In this paper we present an analytical model that studies the strategic role of fake media content in a media market. We first find the conditions under which a monopoly media platform would publish fake media content. Then we show that certain opposite patterns exist in a competitive environment. Our results suggest that media platforms may find optimal profitability in publishing apparently less credible fake media content if the fake content can resolve consumers' cognitive dissonance. We find the exact equilibrium conditions under which both the platforms in a duopoly setting will find publishing fake media content as the optimal strategy. Additionally, we show that under specific conditions both platforms publishing fake media content can turn out to be a Prisoner's dilemma equilibrium. We also compute the relevant consumer surplus. Lastly, we use experiments to validate some of the results established by the analytical model.

While the relationship between market orientation and new product performance has been extensively investigated, the mechanism by which market orientation contributes to new product performance was further studied in a business-to-business context. We developed a set of alternative research models to examine the roles of timing of entry and positional advantage in the market orientation—new product performance relationship. The results showed that industrial firms’ positional advantage is a key step in the process. Market orientation does not directly influence new product performance. Instead, market orientation helps to establish a firms’ positional advantage, which, in turn, positively influences new product performance in the marketplace. Timing of entry, shown to be an outcome of positional advantage, is not a determinant of new product performance in the business-to-business context. The findings revealed that market-oriented firms achieve superior new product performance through thoughtfulness indicated by a well-defined positioning strategy, not rapidity of action.