite, the main constituent of the bentonite, is 2:1 type aluminosilicate clay mineral with high swelling capacity and low permeability. Montmorillonite alteration under alkaline and saline conditions may affect the physico-chemical properties of the bentonite buffer. In this study, montmorillonite alteration by interaction with synthetic alkaline and saline solution and its retention capacity for cesium and iodide were investigated. The experiments were performed in three different batches (Milli-Q water, alkaline water, and saline water) doped with cesium and iodide for 7 days. Alteration characteristics and nuclide retention capacity of original- and reacted bentonite was analyzed by X-ray diffraction (XRD), Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR) spectroscopy, Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM), Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR) and Cation Exchange Capacity (CEC) analysis. From the results, cesium retention occurred differently depending on the presence of competing ions such as K, Na, and Mg ions in synthetic solutions, while iodide was negligibly removed by bentonite. Montmorillonite alteration mainly occurred as cation exchange and zeolite minerals such as merlinoite and mordenite were new-formed during alkaline alteration of the montmorillonite. CEC value of reacted bentonite increased by formation of the zeolite minerals under alkaline conditions.

Currently, there are 25 nuclear power plants (NPPs) in operation in Korea, including 22 pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and three pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs). Two NPPs, including Kori Unit 1 and Wolsong Unit 1, are permanently shut down and awaiting decommissioning. If Kori Unit 2, which is expected to be permanently shut down soon, is included, the number of decommissioning NPPs will be increased to three. Spent fuels (SFs) are continuously generated during the NPP operation, which are stored in an SF storage pool in NPPs to cool down the decay heat emitted from SFs. For safe NPP operation, SFs must be regarded as waste, and a disposal site must be selected to isolate SFs. However, an appropriate site has yet to be selected in Korea. SFs contain long-lived nuclides with a high specific activity. For disposal, it is important to characterize the nuclides in the fuels and delay the migration of the nuclides to the environment when SFs are placed in a future disposal facility. If the disposal container is broken, the nuclides in the fuels escape from the filling material, such as bentonite. These escaped nuclides are dissolved in groundwater and migrate to the surface of the earth. Thus, it is possible to assess the radiological impact, such as the exposure dose during and after the disposal, if the types and characteristics of nuclides in SFs are known. This study investigated the nuclides in SFs and identified exposure scenarios that may occur in the disposal process of SFs and migration characteristics when the nuclides leak into groundwater to propose a dose assessment methodology for workers and the public.

The Korea Laboratory Accreditation Scheme (KOLAS) is the national accreditation body responsible for providing accreditation services to testing and calibration laboratories. The primary objective of KOLAS is to promote the quality and reliability of laboratory testing by providing nationally and internationally recognized accreditation services. Laboratories accredited by KOLAS are required to meet rigorous international standards set by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and are subject to regular assessments to ensure ongoing compliance with the standards. KOLAS accreditation is highly regarded both domestically and internationally, and is recognized for providing high-quality and reliable testing services. The nuclear analysis laboratory at KINAC has been working to establish a quality management system to ensure the external reliability of analytical results and to secure its position as an authorized testing agency. To achieve this, a detailed manual and procedure for nuclear material analysis were developed to conform to the international standards of ISO/IEC 17025. This study presents the preparation process for establishing the management system, focusing on meeting technical and quality requirements for the implementation of the ISO/IEC 17025 standard in the KINAC nuclear analysis laboratory, specifically in the field of chemical testing (dosimetry, radioactive, and neutron measurement subcategories). The preparation process involved two tracks. The first track focused on satisfying technical requirements, with Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometer (TIMS) and Inductively Coupled Plasma-Mass Spectrometer (ICP-MS) selected as the major equipment for analysis. Analytical methods for determining isotope ratios and concentrations of nuclear materials were determined, and technical qualification was ensured through participation in proficiency test programs, inter-experimenter comparison tests, and uncertainty reports. The second track focused on developing the quality system, including quality manuals, procedures, and guidelines based on the requirements of the ISO/IEC 17025 standard. Various implementation documents were produced during the six-month pilot period, in accordance with the three levels of documents required by the standard. Implementation of ISO/IEC 17025 is expected to have a systematic quality management process for the analysis lab’s operations and to increase confidence in KINAC’s nuclear analysis.

The domestic representative nuclear fuel cycle facilities are post-irradiation examination facility (PIEF) and Irradiated Examination Facility (IMEF) at KAERI. They have regularly operated since 1991 and 1993, respectively. Due to the long period of use, the facilities are ageing, and maintenance costs are increasing every year. The maintenance methods have mainly been breakdown maintenance (BM) and partially preventive maintenance (PM). They involve replacing components that have problems through periodic inspections by on-site inspectors. However, these methods are not only uncertain in terms of replacement cycles due to worker’s deviation on the inspection results, but also make it difficult to respond accidents developed through failures on the critical equipment that confines radioactive material. Therefore, an advanced operation and maintenance studied in 2022 through all of nuclear facilities operated at KAERI. Advancement strategy in four categories (safety, sustainability, performance, innovativeness) was analyzed and their priorities according to a facility environment were determined so a roadmap for advanced operation and maintenance could be developed. The safety and sustainability are higher importance than the performance and innovativeness because facilities at KAERI has an emphasis on research and development rather than industrial production. Thus, strategy for advancement has focused even more on strengthening the safety and sustainability. To enhance safety, it has been identified that immediate improvement of aged structures, systems, and components (SSCs) through large-scale replacement is necessary, while consideration of implementing an ageing management program (AMP) in the medium to long term is also required. Facility sustainability requires strengthening operation expertise through training, education, and cultivation of specialized personnel for each system, and addressing outstanding regulatory issues such as approval of radiation environment report on the nuclear fuel processing facilities and improvement work according to fire hazard analysis. One of the safety enhancement methods, AMP, is a new maintenance approach that has not been previously applied, so it had to be thoroughly examined. In this study, an analysis was conducted on the procedure and method for introducing an AMP. An AMP for nuclear fuel cycle facilities was developed by analyzing the AMP applied to the BR2 research reactor in Belgium and modifying it for application to nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The ageing management for BR2 has the objective to maintain safety, availability and cost efficiency and three-step process. The first step is the classification of SSCs into four classes to apply graded approach. Secondly, ageing risk is assessed to identify critical failure modes, their frequency and precursors. Final step involves defining measures to reduce the ageing risk to an acceptable level in order to integrate the physical and economic aspects of ageing into a strategy for inspection, repair, and replacement. Similar approach was applied to the nuclear fuel cycle facility. Firstly, the SSCs of nuclear fuel cycle facilities have been classified according to their safety and quality classifications, as well as whether they are part of the confinement boundary. The SSCs involved in the confinement boundary were given more weight in the classification process, even if they are not classified as safety-class. A risk index for ageing was introduced to determine which prevention and mitigation measure should be chosen. By multiplying the health index and the impact index, the ageing risk matrix provides a numerical score that represents guidance on the prevention and mitigation of ageing effect. The health index is determined by combining the likelihood of failure and engineering evaluation of the current condition of SSCs, whereas the impact index is calculated by taking into account the severity of consequences and the duration of downtime resulting from a failure. This ageing management has to be thoroughly reviewed and modified to suit each facility before being applied to nuclear fuel cycle facilities.