The Agency needs to maintain a solid and reliable foundation for recruited inspectors by providing practical training at commercial nuclear power plants. The Comprehensive Inspection Exercise (CIE) is a basic training which consists of a simulation of a Design Information Verification (DIV) Visit, a Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) at a nuclear power plant, including Complementary Access. The basic curriculum includes a pre-course session, auditing exercises, fresh fuel (bundles and assemblies) measurements, spent fuel (bundles and assemblies) measurements, verification of design features, as well as nuclear material flow. ROK has been holding the lightwater reactor (LWR) / heavy-water reactor (CANDU) training course (CIE) from 2010 every year with about 2 weeks curriculum through MSSP (Member State Support Program). LWR and CANDU are operated by KHNP. To efficiently carry out the safeguards, IAEA receives the contribution through the ROK support program and implement R&D for the nuclear material inspection. ROK has been supporting and contributing total 22 tasks to IAEA in-cash and in-kind. Among them, this training provides for a course on safeguards verification activities at CANDU and LWR facilities. This course offers inspectors a unique opportunity to understand diversion scenarios and to familiarize themselves with instruments specifically used at CANDU and LWR facilities (OFPS and DCVD), as well as spent fuel dry storage transfer verification activities and dry storage dual sealing arrangements. KINAC performs PoC (Point of Contact) on behalf of NSSC and coordinates work between IAEA and KHNP. Additionally, KINAC first discusses with KHNP that can host light-water reactors and heavy-water reactors with KHNP at the beginning of each year. In order to hold a successful training, ROK plans and carries out a lot of process including agenda, accommodation, equipment movement, logistics and so on in consultation with the IAEA and facilities.

Since 2015, the IAEA has been implementing inspections by changing the paradigm from a nuclear facility level perspective to state level approach in order to enhance effectiveness/efficiency, and random inspections have become a major means of paradigm conversion. From this point of view, Safeguards Division analyzed the implementation status of random inspection conducted in ROK over the past five years by type, facility, and year, and predict the future implementation direction. A total of 106 random inspections have been implemented in ROK over the past five years (2017- 2021). When classified by random inspection type, 20 Short Notice Random Inspections (SNRI), 9 Short Notice Inspections (SNI), 34 Unannounced Inspections (UI), and 43 Random Interim Inspections (RII) were performed, of which RII accounted for the largest proportion with about 40.6%. IAEA conducts customized random inspections according to the characteristics of each nuclear facility. In the past five years, 34 cases of LWR, 20 cases of Bulk Handling Facility, 22 cases of CANDU, 30 cases of random inspections were implemented at R&D facilities, with the largest proportion of LWR. In connection with this, as a result of analyzing the current status of random inspections by year, 19 cases in 2017, 21 cases in 2018, 20 cases in 2019, 19 cases in 2020, and 27 cases in 2021 were implemented, especially in 2021, an increase of about 40% compared to the previous year. In conclusion, the IAEA is increasing the proportion of random inspections every year in line with the updated SLA, and this stance is expected to be maintained in the future. This can be seen as proof that randomized tests are showing an increasing trend even in the COVID-19 pandemic situation that has occurred since December 2019. and, In the case of LWR, it is expected that the form of random inspection may vary depending on the direction of IAEA’s SLA improvement. Through these analyses, it is expected that the direction of future safeguards policy can be established.

Kori unit 1, Korea’s first light-water nuclear power plant, was permanently shut down in June 2017. The operator, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. (KHNP), submitted a final dismantling plan for Kori unit 1 to the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) in May 2021. Pursuant to this procedure, the NSSC is preparing regulations for the decommissioning stage of large nuclear facilities for the first time in the Republic of Korea. The Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control (KINAC) is also considering applying regulations on safeguards. Moreover, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed the “International Safeguards Guidelines for Nuclear Facilities under Decommissioning” in 2021. The guidelines describe the detailed application of safeguards measures to be considered when decommissioning nuclear facilities, dismantling essential equipment, and providing relevant information to the IAEA, as well as the scope of IAEA inspections. In addition, Dr. R. Bari of the Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) proposed the Facility Safeguardability Assessment (FSA), a methodology that reflects facility characteristics from the design stage to ensure that designers, national regulators, and the IAEA communicate smoothly regarding safeguards measures. The FSA process derives expected problems with safeguards measures considering new nuclear facilities by analyzing the gap of safeguards measures applied to existing similar nuclear facilities. This study uses the existing FSA methodology to predict problems related to safeguards measures when decommissioning nuclear facilities and to analyze deviations from safeguards measure requirements according to IAEA guidelines. To this end, the reference facility is set as an operating pressurized light water reactor; the issues with the safeguards measures are summarized using the FSA Process; and a draft safeguards concept for nuclear facilities under decommissioning is designed. Furthermore, validity is confirmed through a simple analysis of the diversion path, and implications and lessons are derived. Through this, it is possible to anticipate new safeguards measures to be applied when decommissioning nuclear facilities in the Republic of Korea and review problems and considerations in advance.

The purpose of the present research is to verify the design characteristics of the SMART facility for the application of the IAEA’s safeguards-by-design (SBD) concept to small modular reactor (SMR) and to establish a foundation for SBD to be faithfully implemented as early as possible from the design stage. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is planning to facilitate the verification activities of inspectors by developing a safeguards approach to the reactor as early as possible and preparing a safeguards technical report (STR) before commercial operation of SMR begins. To this end, the IAEA is developing various approaches to the application of SBD to SMR with countries such as Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, China, the United States, and Canada through the Member State Support Program (MSSP). In order to review the unique design information of SMART facilities, the only deployable SMR in Korea, and to establish safeguards from the early design stages of SMART, it is necessary to carry out the task through cooperation with the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) and Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC). IAEA agreed with the KINAC and KAERI to the direction of the project and to prepare both the Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and the Safeguards Technical Report (STR) for SMART facilities sequentially. The DIQ is a collection of questions to understand the characteristics of the reactor facilities that must be considered in applying safeguards. The STR is a document referenced by IAEA inspectors when verifying safeguards. Those draft versions were prepared and submitted to the IAEA. After review opinions were received, additional revision was conducted. In 2022, the IAEA holds the consultancy meeting on SBD for SMART. The purpose of the meeting is to review the draft DIQ and STR prepared by designers and discuss the future work plan of the task with designer and the task point of contact in order to safeguards can be considered at the early stage of the design. The results will be beneficial to the efficient safeguards verification activities of IAEA inspectors in the future.

Since 2017, the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) has been implementing State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC) training courses for the nuclear Newcomer States. This IAEA SSAC course for Newcomer States aims to provide overall concepts and techniques, particularly on nuclear material accountancy and control systems, and address future challenges with regard to developing new nuclear power plants. Due to the restricted travels and limited in-person access to training and facilities from the COVID-19 pandemic, however, a new software was developed to substitute a technical tour on bulk handling facility (BHF) of the training course, and the course was favorably shifted to online in 2021. This newly built training software allows participants to follow each step of the technical process at a virtual bulk handing facility, and provides a video tour for such conditions where the software is found difficult to operate. Another feature of the development is a security function that prevents access of unauthorized users to the software. The achievement is expected to strengthen the SSAC of Newcomer States and ensure the practical implementation of safeguards from the initial stage of their novel nuclear power program through cooperation with IAEA. This contribution of the Republic of Korea (ROK) as one of the leading countries in the field of nuclear nonproliferation will further extend the partnership between IAEA and ROK and promote cooperation with the Newcomer States.

IAEA, in preparation for possible commercial operation of small modular reactors (SMR), is pursuing the early development of safeguards approaches for these reactors along with the publication of the safeguards technical report (STR) to make verification activities easier for inspectors. For this purpose, the IAEA, through the MSSP, is developing various approaches for the application of safeguards by design for SMRs in collaboration with five countries that along with the ROK includes Russia, China, and U.S. etc. In order to review the specific design information of the ROK’s only SMR facility, SMART, and to establish safeguards methods from the initial design stage, collaborations were made with the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, which researched and developed the SMART. As a result, the design information questionnaire (DIQ) and STR was created and sent to the IAEA. The DIQ is a collection of crucial questions regarding the application of safeguards to understand the characteristics of the reactor facility, and STR is a document referred to by IAEA inspectors during safeguards verification activities. The main contents of the STR consist of introduction, technological description of SMR, safeguards approach, conclusions and annexes. Through this study, it is anticipated to understand the technical requirements for safeguards implementation of SMRs in the design stage, and through the completion of the final report applying SBD with regards to the design of the SMART facility, it could be used as information material for future safeguard verification activities by IAEA inspectors.

MSSP means Member State Support Program, which is the program of the member state supporting IAEA. To efficiently carry out the safeguards, IAEA receives the support of the member states through this program and carries out R&D for the nuclear material inspection equipment, etc. ROK has been supporting and contributing total 21 tasks to IAEA in-cash and in-kind. These tasks consist of training, safeguards approaches, Analysis Support and NWAL Coordination, information analysis, Safeguards Information Systems and System Usability. ROK support program that consisted mainly of hosting IAEA inspector training courses was not active in 2021 due to COVID-19. So, through the project called “online course development consultation”, we developed e-learning module (titled “Introduction to Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements following the model text of INFCIRC/153 (corr.) related to State reporting obligations”) to provide continuous support for IAEA’s non-face-to-face safeguards activities in the current pandemic situation. We developed this module that is HTML5+MP4-based SCORM type to provide services for both PCs and smart phones. In conclusion, The ROK has differed in its form of support from previous years by developing e-learning modules for IAEA trainings and thus contributed towards IAEA’s international collaborative system to enhance its safeguards capability and this has enhanced the ROK’s status in the IAEA.